

Registered (Inner-Product) Functional Encryption

Danilo Francati¹, Daniele Friolo², Monosij Maitra^{3,4**}, Giulio Malavolta³, Ahmadreza Rahimi³, and Daniele Venturi²

¹ Aarhus University

dfrancati@cs.au.dk

² Sapienza University of Rome

friolo@di.uniroma1.it

venturi@di.uniroma1.it

³ Ruhr-Universität Bochum

monosij.maitra@rub.de

⁴ Max-Planck Institute for Security and Privacy

giulio.malavolta@hotmail.it

ahmadrezar@pm.me

Abstract. Registered encryption (Garg *et al.*, TCC'18) is an emerging paradigm that tackles the key-escrow problem associated with identity-based encryption by replacing the private-key generator with a much weaker entity known as the key curator. The key curator holds no secret information, and is responsible to: (i) update the master public key whenever a new user registers its own public key to the system; (ii) provide helper decryption keys to the users already registered in the system, in order to still enable them to decrypt after new users join the system. For practical purposes, tasks (i) and (ii) need to be efficient, in the sense that the size of the public parameters, of the master public key, and of the helper decryption keys, as well as the running times for key generation and user registration, and the number of updates, must be small.

In this paper, we generalize the notion of registered encryption to the setting of functional encryption (FE). As our main contribution, we show an efficient construction of registered FE for the special case of (*attribute hiding*) inner-product predicates, built over asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order. Our scheme supports a *large* attribute universe and is proven secure in the bilinear generic group model. We also implement our scheme and experimentally demonstrate the efficiency requirements of the registered settings. Our second contribution is a feasibility result where we build registered FE for P/poly based on indistinguishability obfuscation and somewhere statistically binding hash functions.

Keywords: Registered encryption; functional encryption, inner-product predicate encryption.

** Research conducted partially at Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany.

1 Introduction

Functional encryption (FE) [SW05, O’N10, BSW11] enriches standard public-key encryption with fine-grained access control over encrypted data. This added feature is made possible by having a so-called master secret key msk that can be used (by an authority) to generate decryption keys sk_f associated with functions f , in such a way that decrypting any ciphertext c , corresponding to a plaintext m , reveals $f(m)$ and nothing more. Recent years have seen a flourish of works exploring FE constructions in various settings and from different assumptions [GGH⁺13, SW14, GGHZ16, GKP⁺13, BGG⁺14, ABSV15, GLSW15, Lin16, AS17, AJL⁺19, Agr19, JLMS19, JLS21, BDGM20, WW21, GP21, BDGM22, GJLS21, JLS22, GVW12, AV19, AMVY21, AKM⁺22], and its applications to building powerful cryptographic tools such as reusable garbled circuits [GKP⁺13], adaptive garbling [HJO⁺16], multi-party non-interactive key exchange [GPSZ17], universal samplers [GPSZ17], verifiable random functions [GHKW17, Bit20], and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [BV15, AJ15] (which, in turn, implies a plethora of other cryptographic primitives [SW14]).

An important limitation of FE is the well-known *key escrow* problem: the authority holding the master secret key (sometimes referred to as the private key generator – PKG) can generate secret keys for any function, allowing it to arbitrarily decrypt messages intended for specific recipients. This requires a fully trusted PKG which severely restricts the applicability of FE in many scenarios.

Registered Encryption. A recent line of research proposes to tackle the key-escrow problem in the much simpler case of identity-based encryption⁵ (IBE) [Sha84]. This led to the notion of *registered* IBE (RIBE) [GHMR18]⁶, where the main idea is to replace the PKG with a much weaker entity called the key curator (KC), whose role is to register the public keys of the users (without possessing any secret key). In particular, in a RIBE scheme there is an initial setup phase in which a common reference string (CRS) is sampled. The CRS is given to the KC which publishes an (initially empty) master public key. Each user now can also use the CRS and sample its own public and secret key, and can register its identity and the chosen public key to the KC; the KC is required to generate a new master public key, which includes the newly registered public keys, and which will permit encrypting messages to any of the registered users. Moreover, since the master public key is updated over time, the KC is responsible for providing any decrypting party with a so-called helper decryption key, i.e., auxiliary information connecting its public key with the updated master public key.

Recently, the notion of RIBE has been extended to the setting of attribute-based encryption (ABE) [HLWW22], where one can encrypt messages with respect to policies, and where decryptors can recover the message if their attributes satisfy the policy embedded in the ciphertext. However, their registered ABE (RABE) schemes [HLWW22] are required to hide only messages in the ciphertext. In particular, they do not hide the policies embedded in the ciphertexts, since they are required in the clear for decryption to work. This restricts using RABE in scenarios where hiding the policy is also important.

More generally, the current state of affairs leaves open the question of building registered FE (RFE), where any user can sample its own key pair (pk, sk) as before, along with fixing a function of its choice (say f , from a class of functions), and register (pk, f) with the KC. In such a setting, one can then encrypt messages m that the registered user can decrypt with sk and a helper secret key to learn only $f(m)$. Overall, this would achieve the analogous functionality to that of the celebrated notion of FE, without suffering from the key escrow issue. The focus of our work is to make progress on this problem.

1.1 Our Contributions

We initiate the study of RFE in this paper by providing two constructions – one for a special class of FE, and another for the general class of all functions.

⁵ IBE can be seen as a special case of FE for equality predicates f_y such that $f_y(x, m) = m$ if and only if $y = x$ (and \perp otherwise). Here, x and y have the role of the parties’ identities (which do not need to be secret), and m is the encrypted message.

⁶ The original paper define the primitive as registration based encryption. However, we choose to call it as registered IBE, in line with the more recent work in [HLWW22].

In particular, as our first contribution, we provide the *first* RFE scheme for the class of inner-product predicates (a.k.a. (attribute hiding) inner-product predicate encryption), i.e., a registered IPE (RIPE) from asymmetric bilinear maps on prime-order groups. More concretely, our scheme supports the function class $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{\mathbf{x}}(\cdot, \cdot)\}_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+}}$ defined as:

$$f_{\mathbf{x}}(m, \mathbf{y}) = \begin{cases} m & \text{if } \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle = 0 \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} are n -size vectors over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n+} = \mathbb{Z}_q^n \setminus \{\mathbf{0}^n\}$, and q is a prime. Below we summarize our result informally in [Theorem 1](#) and also later in [Table 1](#) ([Section 3](#) on page 10) when we discuss related works to compare it with existing registered encryption schemes.

Theorem 1 (Informal). *Let λ be a security parameter, n be the length of supported vectors, and L be a bound on the maximum number of users. There is a (black-box) construction of RIPE supporting a large universe and up to L users in the generic bilinear group model, satisfying the following properties:*

- The CRS is of size $n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$.
- The master public key and each helper decryption key is of size $n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$.
- Key-generation and registration runs in time $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$ and $n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$, respectively.
- Each registered user receives at most $O(\log L)$ updates from the KC over the entire lifetime of the system.

Moreover, both encryption and decryption runs in time $n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$.

Our scheme is proven secure in the bilinear generic group model [[BCFG17](#), [BFF⁺19](#)]. We emphasize that our scheme supports *attribute-hiding* and a *large universe* unlike [[HLWW22](#)]. In particular, our scheme satisfies the strong notion of *two-sided* security [[FFMV23](#), [KSW08](#)], where no information about the attribute vector \mathbf{y} is revealed (besides the orthogonality test) even if decryption succeeds, akin to what [[KSW08](#)] achieved.⁷

Somewhat interestingly, our proof strategy and construction template are substantially different from the typical inner-product predicate encryption schemes in the literature (e.g., [[KSW08](#)]). Roughly speaking, traditional proof strategies work by “programming” the function output (for the challenge ciphertext) in the key given by the adversary, and then arguing that this new key is indistinguishable from the original distribution. In the registered setting, the adversary can sample its own key, so the reduction has no control over it and cannot modify its distribution. Thus we see RIPE as the main technical contribution of this work.

We also implemented our scheme and describe the results in [Section 7](#). The benchmarks are achieved with a set of $L = 100$ to $L = 1000$ users with attribute vectors of length varying between $n = 10$ and $n = 100$. Our results demonstrate concrete, practical efficiency of our scheme beyond the realms of only feasibility. Further, following the *generic* and *non-cryptographic* transformations described in [[KSW08](#), Section 5], our RIPE scheme can also support constant-degree polynomial evaluations, disjunctions, conjunctions, and evaluating CNF and DNF formulas.

As our second contribution, we build RFE for all circuits from indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). This is a feasibility result extending the iO-based RABE schemes in [[HLWW22](#)] to the setting of RFE. In more detail, we achieve the following:

Theorem 2 (Informal). *Let λ be the security parameter. Assuming somewhere statistically binding hash functions [[HW15](#), [OPWW15](#)] and iO [[BGF⁺12](#)], there is a (non black-box) construction of RFE supporting arbitrary functions and an arbitrary number of users, satisfying the following properties:*

- The CRS, master public key, and each helper decryption key is of size $\text{poly}(\lambda)$.
- Key-generation and registration runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, respectively, where L stands for the current number of registered users.

⁷ Generic compilers from any ABE for LSSS (or equivalently, monotone span programs) to (hierarchical) IPE are known (e.g., [[AHY15](#)]). However, such compilers *do not ensure* attribute privacy which we crucially require from our (registered) IPE scheme.

- Each registered user receives at most $O(\log L)$ updates from the KC over the entire lifetime of the system, where L is as defined in the previous item.

Moreover, both encryption and decryption runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda)$. Further, the above scheme achieves the same efficiency as that of iO -based RABE from [HLWW22].

2 Technical Overview

In the following, we first describe the notion of registered FE and its properties of interest. Next, we provide a brief overview of the techniques behind our schemes.

RFE definition. We discuss the notion of RFE at a high level. Fundamentally, RFE allows users to generate their own keys (associated to functions of their choice) without the need of a trusted authority, which is replaced with a KC that does not hold any secret. The KC is simply responsible of managing a data structure containing the public keys (plus the corresponding functions) of registered users. Roughly, the RFE syntax goes as follows: For some security parameter λ and a function class \mathcal{F} , the algorithm $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, |\mathcal{F}|)$ initializes the system to output a common reference string crs .⁸ Given crs , the KC initializes a state $\alpha = \perp$ (i.e., the data structure) and the master public key $\text{mpk} = \perp$. A user can now register its own (pk, f) pair as follows: it samples $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, \alpha)$ and submits a registration request (pk, f) to the KC, where $f \in \mathcal{F}$ is a function it wishes to associate with pk . The KC updates its state as $\alpha = \alpha'$ and $\text{mpk} = \text{mpk}'$ where (mpk', α') are output by the *deterministic* registration algorithm $\text{RegPK}(\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}, f)$. Intuitively, a ciphertext $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m)$ computed with mpk can be later decrypted by the users registered before or during mpk was generated. The registered user uses sk to decrypt c . However, mpk is updated periodically (after each registration) – so the user issues an update request to the KC that, in turn, *deterministically* returns a helper secret key $\text{hsk} = \text{Update}(\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk})$. The hsk provides necessary information to make a (previously registered) user’s secret key sk valid with respect to a new mpk . With hsk , the user can decrypt to learn $f(m) = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{hsk}, c)$. For optimal efficiency, an RFE system with L registered users should satisfy the following properties:

- (1) Compact parameters: The sizes of $\text{crs}, \text{mpk}, \text{hsk}$ must be small, e.g., $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$.
- (2) Efficiency: This measures key-generation and registration runtimes, and the number of updates as described below.
 - (a) Each execution of KGen and RegPK should run in time $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$.
 - (b) Each registered user receives at most $O(\log L)$ number of new updates (i.e., new hsk s) over the lifetime of the system.

RFE can support an unbounded or a bounded number of users. In particular, for the unbounded case, the setup is independent of the number of users. (In this case, the parameter L in efficiency conditions refer to the *current* number of registered users.) For the bounded case, the setup depends on a bound L (fixed a-priori). Security of RFE is analogous to that of RIBE [GHMR18] and RABE [HLWW22]. In particular, an adversary \mathbf{A} , that corrupts a subset of k registered users (i.e., \mathbf{A} knows the set $\{(\text{sk}_i, (\text{pk}_i, f_i))\}_{i \in [k]}$), cannot distinguish between $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_0)$ and $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_1)$, as long as $f_i(m_0) = f_i(m_1), \forall i \in [k]$. This should hold even if \mathbf{A} registers *malformed* public keys. We refer to [Appendix A](#) for more details.

Slotted RFE. Following Hohenberger *et al.* [HLWW22], we first define and use *slotted* RFE as a stepping stone towards building full-fledged RFE. Differently to RFE, there is only a single update (referred to as *aggregation*) in slotted RFE, where users are assigned to “slots” and the master public key is only computed once all slots are filled. In more detail, initialization and key generation work as before, except now that the Setup (resp. KGen) takes as an extra input the maximum number of slots/keys L that can be aggregated (resp. a user index $i \in [L]$). The KC takes all L pairs $\{(\text{pk}_i, f_i)\}_{i \in [L]}$ *together*, aggregates (i.e. updates) it

⁸ Although the common reference string is generated by a trusted setup, the important difference is that there is no long-term secret that needs to be stored throughout the lifetime of the system. Furthermore, in some cases, the setup algorithm could be “transparent”, and therefore computable using just a hash function.

to compute a short mpk and L helper secret keys $\{\text{hsk}_i\}_{i \in [L]}$ for each user. Encryption and decryption again works as before.

Akin to RFE, slotted RFE security requires that, for an aggregated mpk w.r.t. to all L slots, $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_0)$ and $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_1)$ are computationally indistinguishable, so long as $f_j(m_0) = f_j(m_1)$ for all *corrupted* slots $j \in [L]$. We refer to [Appendix A.1](#) for more details.

Hohenberger *et al.* [[HLWW22](#)] lifted slotted RABE to a standard RABE via a generic compiler, and the same holds for slotted RFE (with minor syntactic changes). Loosely speaking, they use a “powers-of-two” approach, where users are assigned to different slotted schemes with increasing capacities, and they are moved forward as new users join the system. The same idea yields a fully-fledged RFE that supports $O(\log L)$ number of updates and incurs a multiplicative $O(\log L)$ overhead on the size of crs , mpk , hsk , and the key-generation and encryption runtimes compared to that of the underlying slotted RFE scheme. The registration runtime is dominated by $O(t_{\text{Aggr}} + L \cdot t_{\text{hsk}})$, where t_{Aggr} and t_{hsk} are the aggregation runtime and the helper decryption key size of the slotted RFE respectively. For completeness, we present the transformation in [Appendix C](#).

2.1 (Bounded Users) Slotted RIPE from Pairings

We begin with an overview of our scheme for inner-product predicates. This is a special case of FE, where vectors $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+} (= \mathbb{Z}_q^n \setminus \{\mathbf{0}^n\})$ denote functions $f_{\mathbf{x}}$ (associated to keys), and messages consist of a tuple (\mathbf{y}, m) . The function $f_{\mathbf{x}}$ can be recast as:

$$f_{\mathbf{x}}(\mathbf{y}, m) = \begin{cases} m & \text{if } \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle = 0 \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where we denote the length of vectors by $n = n(\lambda)$, and assume the attribute space to be $\mathcal{U} = \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ (i.e., domain of vectors). Our scheme follows the blueprint of [[HLWW22](#)]. However, unlike [[HLWW22](#)], that reveals the policy in clear, achieving attribute-hiding security in this setting of predicate encryption requires us to introduce crucial modifications, which we highlight after the overview of our scheme below. Furthermore, the security analysis is completely different.

Single-Slot Scheme. We begin by discussing a simplified scheme with $L = 1$ (i.e., there is a single slot). Below is a description of each algorithm in the scheme.

- **Generating the CRS:** We first describe the CRS generation. The CRS can be split into three different parts, a general part, a slot-specific part, and a key-specific part. We will describe how each part is generated individually.
 - *General part:* First, we generate an asymmetric pairing group of prime order q , denoted as $\mathcal{G} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g_1, g_2, e)$. Then, we sample $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and set $h = g_1^\beta, Z = e(g_1, g_2)^\alpha$. (We will need γ for the multi-slot scheme, which we describe later.)
 - *Slot-specific part:* We associate each slot with a set of group elements, for this case we sample $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and set $A = g_2^t$ and $B = g_2^\alpha A^\beta = g_2^{\alpha + \beta t}$.
 - *Key-specific part:* We also associate a group element to each component of the key vector, plus the secret key. To do this, for each $w \in [n + 1]$, we sample $u_w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and set $U_w = g_1^{u_w}$.

In the end, we set the CRS to be:

$$\text{crs} = (\mathcal{G}, Z, h, A, B, \{U_w\}_{w \in [n+1]}).$$

- **Generating keys:** To compute a new pair of public/secret keys, we sample a non-zero secret key $\text{sk} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and set $\text{pk} = U_{n+1}^{-\text{sk}}$. Note that we are conceptually treating the secret key as one more element of the predicate vector. This is an important structural difference with respect to [[HLWW22](#)].
- **Key Aggregation:** Since we only have one slot, given pk and crs , and a predicate vector (or key) $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, we set the master public key as:

$$\text{mpk} = \left(\mathcal{G}, h, Z, \{U_w\}_{w \in [n+1]}, \text{pk} \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n U_w^{-x_w} \right).$$

- **Encryption:** To encrypt a message $m \in \mathbb{G}_T$ with respect to a non-zero attribute vector $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+}$, and the master public key mpk , we create a ciphertext that has two components, a message-embedding component, and a key-slot-embedding component.

- *Message embedding:* We sample $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and set $C_1 = m \cdot Z^s, C_2 = g_1^s$.
- *Key-slot embedding:* First, we sample $r, z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{0\}$. Then, we set

$$C_{3,w} = h^{y_w \cdot r + s} \cdot U_w^{-z} \quad (\forall w \in [n]), \quad C_{3,n+1} = h^s \cdot U_{n+1}^{-z}, \quad \text{and}$$

$$C_{3,n+2} = h^s \cdot \text{pk}^{-z} \prod_{w=1}^n U_w^{z \cdot x_w}.$$

The final ciphertext will be $(C_1, C_2, \{C_{3,w}\}_{w \in [n+1]})$.

- **Decryption:** Before describing the actual decryption, let us check the intuition behind each element of the ciphertext. The first component $C_1 = m \cdot Z^s$ is just a masking of the message with a random power of Z from the CRS. Consider B from crs , and the ciphertext components C_1 and C_2 , and observe:

$$\frac{C_1}{e(C_2, B)} = \frac{m \cdot e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \cdot s}}{e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \cdot s} \cdot e(g_1, g_2)^{s\beta t}} = \frac{m}{e(h^s, A)}.$$

Thus, to recover the message, it suffices to recompute $e(h^s, A)$. Note that h^s is already present in some form in the $C_{3,*}$ components. We can partition $C_{3,*}$ terms into three different groups, and see how h^s appears in each one:

1. For all $w \in [n]$, we have $C_{3,w} = h^s \cdot h^{y_w \cdot r} \cdot U_w^{-z}$. In this case, there are extra terms $y_w \cdot r$ as well as U_w present in the ciphertext. However, since \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{y} are orthogonal (otherwise decryption fails), we can eliminate these extra terms by raising each $C_{3,w}$ to the power of x_w for $w \in [n]$ and compute their product. Thus, we will have:

$$\prod_{w=1}^n C_{3,w}^{x_w} = \prod_{w=1}^n h^{x_w \cdot s} \cdot h^{x_w \cdot y_w \cdot r} \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n U_w^{-z \cdot x_w} = h^{s \cdot \sum_{w=1}^n x_w} \cdot \underbrace{h^{r \cdot \sum_{w=1}^n x_w \cdot y_w}}_{=1} \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n U_w^{-z \cdot x_w}.$$

Therefore, we are left with two terms $h^{s \cdot \sum_{w=1}^n x_w}$ and $\prod_{w=1}^n U_w^{-z \cdot x_w}$.

2. For $w = n+1$, we have $C_{3,n+1} = h^s \cdot U_{n+1}^{-z}$, where the term h^s is masked with U_{n+1}^{-z} .
3. For $w = n+2$, we have $C_{3,n+2} = h^s \cdot \text{pk}^{-z} \prod_{w=1}^n U_w^{z \cdot x_w} = h^s \cdot U_{n+1}^{z \cdot \text{sk}} \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n U_w^{z \cdot x_w}$.

Multiplying together the remaining components we obtain:

$$C_{3,n+2} \cdot C_{3,n+1}^{\text{sk}} \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n C_{3,w}^{x_w} = h^s \cdot h^{s \cdot \text{sk}} \cdot h^{s \cdot \sum_{w=1}^n x_w} = h^{s \cdot (1 + \text{sk} + \sum_{w=1}^n x_w)}.$$

The decryptor can now raise $h^{s \cdot (1 + \text{sk} + \sum_{w=1}^n x_w)}$ to the power of $(1 + \text{sk} + \sum_{w=1}^n x_w)^{-1}$ to get h^s . Once h^s is obtained, it can be paired with A , available from crs , to decrypt the message.

Multi-Slot Scheme. To gain an intuition on how our scheme handles multiple slots, we describe a toy example where $L = 2$, i.e., we are in the two-slot setting. Notice that one trivial generalization is to individually generate public keys as before, and concatenate them into the master public key. However, this approach will not work, since we want the master public key size to be independent of the number of slots. Instead, we expand the slot-specific components in the CRS to A_1, B_1 (for slot 1) and A_2, B_2 (for slot 2), which are generated in the same way as A, B in the one-slot setting, but using independent random elements $t_1, t_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ in generating A_1, A_2 . We will also need to link the slots to the keys, so that we can use the slot in the key-generation algorithm. For this, instead of generating only one set of $\{U_w\}_{w \in [n]}$, we generate them with respect to both slots

$$\{U_{w,1} = g_1^{u_{w,1}}\}_{w \in [n+1]} \quad \text{and} \quad \{U_{w,2} = g_1^{u_{w,2}}\}_{w \in [n+1]}$$

where the elements $\{u_{w,i}\}_{i \in \{1,2\}}$ are chosen independently and uniformly at random. Accordingly, in the key generation we can set

$$\mathbf{pk}_1 = U_{n+1,1}^{-\mathbf{sk}_1} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{pk}_2 = U_{n+1,1}^{-\mathbf{sk}_2}$$

and we aggregate the keys as

$$\{\widehat{U}_w = U_{w,1} \cdot U_{w,2}\}_{w \in [n+1]} \quad \text{and} \quad \widehat{U}_{n+2} = \mathbf{pk}_1 \cdot \mathbf{pk}_2 \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,1}^{-x_{w,1}} \prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,2}^{-x_{w,2}}$$

where \mathbf{x}_1 and \mathbf{x}_2 are the chosen keys. One can encrypt using the new \widehat{U} values instead of U , however, once we try to decrypt and expand the corresponding equations, we realize that many terms will not cancel out as before. For example, if a message is encrypted for slot 1, during decryption we will have,

$$\begin{aligned} \prod_{w \in [n]} C_{3,w}^{x_{w,1}} &= \prod_{w \in [n]} h^{(y_w \cdot r + s) \cdot x_{w,1}} \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,1}^{-z \cdot x_{w,1}} \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,2}^{-z \cdot x_{w,1}} \\ C_{3,n+1}^{\mathbf{sk}_1} &= h^{s \cdot \mathbf{sk}_1} \cdot U_{n+1,1}^{-z \cdot \mathbf{sk}_1} \cdot U_{n+1,2}^{-z \cdot \mathbf{sk}_1} \\ C_{3,n+2} &= h^s \cdot U_{n+1,1}^{z \cdot \mathbf{sk}_1} \cdot U_{n+1,2}^{z \cdot \mathbf{sk}_2} \cdot \prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,1}^{z \cdot x_{w,1}} \prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,2}^{z \cdot x_{w,2}} \end{aligned}$$

where the terms in blue can be canceled out using a similar multiplication trick as before. However, the terms $U_{n+1,2}^{-z \cdot \mathbf{sk}_1}$, $U_{n+1,2}^{z \cdot \mathbf{sk}_2}$, $\prod_{w \in [n]} U_{w,2}^{-z \cdot x_{w,1}}$ and $\prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,2}^{z \cdot x_{w,2}}$ cannot be canceled as they do not appear anywhere else, and further we assume the decryptor only knows \mathbf{sk}_1 , but not \mathbf{sk}_2 . We can circumvent this issue by introducing some ‘‘cross-terms’’ into the CRS, and use them in the aggregation to compute helper secret keys that enables the decryptor (holding \mathbf{sk}_1 and \mathbf{x}_1) to cancel such terms. We create these terms such that they include both slot-specific and key-specific parts. Intuitively, they bind each slot to other slots and keys together. For slots $i, j \in [2]$ where $i \neq j$ and key indices $w \in [n+1]$, we define these terms as:

$$W_{i,j,w} = A_i^{u_{j,w}}.$$

We add $\{W_{i,j,w}\}_{i \neq j \in [2], w \in [n+1]}$ to the CRS as:

$$\text{crs} = \left(\mathcal{G}, Z, h, \{A_i, B_i\}_{i \in [2]}, \left\{ \{U_{w,i}\}, \{W_{i,j,w}\}_{i \neq j} \right\}_{i,j \in [2], w \in [n+1]} \right).$$

In addition, we will let the user publish $\{W_{j,i,n+1}^{\mathbf{sk}_i}\}_{i \in \{1,2\}, j \neq i}$ in their respective public keys, to enable the other users to cancel out the desired cross terms, and publish in the ciphertext an additional element $C_4 = g_1^z$, to be paired with the W 's in order to compute the correct terms.

Unfortunately, as described, the construction is correct but *insecure*. At a high level, the problem is that the adversary can pair C_4 with the wrong elements, recovering some extra information about the encrypted message. For this reason, instead of putting g_1^z directly in the ciphertext, we introduce an extra component $\Gamma = g_1^\gamma, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ in the CRS, and set $C_4 = \Gamma^z$. The only other modification that we must apply is the generation of the CRS itself, where for slots $i, j \in \{1,2\}$ with $i \neq j$, and key indices $w \in [n+1]$, we define:

$$W_{i,j,w} = A_i^{u_{j,w}/\gamma}.$$

The rest of the construction remains the same. See [Section 6](#) for more details.

Proof Sketch. We prove the above slotted RIPE scheme secure in the generic bilinear group model (GGM). Recall that in the GGM, the adversary is supplied with handles to the corresponding group elements from the scheme. Further, it can also learn handles to arbitrary linear combinations of existing and new elements (in the same group $\mathbb{G}_t, t \in \{1, 2, T\}$) via the group oracles it is provided with. Additionally, since we are in the

bilinear setting, the adversary also gets access to the pairing oracle that allows it to learn handles referring to the product of any two terms from the source groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 . However, the only crucial information it can actually learn in this whole interaction is via the zero-tests that work again only in \mathbb{G}_T .

Our formal multi-slot RIPE scheme in [Section 6](#) introduces several variables with different combinations of indices. To argue indistinguishability in a convenient way between subsequent hybrids in the proof, we first switch from the GGM to the symbolic group model (SGM) via the Schwarz-Zippel lemma. In particular, the SGM allows us to represent all the terms, that the adversary can learn in the security game, as multivariate polynomials (in respective groups) from a ring of variables. The heart of the proof relies on arguing properties of the *coefficients* of these polynomials that correspond to *successful* zero-tests, which aids in proving indistinguishability directly. In particular, these claims set in while proving attribute hiding by switching the challenge attribute from \mathbf{y}_0 to \mathbf{y}_1 in the ciphertext elements $C_{3,w} \forall w \in [n+2]$, and helps in arguing the following:

1. Coefficients of such polynomials formed by pairing terms $C_{3,w} \in \mathbb{G}_1$ with *any* element in \mathbb{G}_2 , except $A_i, i \in [2]$, must be *all zero*.
2. Such a coefficient vector must be *orthogonal* to \mathbf{y}_b for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and in particular, either be a *constant multiple* of the vector $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i = (\mathbf{x}_i, \text{sk}_i), i \in [2]$ or be *all zero*.

The claim in [Item 1](#) follows from observing that the monomials formed symbolically (in the exponent) when pairing $C_{3,w}$ with *anything* in \mathbb{G}_2 (except A_1 or A_2) are all linearly independent and do not cancel out. [Item 2](#) follows from two observations. The first one is that the randomness r (appearing as an independent symbolic term, but only in the components $C_{3,w}$'s) can only cancel out in zero-tests when the coefficients are orthogonal to \mathbf{y}_b . The second one follows additionally from linear independence of some specific symbolic terms and observing further that the vector of first $n+1$ coefficients can be expressed as a constant multiple of $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i$. Overall, these claims ensure that the only non-trivial adversarial queries can be for vectors lying in the span of both *registered and valid* predicates. The rest of the proof follows from the admissibility of the adversary, and by reusing these claims. We refer to [Theorem 6](#) for more details.

Comparison with the slotted RABE of [HLWW22]. Our slotted RIPE scheme from prime-order pairings (in [Section 6](#)) shares some similarities at a high level with the slotted RABE from composite-order pairings by Hohenberger *et al.* [HLWW22]. For instance, the message-embedding mechanism in both schemes are same, which is by masking the message with the randomness in the term $e(h^s, A_i)$. (This is also a standard technique in many other pairing-based schemes.) The use of “slot”-based framework to embed users’ keys is also similar, but only at the level of a blueprint. In particular, that is where the similarity ends. More specifically, the way slots and attributes are “glued” together in our scheme is fundamentally different: in [HLWW22], the ciphertext has two specific components, an attribute-specific component and a slot-specific one, where one party can decrypt a message if it manages to succeed to decrypt the slot-specific component and the attribute-specific component simultaneously. But in our scheme, the slot and attribute elements are entwined in the same ciphertext component. In essence, we conceptually treat the secret key as “one more dimension” in the predicate vector, whereas the scheme in [HLWW22] uses a separate machinery that takes care of the key component. Further, unlike [HLWW22] which reveals the policy in the ciphertext, we carefully ensure attribute hiding by multiplying a randomizer $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^+$ to the attribute \mathbf{y} . As a result, we achieve totally different functionalities and stronger security notions. Finally, our scheme supports vectors from \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+} where q is a λ -bit prime and n denotes supported the vector length. As stated in [HLWW22, Section 7.2], this enables our scheme to support a large attribute universe in contrast to the pairing-based RABE in [HLWW22], that only supports a small attribute universe.

2.2 (Unbounded Users) Slotted RFE from iO

As a feasibility result, we show (slotted) RFE for all circuits based on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [BGI⁺12] and (succinct) somewhere statistically binding hash functions (SSB) [HW15, OPWW15]. In particular, we generalize the techniques from Hohenberger *et al.* [HLWW22] to get a slotted RFE from iO (which can be lifted to RFE with the powers-of-two trick). Below is a brief overview of this slotted RFE.

The CRS is set as the SSB hash key hk , and users' keys are generated through a PRG \mathbf{G} and a seed s (i.e., $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) = (\mathbf{G}(s), s)$). To aggregate $((\text{pk}_i, f_i))_{i \in [L]}$, the KC computes a Merkle tree hash $h = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, ((\text{pk}_i, f_i))_{i \in [L]})$ and sets $\text{mpk} = (\text{hk}, h)$. The helper secret key hsk_i (of the i -th slot) is essentially the SSB opening π_i for the i -th (hashed) block (pk_i, f_i) . A ciphertext c (encrypting m) is simply the obfuscation \tilde{C} of a circuit $C_{h,m}$ that, on input $(i, \text{pk}_i, f_i, \pi_i, \text{sk}_i)$, returns $f_i(m)$ if the following two conditions are satisfied: π_i is a *valid opening* for the i -th block (pk_i, f_i) and $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ is a *valid* key-pair. Decryption works using sk_i and $\text{hsk}_i = \pi_i$ to evaluate \tilde{C} on input $(i, \text{pk}_i, f_i, \pi_i, \text{sk}_i)$. The scheme supports the function class \mathbf{P}/poly . Compactness of parameters is evident from SSB succinctness. Due to a poly-logarithmic overhead from the powers-of-two trick, the final RFE can support an arbitrary number of users by setting $L = 2^\lambda$. The registration runtime remains linear in the *current/effective* number of registered users at the time of registration. We provide more details in [Appendices B and C](#).

2.3 On Function Privacy in (Slotted) RFE

By definition, RFE allows users to sample their own keys and functions. Thus, the notion of function-privacy, that is typically considered in the setting of (secret-key) FE [[SSW09](#), [BS15](#)], does not make much sense from this perspective. However, one can still define function-privacy w.r.t. any other registered or unregistered party. In more detail, in the case of RFE, a user choosing its own keys and functions may want to hide its function from any party including the KC. Capturing this requires a mild change in the RFE syntax, where the function can be input to the KGen algorithm instead of RegPK and also require that the generated user key-pair is tied to this function. The KC gets access of only the users' public keys to aggregate and generate mpk, hsk .⁹ The security definition would need to change accordingly. In particular, it would now additionally require each public key to computationally hide the function tied to it.

All our schemes can be modified to satisfy this syntax. For example, our slotted RIPE from pairings can be easily adapted to this notion since the *extended* key $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i = (\mathbf{x}_i, \text{sk}_i, 1)$ is embedded in the public-key pk_i for slot $i \in [2]$ as $\text{pk}_i = \prod_{w=1}^{n+1} U_{w,i}^{-\tilde{x}_{w,i}}$. This holds similarly for the cross-terms as well. Using a NIZK, the users can prove that they always choose a non-zero vector as its predicate. It is also easy to verify the same for our slotted RFE from iO. However, for simplicity, we avoid formalizing this in our definitions and schemes. Our formal constructions from [Section 6](#) and [Appendix B](#) are thus in the standard registered setting (i.e., without function-privacy). Building more efficient function-private RFE for specific functions is left as a future work.

⁹ In such a setting (rogue) users can try to register arbitrary functions of their choice which would allow them to learn arbitrary information about encrypted messages. To prevent this, one can restrict the function class at setup meaningfully (e.g., excluding trivial functions like identity). Any user wanting to register its public key would then need to prove the validity of its chosen function w.r.t. this class of functions.

Reference	Type	CRS size	Keygen runtime	Registration key runtime	Master public key size	Helper dec. key size	# Updates	Unbounded users	BB	Assumptions
[GHMR18]	IBE	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✓	✗	iO + SSB
[GHMR18]	IBE	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$O(L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✓	✗	CDH/LWE
[GHM ⁺ 19]	Anon. IBE	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✓	✗	CDH/LWE
[GV20]	IBE	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✓	✗	CDH/LWE
[CES21]	IBE	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\sqrt{L})$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✓	✗	CDH/LWE
[GKMR22]	IBE $O(1)$ -size ciphertexts	$O(\sqrt{L})$	$O(\sqrt{L})$	$O(\sqrt{L})$	$O(\sqrt{L})$	$O(\sqrt{L})$	$O(\sqrt{L})$	✗	✓	Pairings of Prime Order
[GKMR22]	IBE $O(\log L)$ -size ciphertexts	$O(\sqrt{L})$	$O(\sqrt{L})$	$O(\sqrt{L} \log L)$	$O(\sqrt{L} \log L)$	$O(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✗	✓	Pairings of Prime Order
[DKL ⁺ 23]	IBE ABE	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$\text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✓	✓	LWE
[HLWW22]	small attribute space \mathcal{U} LSSS policies	$L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\mathcal{U} , \log L)$	$L \cdot \text{poly}(\mathcal{U} , \log L)$	$L \cdot \text{poly}(\mathcal{U} , \log L)$	$ \mathcal{U} \cdot \text{poly}(\log L)$	$ \mathcal{U} \cdot \text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✗	✓	Pairings of Composite Order
[HLWW22]	ABE large attribute space \mathcal{U} arbitrary policies	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$O(L)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$O(\log L)$	✓	✗	iO + SSB
Ours §6	Inner-Product PE large function space \mathcal{F} n -size vectors	$n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\log L)$	$L \cdot \text{poly}(\log L)$	$n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\log L)$	$n \cdot \text{poly}(\log L)$	$n \cdot \text{poly}(\log L)$	$O(\log L)$	✗	✓	Pairings of Prime Order + GGM
Ours §B	FE large function space \mathcal{F} arbitrary functions	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$O(L)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$	$O(\log L)$	✓	✗	iO + SSB

Table 1. Comparing known registered encryption schemes in terms of efficiency and assumptions. We only consider worst-case time complexity. For schemes supporting an unbounded (resp. bounded) number of users, L denotes the *current* number of registered (resp. the maximum number of supported) users. We omit λ to simplify the table, e.g. for $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $O(k)$ and $\text{poly}(\log k)$ respectively denote $k \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log k)$ etc. \mathcal{U} (from [HLWW22]) denotes the attribute space supported by the corresponding scheme. \mathcal{F} denotes the function space supported by our schemes in §A and §6 (each function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ of our RIPE is an n -length vector from $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$).

3 Related Work

The first paper [GHMR18] defined and built RIBE from iO and SSB hashes; this was later improved by Garg *et al.* [GHM⁺19] building RIBE (with the same level of efficiency) from standard assumptions (e.g., from CDH/LWE) even for *anonymous* IBE. Subsequent work on RIBE focused on adding verifiability [GV20], proving lower bounds on the number of decryption updates [MQR22], improving on practical efficiency of the garbled circuit construction [CES21], providing efficient black-box construction from pairings with $O(\sqrt{L})$ mpk [GKMR22]. More recently, Döttling *et al.* [DKL⁺23] obtain a lattice-based RIBE with the sizes of crs, mpk, hsk as well as key generation runtime growing as $\text{poly}(\log L)$, with a $O(L)$ registration runtime and $O(\log L)$ number of updates. Very recently, [HLWW22] extended RIBE to the setting of ABE. They built a (black-box) registered ABE (RABE) scheme supporting a *bounded* number of users and linear secret sharing schemes as access policies from assumptions on composite-order pairing groups. However, their (pairing-based) scheme, the size of CRS and runtime of aggregate and keygen depend linearly on the size of attribute space $|\mathcal{U}|$. The dependence on $|\mathcal{U}|$ allows their scheme to only support a small attribute space (e.g., $|\mathcal{U}| = \text{poly}(\lambda)$). Notably, our (pairing-based) RIPE does not suffer from this limitation since our parameters depend only on the vector length $n = n(\lambda)$ (see Table 1); so we can support a large attribute universe.

In [GV20], the authors further introduced an RABE extension to more general access structures. Specifically, they proposed a universal definition of registration-based encryption in which the algorithms take as an additional input the description of an FE scheme (although no construction was presented). Such algorithms compile the standard algorithmic behavior of the FE scheme into a (verifiable) registration-based one. However, our tailored notion for the functional encryption setting is more natural and follows directly from the RABE definition.

Finally, we also mention a related work on dynamic decentralized FE [CDSG⁺20] (DDFE), where there is no trusted authority and users sample their own keys. DDFE, as a notion, posits other general (and albeit unrelated) requirements like (conditional) aggregation of labelled data which comes from different users using separate FE instances. However, a crucial difference from the registered setting, is that in DDFE there is no requirement on the master public key size, which can be as large as the number of registered users. This is a

major challenge (and arguably the defining feature) of all registered settings. Chotard *et al.* [CDSG⁺20] also built IP-DDFE, that outputs the inner-product value $\langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle$, while our scheme is for the more challenging orthogonality-test predicate (with two-sided security).

Open Problems. We view our work as an initial first step in the world of registered FE, however many open problems remain. For example, a natural question is if registered FE can be obtained generically from any compact, polynomially-hard FE. Another interesting direction is to design schemes for specialized function classes from weaker assumptions. Finally, a technical open problem is to prove our pairing-based RIPE scheme (or some modification thereof) secure in the standard model.

4 Organization

We organize the rest of the paper as follows. The formal definitions of both RFE and slotted RFE extend the same for the RABE setting from [HLWW22] in a straightforward way. Hence, we provide the RFE definitions in Appendix A. Our main focus in this paper is on building (slotted) registered IPE. Thus, we first define slotted RIPE formally in Section 5.1 and extend the definitions to slotted RFE for the case of general functions in Appendix A.1. Our slotted RIPE scheme from bilinear pairings and its proofs are provided in Section 6. We demonstrate our implementation results of the above slotted RIPE scheme in Section 7. Our slotted RFE for general functions and unbounded users, built on iO (plus an SSB hash and a PRG), generalizes a construction from [HLWW22] and is presented in Appendix B. In Appendix C, we transform slotted RFE into RFE extending the generic compiler from [HLWW22].

5 Preliminaries

Notations. We write $[n] = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and $[0, n] = \{0\} \cup [n]$. Capital bold-face letters (such as \mathbf{X}) are used to denote random variables, small bold-face letters (such as \mathbf{x}) to denote vectors, small letters (such as x) to denote concrete values, calligraphic letters (such as \mathcal{X}) to denote sets, serif letters (such as \mathbf{A}) to denote algorithms. All of our algorithms are modeled as (possibly interactive) Turing machines. For a string $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, we let $|x|$ be its length; if \mathcal{X} is a set or a list, $|\mathcal{X}|$ represents the cardinality of \mathcal{X} . When x is chosen uniformly in \mathcal{X} , we write $x \leftarrow_s \mathcal{X}$. If \mathbf{A} is an algorithm, we write $y \leftarrow_s \mathbf{A}(x)$ to denote a run of \mathbf{A} on input x and output y ; if \mathbf{A} is randomized, y is a random variable and $\mathbf{A}(x; r)$ denotes a run of \mathbf{A} on input x and (uniform) randomness r . An algorithm \mathbf{A} is *probabilistic polynomial-time* (PPT) if \mathbf{A} is randomized and for any input $x, r \in \{0, 1\}^*$ the computation of $\mathbf{A}(x; r)$ terminates in a polynomial number of steps (in the input size). We write $C(x) = y$ to denote the evaluation of the circuit C on input x and output y . For any integer $k \in \mathbb{N}$, we denote $\mathbb{Z}_q^{k+} = \mathbb{Z}_q^k \setminus \{\mathbf{0}^k\}$ as the set of all non-zero k -size vectors over \mathbb{Z}_q , and $\mathbb{Z}_q^+ = \mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{0\}$.

5.1 Slotted Registered Inner-Product Encryption

We now present the slotted RIPE definitions below. Let $n = n(\lambda)$ be a polynomial in λ and q be a prime. A slotted RIPE with message space \mathcal{M} and attribute space \mathcal{U} is composed of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^L$): On input the security parameter 1^λ , the vector length n , and the number of slots L , the randomized setup algorithm outputs a common reference string crs .

KGen(crs, i): On input the common reference string crs and a slot index $i \in [L]$, the randomized key-generation algorithm outputs a public key pk_i and a secret key sk_i .

IsValid($\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i$): On input the common reference string crs , a slot index $i \in [L]$, and a public key pk_i , the deterministic key validation algorithm outputs a decision bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Aggr($\text{crs}, ((\text{pk}_i, \mathbf{x}_i))_{i \in [L]}$): On input the common reference string crs and a L pairs $(\text{pk}_1, \mathbf{x}_1), \dots, (\text{pk}_L, \mathbf{x}_L)$ each composed of a public key pk_i and its corresponding (non-zero) vector $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{U}$, the deterministic aggregation algorithm outputs the master public key mpk and a L helper decryption keys $\text{hsk}_1, \dots, \text{hsk}_L$.

$\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \mathbf{y}, m)$: On input the master public key mpk , a (non-zero) attribute vector $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{U}$, and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, the randomized encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c .

$\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{hsk}, c)$: On input a secret key sk , an helper decryption key hsk , and a ciphertext c , the deterministic decryption algorithm outputs a message $m \in \mathcal{M} \cup \{\perp\}$.

Completeness, Correctness, and Efficiency. Completeness of slotted RIPE says that honestly generated public keys for a slot index $i \in [L]$ are valid with respect to the same slot i , i.e., $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i) = 1$. Similarly, correctness says that honest ciphertexts correctly decrypt (to functions of the plaintext) under honestly generated and aggregated keys. For compactness and efficiency, we extend the requirements of RFE (Definition 6 in Appendix A) to the slotted RIPE setting. The formal definitions are provided below.

Definition 1 (Completeness of slotted RIPE). A slotted RIPE scheme $\Pi_{\text{sRIPE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and attribute space \mathcal{U} is complete if $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, n \in \mathbb{N}, L \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\forall i \in [L]$,

$$\mathbb{P}[\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i) = 1 \mid \text{crs} \leftarrow^s \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^L), (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow^s \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i)] = 1.$$

Definition 2 (Perfect Correctness of slotted RIPE). A slotted RIPE scheme $\Pi_{\text{sRIPE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and attribute space \mathcal{U} is correct if $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, n \in \mathbb{N}, L \in \mathbb{N}, i \in [L]$, $\forall \text{crs}$ output by $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^L)$, $\forall (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ output by $\text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i)$, \forall collection of public key $\{\text{pk}_j\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$ such that $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, j, \text{pk}_j) = 1$, $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}$, $\forall \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_L \in \mathcal{U}$, and $\forall \mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{U}$ such that $\langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y} \rangle = 0$ for every $i \in [L]$, we have:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_i, \text{hsk}_i, c) = m \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{mpk}, (\text{hsk}_j)_{j \in [L]}) = \text{Aggr}(\text{crs}, ((\text{pk}_j, \mathbf{x}_j))_{j \in [L]}), \\ c \leftarrow^s \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \mathbf{y}, m) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

Definition 3 (Compactness and Efficiency for slotted RIPE). This definition is identical to that of slotted RFE (Definition 10).

We now define the security of slotted RIPE formally below.

Definition 4 (Security of slotted RIPE). Let $\Pi_{\text{sRIPE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a slotted RIPE scheme with message space \mathcal{M} and attribute space \mathcal{U} . For any adversary \mathbf{A} , define the following security game $\text{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{sRIPE}}, \mathbf{A}}^{\text{sRIPE}}(\lambda, b)$ with respect to a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ between \mathbf{A} and a challenger.

- **Setup phase:** Upon getting an attribute length n and a slot count L from the adversary \mathbf{A} , the challenger samples $\text{crs} \leftarrow^s \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^L)$ and gives crs to \mathbf{A} . The challenger also initializes a counter $\text{ctr} = 0$, a dictionary D , and a set of slot indices $\mathcal{C}_L = \emptyset$ to account for corrupted slots.
- **Pre-challenge query phase:** \mathbf{A} can issue the following queries.
 - **Key-generation query:** \mathbf{A} specifies a slot index $i \in [L]$. As a response, the challenger increments $\text{ctr} = \text{ctr} + 1$, samples $(\text{pk}_{\text{ctr}}, \text{sk}_{\text{ctr}}) \leftarrow^s \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i)$, updates the dictionary as $\text{D}[\text{ctr}] = (i, \text{pk}_{\text{ctr}}, \text{sk}_{\text{ctr}})$ and replies with $(\text{ctr}, \text{pk}_{\text{ctr}})$ to \mathbf{A} .
 - **Corruption query:** \mathbf{A} specifies an index $c \in [\text{ctr}]$. In response, the challenger looks up the tuple $\text{D}[c] = (i', \text{pk}', \text{sk}')$ and replies with sk' to \mathbf{A} .
- **Challenge phase:** For each $i \in [L]$, \mathbf{A} specifies a tuple $(c_i, \mathbf{x}_i, \text{pk}_i^*)$ where:
 - either $c_i \in [\text{ctr}]$ that refers to a challenger-generated key from before which it associates with a non-zero predicate $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{U}$: in this case, the challenger looks up $\text{D}[c_i] = (i', \text{pk}', \text{sk}')$ and halts if $i \neq i'$. Else, the challenger sets $\text{pk}_i^* = \text{pk}'$. Further, if \mathbf{A} issued a corrupt query before on c_i , the challenger adds i to \mathcal{C}_L .
 - or $c_i = \perp$ that refers to a self-generated (and corrupt) secret key for an arbitrary non-zero predicate $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{U}$: in this case, the challenger aborts if $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i^*) = 0$. Else if pk_i^* is valid, it adds the index i to \mathcal{C}_L .

Additionally, \mathbf{A} sends a challenge pair $(\mathbf{y}_0, m_0), (\mathbf{y}_1, m_1) \in \mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{M}$. In response, the challenger computes $(\text{mpk}, (\text{hsk}_i)_{i \in [L]}) = \text{Aggr}(\text{crs}, (\text{pk}_i^*, \mathbf{x}_i)_{i \in [L]})$ and $c^* \leftarrow^s \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \mathbf{y}_b, m_b)$, and replies with c^* to \mathbf{A} .

- **Output phase:** \mathbf{A} returns a bit $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ which is also the output of the experiment.

A is called admissible if the challenge pair $(\mathbf{y}_0, m_0), (\mathbf{y}_1, m_1)$ satisfy the following:

– $\forall \mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{U}$ with $i \in \mathcal{C}_L$, it holds that:

$$\text{either } \langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_0 \rangle = \langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_1 \rangle = 0 \quad \text{or} \quad \text{both } \langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_0 \rangle, \langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_1 \rangle \neq 0, \text{ and}$$

– if $\exists \mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{U}$ with $i \in \mathcal{C}_L$ such that $\langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_0 \rangle = \langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_1 \rangle = 0$, then $m_0 = m_1$.

We say that Π_{sRIPE} is secure if for all polynomials $n = n(\lambda), L = L(\lambda)$ and for all PPT and admissible A in the above security hybrid, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{sRIPE}}, A}^{\text{sRIPE}}(\lambda, 0) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{sRIPE}}, A}^{\text{sRIPE}}(\lambda, 1) = 1 \right] \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Remark 1. As discussed for general RFE in [Remark 3](#) (in [Appendix A](#)), security without post-challenge queries imply security with post-challenge queries in the slotted setting as well. This is because Aggr is deterministic and does not require any secret. Hence, an adversary can simulate the post-challenge queries itself.

6 Slotted Registered IPE from Prime-Order Pairings

Bilinear groups. Our slotted RIPE is based on asymmetric bilinear groups. We use cyclic groups of prime order q with an asymmetric bilinear map endowed on them. We assume a PPT algorithm GroupGen that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs $\mathcal{G} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g_1, g_2, e)$, where $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ are cyclic groups of prime order q , g_1 (resp. g_2) is random generator in \mathbb{G}_1 (resp. \mathbb{G}_2) and $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is a non-degenerate bilinear map.

We assume the message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}_T$ for our scheme. Our slotted RIPE supports an a-priori fixed number of slots $L = L(\lambda)$, i.e., the scheme supports a bounded number of slots. Below, we describe our formal scheme.

Construction 1 *The slotted RIPE scheme $\Pi_{\text{sRIPE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}_T$ and attribute space $\mathcal{U} = \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ is as follows:*

Setup $(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^L)$: *On input the security parameter λ , the attribute size n and the number of slots L , compute $\mathcal{G} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g_1, g_2, e) \leftarrow_s \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ and generate the common reference string as follows.*

1. *Sample $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q^+$ and set $h = g_1^\beta, Z = e(g_1, g_2)^\alpha, \Gamma = g_1^\gamma, n' = n + 1$.*
2. *For each index $i \in [0, L]$, do the following:*
 - (a) *for each $w \in [n']$, sample $u_{w,i} \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q$ and set $U_{w,i} = g_1^{u_{w,i}}$.*
 - (b) *for a slot index $i > 0$, sample $t_i \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q$ and set $A_i = g_2^{t_i}, B_i = g_2^\alpha \cdot A_i^\beta$.*
 - (c) *for a slot index $i > 0, \forall w \in [n'], j \in [0, L] \setminus \{i\}$, set $W_{i,j,w} = A_i^{u_{w,j}/\gamma}$.*
3. *Sample $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0 = (\tilde{x}_{1,0}, \dots, \tilde{x}_{n,0}, \tilde{r}_0) \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$. Set $\text{sk}_0 = \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0$ and*

$$T_0 = \left(\prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,0}^{-\tilde{x}_{w,0}} \right) \cdot U_{n',0}^{-\tilde{r}_0}, \quad \tilde{W}_{i,0} = \left(\prod_{w=1}^n W_{i,0,w}^{\tilde{x}_{w,0}} \right) \cdot W_{i,0,n'}^{\tilde{r}_0}, \quad \forall i \in [L].$$

$$\text{Also, set } \text{pk}_0 = \left(T_0, \left\{ \tilde{W}_{i,0} \right\}_{i \in [L]} \right).$$

Finally, output the common reference string

$$\text{crs} = (\mathcal{G}, Z, h, \Gamma, \{A_i, B_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \{\{U_{w,i}\}_{i \in [0,L]}, \{W_{i,j,w}\}_{i \in [L], j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}}\}_{w \in [n']}, \text{pk}_0)$$

KGen (crs, i) : *On input the common reference string crs and a slot index $i \in [L]$, do the following.*

1. Parse the common reference string

$$\text{crs} = \left(\mathcal{G}, Z, h, \Gamma, \{A_i, B_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \left\{ \{U_{w,i}\}_{i \in [0,L]}, \{W_{i,j,w}\}_{i \in [L], j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \right\}_{w \in [n']}, \text{pk}_0 \right).$$

2. Sample $\tilde{r}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^+$ and pick elements $U_{n',i}$ and $\{W_{j,i,n'}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$ from crs.

3. Compute $T_i = U_{n',i}^{-\tilde{r}_i}$ and $\tilde{W}_{j,i} = W_{j,i,n'}^{\tilde{r}_i}, \forall j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}$.

4. Output $\text{pk}_i = \left(T_i, \{\tilde{W}_{j,i}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}} \right)$ and $\text{sk}_i = \tilde{r}_i$.

$\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i)$: On input the common reference string crs, a slot index $i \in [L]$ and a purported public key $\text{pk}_i = \left(T_i, \{\tilde{W}_{j,i}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}} \right)$, the key-validation algorithm first affirms that each of the components in pk_i is a valid group element, namely: $\left(T_i \stackrel{?}{\in} \mathbb{G}_1 \setminus \{1_{\mathbb{G}_1}\} \quad \wedge \quad \tilde{W}_{j,i} \stackrel{?}{\in} \mathbb{G}_2 \setminus \{1_{\mathbb{G}_2}\}, \quad \forall j \in [L] \setminus \{i\} \right)$ where $1_{\mathbb{G}_t}$ denotes the identity in \mathbb{G}_t for $t \in [2]$. If the checks pass, it picks the elements $U_{n',i}$ and $\{W_{j,i,n'}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$ from crs and checks further that

$$e(T_i^{-1}, W_{j,i,n'}) \stackrel{?}{=} e(U_{n',i}, \tilde{W}_{j,i}), \forall j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}.$$

If all checks pass, it outputs 1. Else, it outputs 0.

$\text{Aggr}(\text{crs}, (\text{pk}_i, \mathbf{x}_i)_{i \in [L]})$: On input the common reference string crs and a set of L public keys $\text{pk}_i = \left(T_i, \{\tilde{W}_{j,i}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}} \right)$ together with vectors $\mathbf{x}_i = (x_{1,i}, \dots, x_{n,i}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ (representing predicates $f_{\mathbf{x}_i}$), compute the following.

1. Parse the common reference string

$$\text{crs} = \left(\mathcal{G}, Z, h, \Gamma, \{A_i, B_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \left\{ \{U_{w,i}\}_{i \in [0,L]}, \{W_{i,j,w}\}_{i \in [L], j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \right\}_{w \in [n']}, \text{pk}_0 \right).$$

2. Fuse the predicate vector \mathbf{x}_i into pk_i by updating each of its components as

$$T_i = \left(\prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,i}^{-x_{w,i}} \right) \cdot T_i \quad , \quad \tilde{W}_{j,i} = \left(\prod_{w=1}^n W_{j,i,w}^{x_{w,i}} \right) \cdot \tilde{W}_{j,i}, \forall j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}$$

and set $\text{pk}_i = \left(T_i, \{\tilde{W}_{j,i}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}} \right)$. Further, parse pk_0 as follows:

$$\text{pk}_0 = \left(T_0, \{\tilde{W}_{j,0}\}_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{0\}} \right).$$

3. For each $w \in [n']$, compute $\hat{U}_w = \prod_{i \in [0,L]} U_{w,i}$ and $\hat{U}_{n'+1} = \prod_{i \in [0,L]} T_i$.

4. Compute the cross-terms as follows. For each slot index $i \in [L]$:

(a) for each $w \in [n']$, compute $\hat{W}_{w,i} = \prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} W_{i,j,w}$.

(b) compute $\hat{W}_{n'+1,i} = \left(\prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \tilde{W}_{i,j} \right)^{-1}$.

5. Output the master public key and the slot-specific helper secret keys as

$$\text{mpk} = \left(\mathcal{G}, h, Z, \Gamma, \left\{ \hat{U}_w \right\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right), \quad \text{and} \quad \text{hsk}_i = \left(\mathcal{G}, i, \mathbf{x}_i, A_i, B_i, \left\{ \hat{W}_{w,i} \right\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right), \forall i \in [L].$$

$\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \mathbf{y}, m)$: On input the master public key mpk, a vector $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ (as an attribute) and a message $m \in \mathbb{G}_T$, the ciphertext is computed as:

1. Parse $\text{mpk} = \left(\mathcal{G}, h, Z, \Gamma, \left\{ \hat{U}_w \right\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right)$.

2. Set $\tilde{\mathbf{y}} = (\mathbf{y}, 0, 0) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^++1}$ and sample $s, r, z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^+$. Also, parse $\tilde{\mathbf{y}} = (\tilde{y}_1, \dots, \tilde{y}_{n'+1})$.

3. *Message embedding*: set $C_1 = m \cdot Z^s$ and $C_2 = g_1^s$.
4. *Attribute and Slot embedding*: for each $w \in [n' + 1]$, set $C_{3,w} = h^{\tilde{y}_w \cdot r + s} \cdot \widehat{U}_w^{-z}$. Set $C_4 = \Gamma^z$.
5. *Output the ciphertext* $c = (C_1, C_2, \{C_{3,w}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}, C_4)$.

$\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{hsk}, c)$: Parse the input secret key sk , helper secret key hsk and ciphertext c as $\text{sk} = \tilde{r}_i$, and

$$\text{hsk} = \left(\mathcal{G}, i, \mathbf{x}_i, A_i, B_i, \left\{ \widehat{W}_{w,i} \right\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right), c = (C_1, C_2, \{C_{3,w}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}, C_4),$$

for some $i \in [L]$. Let $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i = (\tilde{x}_{1,i}, \dots, \tilde{x}_{n'+1,i}) = (\mathbf{x}_i, \tilde{r}_i, 1) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n'+1}$, $X_i = \sum_{w=1}^{n'+1} \tilde{x}_{w,i} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Compute and output the following:

$$\frac{C_1}{e(C_2, B_i)} \cdot \left[\prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} \left\{ e(C_{3,w}, A_i) \cdot e(C_4, \widehat{W}_{w,i}^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}}) \right\} \right]^{X_i^{-1}}.$$

Remark: In the setup algorithm in our scheme, we introduce a *dummy* slot “0” and pre-register an *honestly* generated dummy key pk_0 . This slot does not impact the security definition in any way because the associated secret key sk_0 is thrown away once the one-time setup is executed. This modification is done only for a simpler analysis of the security proof in the GGM.

Theorem 3 (Completeness of Construction 1). *The slotted RIPE scheme Π_{sRIPE} with message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}_\top$ and attribute space $\mathcal{U} = \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ from Construction 1 is complete.*

Proof. Fix the security parameter λ , $n = n(\lambda)$, and $L = L(\lambda)$. Let $\text{crs} \leftarrow_s \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^L)$. Take any index $i \in [L]$ and let $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow_s \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i)$. Recall $\text{pk}_i = (T_i, \{\widetilde{W}_{j,i}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}})$ and $\text{sk}_i = \tilde{r}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^+$, where

$$T_i = U_{n',i}^{-\tilde{r}_i} \quad \text{and} \quad \widetilde{W}_{j,i} = W_{j,i,n'}^{\tilde{r}_i}, \forall j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}$$

and $U_{n',i}$ and $\{W_{j,i,n'}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$ are elements from the crs . The theorem follows by observing that $\forall j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}$ we have

$$e(T_i^{-1}, W_{j,i,n'}) = e(U_{n',i}^{\tilde{r}_i}, W_{j,i,n'}) = e(U_{n',i}, W_{j,i,n'}^{\tilde{r}_i}) = e(U_{n',i}, \widetilde{W}_{j,i}).$$

Theorem 4 (Compactness and Efficiency of Construction 1). *The slotted RIPE scheme Π_{sRIPE} with message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}_\top$ and attribute space $\mathcal{U} = \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ from Construction 1 satisfies the following properties:*

- $|\text{crs}| = n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $|\text{mpk}| = n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $|\text{hsk}| = (n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) + O(\log L))$
- $\text{Runtime}(\text{KGen}) = O(L) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $\text{Runtime}(\text{IsValid}) = L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $\text{Runtime}(\text{Aggr}) = n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Recall $n' = n + 1$. We demonstrate each property individually.

- $|\text{crs}| = n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$: The common reference string crs consists the following elements. The description of group \mathcal{G} , which is of size $\text{poly}(\lambda)$, the group elements Z, h, Γ group \mathbb{G}_1 , where their sizes are also in $\text{poly}(\lambda)$. The set of \mathbb{G}_2 elements $\{A_i, B_i\}_{i \in [L]}$, which is of size $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, the set $\{U_{w,i}\}_{i \in [0,L], w \in [n']}$ of \mathbb{G}_1 elements which is of size $n \cdot L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, pk_0 and its helper secret keys which consists of $L + 1$ group elements, of total size $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, and finally the largest part of the crs will be the set

$$\{W_{i,j,w}\}_{i \in [L], j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}, w \in [n']} \text{ (of } \mathbb{G}_2 \text{ elements)}$$

whose size will be $n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$. Hence, we have $|\text{crs}| = n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

- $|\text{mpk}| = n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$: The master public key mpk consists of elements $\mathcal{G}, h, z, \Gamma$ of size $\text{poly}(\lambda)$, and $\{\widehat{U}_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]}$ of size $n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

- $\forall i \in [L], |\text{hsk}_i| = (n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) + O(\log L))$: Each hsk_i consists of elements $\mathcal{G}, i, B_i, A_i, \mathbf{x}_i, \{\widehat{W}_{w,i}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}$ where \mathcal{G}, B_i, A_i are of size $\text{poly}(\lambda)$, i is of size $O(\log L)$, and \mathbf{x}_i and $\{\widehat{W}_{w,i}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}$ of size $n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.
- **Runtime(KGen)** = $O(L) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$: Note that we do not need to parse the full crs here. For a particular $i \in [L]$, we only pick the elements $U_{n',i}$ and $W_{j,i,n'}$ for all $j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}$, which can be done in total $O(L)$ time. The key generation algorithm has to perform $L - 1$ exponentiations on the cross terms to create the \widehat{W} part of the public key, so this operation only takes linear time in L . The rest of the operations can be performed in constant time.
- **Runtime(IsValid)** = $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$: Note that we do not need to parse the full crs here. For a particular $i \in [L]$, we only pick the elements $U_{n',i}$ and $W_{j,i,n'}$ for all $j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}$, which can be done in total $O(L)$ time. Further, the validation algorithm simply computes and checks $L - 1$ pairings. Assuming each pairing takes $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ time, the total running time becomes $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.
- **Runtime(Aggr)** = $n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$: We analyze the running time of the Aggr algorithm by analyzing each step individually.
 - Step 1: The aggregation parses the crs which takes $n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ time.
 - Step 2: In order to compute T_i , we need to compute $\prod_{w=1}^n U_{w,i}^{-x_{w,i}}$ for each user. This part takes $n \cdot L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ time. Using the same logic, computing $\widetilde{W}_{j,i}$ for all users, also takes $n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ time.
 - Step 3: This step takes $n \cdot L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ time.
 - Step 4: Since we need to compute $\widehat{W}_{w,i}$, for each $w \in [n']$ and each index $i \in [L]$, this step takes $n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Above, steps 2, 4 dominate the runtime for Aggr which is $n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Theorem 5 (Perfect Correctness of Construction 1). *The slotted RIPE scheme Π_{sRIPE} with message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}_{\mathsf{T}}$ and attribute space $\mathcal{U} = \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ from Construction 1 is perfectly correct.*

Proof. Fix some λ , attribute size $n = n(\lambda)$, a slot count $L = L(\lambda)$ and an index $i \in [L]$. Let $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^L)$ and $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i)$ be defined as in the scheme from Construction 1. Take any set of public keys $\{\text{pk}_j\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$, where $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, j, \text{pk}_j) = 1$. Therefore, we have

$$\text{pk}_j = \left(T_j, \left\{ \widetilde{W}_{\ell,j} \right\}_{\ell \in [L] \setminus \{j\}} \right), \forall j \in [L] \setminus \{i\} \quad , \quad \text{sk}_j = \widetilde{r}_j \text{ for some } \widetilde{r}_j \in \mathbb{Z}_q^+.$$

For each $j \in [L]$, let $\mathbf{x}_j \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ be the predicate vector associated to pk_j and let $\widetilde{\mathbf{x}}_j = (\mathbf{x}_j, \widetilde{r}_j, 1)$. Further, let mpk and hsk_i be as computed by $\text{Aggr}(\text{crs}, ((\text{pk}_j, \mathbf{x}_j))_{j \in [L]})$. Now, note that in the Dec algorithm, the computation associated to the message components yield

$$\frac{C_1}{e(C_2, B_i)} = \frac{m \cdot Z^s}{e(g_1^s, g_2^\alpha \cdot A_i^\beta)} = \frac{m \cdot e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \cdot s}}{e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \cdot s} \cdot e(g_1, g_2)^{s\beta t_i}} = \frac{m}{e(g_1, g_2)^{s\beta t_i}} \quad (2)$$

Now observe that for any vector $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ for some $i \in [L]$ and an attribute $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ with $\langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y} \rangle = 0$, it also holds that $\langle \widetilde{\mathbf{x}}_i, \widetilde{\mathbf{y}} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y} \rangle + \langle \widetilde{r}_i, 0 \rangle + 1 \cdot 0 = 0$. For brevity, we set up the notations $g_{\mathsf{T}} = e(g_1, g_2)$ and the discrete logarithm as $\text{DL}(K) = k$, where $K = g_t^k$ for any $k \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ (i.e., irrespective of any group type $t \in \{1, 2, \mathsf{T}\}$) for the rest of the proof. To ensure correctness with the rest of decryption above, it is thus enough to show that

$$\prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} \left\{ e \left(C_{3,w}^{\widetilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i \right) \cdot e \left(C_4, \widehat{W}_{w,i}^{\widetilde{x}_{w,i}} \right) \right\} = g_{\mathsf{T}}^{s\beta t_i X_i} \quad (3)$$

so that Dec yields the message $m \in \mathbb{G}_{\mathsf{T}}$. We will analyze individual pairing products in the above form separately. Before that we note a few things about the public keys *after they are fused with the predicate*

vectors during Aggr. For any $i \in [L], j \in [0, L]$, we have

$$T_j = \left(\prod_{w \in [n]} U_{w,j}^{-x_{w,j}} \right) \cdot U_{n',j}^{-\tilde{r}_j} = \prod_{w \in [n']} g_1^{-u_{w,j} \tilde{x}_{w,j}} = g_1^{-\sum_{w \in [n']} u_{w,j} \tilde{x}_{w,j}} \implies \text{DL}(T_j) = - \sum_{w \in [n']} u_{w,j} \tilde{x}_{w,j},$$

$$\widetilde{W}_{i,j} = \left(\prod_{w \in [n]} W_{i,j,w}^{x_{w,j}} \right) \cdot W_{i,j,n'}^{\tilde{r}_j} = \prod_{w \in [n']} \left(A_i^{u_{w,j}/\gamma} \right)^{\tilde{x}_{w,j}} = A_i^{\frac{1}{\gamma} \cdot \sum_{w \in [n']} u_{w,j} \tilde{x}_{w,j}} = A_i^{-\text{DL}(T_j)/\gamma},$$

where we redefined $\tilde{x}_{n',0} = \tilde{r}_0$. Further, for any $w \in [n']$ and $i \in [L]$, we have:

$$\widehat{W}_{w,i}^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}} = \prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} W_{i,j,w}^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}} = \prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \left(A_i^{u_{w,j}/\gamma} \right)^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}} = A_i^{(\tilde{x}_{w,i} \cdot \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} u_{w,j})/\gamma} \quad (4)$$

Defining the first pairing product as $\theta_1 = \prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} e\left(C_{3,w}^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right)$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_1 &= \prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} e\left(\left(h^{\tilde{y}_w \cdot r + s} \cdot \widehat{U}_w^{-z}\right)^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) \\ &= \prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} \left\{ e\left(h^{r \cdot \tilde{x}_{w,i} \tilde{y}_w}, A_i\right) \cdot e\left(h^{s \cdot \tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) \cdot e\left(\widehat{U}_w^{-z \tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) \right\} \\ &= e\left(h^{r \cdot \sum_{w=1}^{n'+1} \tilde{x}_{w,i} \tilde{y}_w}, A_i\right) \cdot e\left(g_1^{s\beta \sum_{w=1}^{n'+1} \tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) \cdot \prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} e\left(\widehat{U}_w^{-z \tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) \\ &= e\left(h^0, A_i\right) \cdot e\left(g_1^{s\beta X_i}, g_2^{t_i}\right) \cdot \prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} e\left(\widehat{U}_w^{-z \tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) \\ &= g_{\top}^{s\beta t_i X_i} \cdot \theta_{11} \cdot \theta_{12}, \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{where } \theta_{11} = \prod_{w=1}^{n'} e\left(\widehat{U}_w^{-z \tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) \text{ and } \theta_{12} = e\left(\widehat{U}_{n'+1}^{-z}, A_i\right) \text{ (recall } \tilde{x}_{n'+1,i} = 1)$$

Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_{11} &= \prod_{w \in [n']} e\left(\prod_{j=0}^L U_{w,j}^{-z \tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) = \prod_{w \in [n']} e\left(\left(g_1^{\sum_{j=0}^L u_{w,j}}\right)^{-z \tilde{x}_{w,i}}, g_2^{t_i}\right) \\ &= \prod_{w \in [n']} g_{\top}^{-z t_i \tilde{x}_{w,i} \sum_{j=0}^L u_{w,j}} = \prod_{w \in [n']} g_{\top}^{z t_i (-\tilde{x}_{w,i} u_{w,i})} \cdot \prod_{w \in [n']} g_{\top}^{-z t_i \tilde{x}_{w,i} \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} u_{w,j}} \\ &= g_{\top}^{z t_i \text{DL}(T_i)} \cdot \zeta_1, \text{ where } \zeta_1 = \prod_{w \in [n']} g_{\top}^{-z t_i \tilde{x}_{w,i} \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} u_{w,j}} \text{ and} \\ \theta_{12} &= e\left(\widehat{U}_{n'+1}^{-z}, A_i\right) = e\left(\prod_{j=0}^L T_j^{-1}, A_i^z\right) = \prod_{j=0}^L e\left(T_j^{-1}, A_i^z\right) = \prod_{j=0}^L e\left(\prod_{w=1}^{n'} U_{w,j}^{\tilde{x}_{w,j}}, A_i^z\right) \\ &= \prod_{j=0}^L e\left(g_1^{\sum_{w \in [n']} u_{w,j} \tilde{x}_{w,j}}, A_i^z\right) = \prod_{j=0}^L e\left(g_1^{-\text{DL}(T_j)}, g_2^{z t_i}\right) = \prod_{j=0}^L g_{\top}^{-z t_i \text{DL}(T_j)} \\ &= g_{\top}^{-z t_i \text{DL}(T_i)} \cdot \zeta_2, \text{ where } \zeta_2 = g_{\top}^{-z t_i \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \text{DL}(T_j)}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we have $\theta_1 = g_{\top}^{s\beta t_i X_i} \cdot \left(g_{\top}^{z t_i \text{DL}(T_i)} \cdot \zeta_1\right) \cdot \left(g_{\top}^{-z t_i \text{DL}(T_i)} \cdot \zeta_2\right) \Rightarrow \theta_1 = g_{\top}^{s\beta t_i X_i} \cdot \zeta_1 \cdot \zeta_2$

Defining the second pairing product as $\theta_2 = \prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} e\left(C_4, \widehat{W}_{w,i}^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}}\right)$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\theta_2 &= \left\{ \prod_{w \in [n']} e\left(g_1^{z\gamma}, \widehat{W}_{w,i}^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}}\right) \right\} \cdot e\left(g_1^{z\gamma}, \widehat{W}_{n'+1,i}\right) \text{ (recall } \tilde{x}_{n'+1,i} = 1 \text{ and } C_4 = \Gamma^z = g^{z\gamma}) \\
&= \left\{ \prod_{w \in [n']} e\left(g_1^{z\gamma}, A_i^{(\tilde{x}_{w,i} \cdot \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} u_{w,j})/\gamma}\right) \right\} \cdot e\left(g_1^{z\gamma}, \left(\prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \widetilde{W}_{i,j}\right)^{-1}\right) \\
&= \prod_{w \in [n']} e\left(g_1^{z\gamma}, g_2^{(t_i \tilde{x}_{w,i} \cdot \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} u_{w,j})/\gamma}\right) \cdot \prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} e\left(g_1^{z\gamma}, \left(A_i^{-\text{DL}(T_j)/\gamma}\right)^{-1}\right) \\
&= \prod_{w \in [n']} g_{\Gamma}^{z t_i \tilde{x}_{w,i} \cdot \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} u_{w,j}} \cdot \prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} e\left(g_1^{z\gamma}, g_2^{t_i \text{DL}(T_j)/\gamma}\right) \\
&= \zeta_1^{-1} \cdot \prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} g_{\Gamma}^{z t_i \text{DL}(T_j)} = \zeta_1^{-1} \cdot g_{\Gamma}^{z t_i \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \text{DL}(T_j)} = \zeta_1^{-1} \cdot \zeta_2^{-1}
\end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof since

$$\prod_{w=1}^{n'+1} \left\{ e\left(C_{3,w}^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}}, A_i\right) \cdot e\left(C_4, \widehat{W}_{w,i}^{\tilde{x}_{w,i}}\right) \right\} = \theta_1 \cdot \theta_2 = g_{\Gamma}^{s\beta t_i X_i} \cdot \zeta_1 \cdot \zeta_2 \cdot \zeta_1^{-1} \cdot \zeta_2^{-1} = g_{\Gamma}^{s\beta t_i X_i}.$$

Theorem 6 (Security of Construction 1). *The slotted RIPE scheme Π_{sRIPE} with message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}_{\Gamma}$ and attribute space $\mathcal{U} = \mathbb{Z}_q^{n^+}$ from Construction 1 is secure in the GGM.*

Below, we show that our slotted RIPE scheme Π_{sRIPE} (Construction 1) is secure in the generic group model. We start with some notations and definitions for generic and symbolic group models.

Generic Bilinear Group Model. Our definitions for generic bilinear group model is adapted from [BCFG17, AY20]. Let $\mathcal{G} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_{\Gamma}, q, g_1, g_2, e)$ be a bilinear group setting, $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2, \mathcal{L}_{\Gamma}$ be lists of group elements in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$, and \mathbb{G}_{Γ} respectively. Let \mathcal{D} be a distribution over $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2, \mathcal{L}_{\Gamma}$. The generic group model for a bilinear group setting \mathcal{G} and a distribution \mathcal{D} is described in Figure 1. In this model, the challenger first initializes the lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2, \mathcal{L}_{\Gamma}$ by sampling the group elements according to \mathcal{D} , and the adversary receives handles for the elements in the lists. For $t \in \{1, 2, \Gamma\}$, $\mathcal{L}_t[h]$ denotes the h -th element in the list \mathcal{L}_t . The handle to this element is simply the pair (t, h) . An adversary \mathbf{A} running in the generic bilinear group model can apply group operations and the bilinear map e to the elements in the lists. To do this, \mathbf{A} has to call the appropriate oracle specifying handles for the input elements. \mathbf{A} also gets access to the internal state variables of the challenger via handles, and we assume that the equality queries are “free”, in the sense that they do not count when measuring the computational complexity \mathbf{A} . For $t \in \{1, 2, \Gamma\}$, the challenger computes the result of a query, say $\delta \in \mathbb{G}_t$, and stores it in the corresponding list as $\mathcal{L}_t[\text{pos}] = \delta$ where pos is its next empty position in \mathcal{L}_t , and returns to \mathbf{A} its (newly created) handle (t, pos) . Handles are not unique (i.e., the same group element may appear more than once in a list under different handles). As in [AY20], the equality test oracle in [BCFG17] is replaced with the zero-test oracle $\text{Zt}_{\Gamma}(\cdot)$ that, on input a handle (t, h) , returns 1 if $\mathcal{L}_t[h] = 0$ and 0 otherwise only for the case $t = \Gamma$.

Symbolic Group Model. The symbolic group model (SGM) for a bilinear group setting \mathcal{G} and a distribution \mathcal{D} gives to the adversary the same interface as the corresponding generic group model (GGM), except that internally the challenger stores lists of elements from the ring $\mathbb{Z}_q[\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_k]$ instead of lists of group elements, where $\{\mathbf{x}_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ are indeterminates. The oracles $\text{Add}_t(\cdot, \cdot), \text{Neg}_t(\cdot), \text{Map}_e(\cdot, \cdot), \text{Zt}_{\Gamma}(\cdot)$ compute addition, negation, multiplication, and zero tests respectively in the ring. For our proof, we will work in the ring $\mathbb{Z}_q[\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_k, 1/\mathbf{x}_i]$ for some $i \in [k]$. Note that any element $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_k, 1/\mathbf{x}_i]$ can be represented as

$$f(\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n) = \sum_{\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}^k} \eta_{\mathbf{c}} \prod_{i=1}^k \mathbf{x}_i^{c_i} \quad \text{with } \mathbf{c} = (c_1, \dots, c_k) \in \mathbb{Z}^k$$

State: Lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2, \mathcal{L}_T$ over $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ respectively.

Initializations: Lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2, \mathcal{L}_T$ sampled according to distribution \mathcal{D} .

Oracles: The oracles provide black-box access to the group operations, the bilinear map, and zero-tests.

- $\forall t \in \{1, 2, T\}$: $\text{Add}_t(h_1, h_2)$ appends $\mathcal{L}_t[h_1] + \mathcal{L}_t[h_2]$ to \mathcal{L}_t and returns its handle $(t, |\mathcal{L}_t|)$.
- $\forall t \in \{1, 2, T\}$: $\text{Neg}_t(h)$ appends $-\mathcal{L}_t[h]$ and returns its handle $(t, |\mathcal{L}_t|)$.
- $\text{Map}_e(h_1, h_2)$ appends $e(\mathcal{L}_1[h_1], \mathcal{L}_2[h_2])$ and returns its handle $(T, |\mathcal{L}_T|)$.
- $\text{Zt}_T(h)$ returns 1 if $\mathcal{L}_T[h] = 0$ and 0 otherwise.

All oracles return \perp when given invalid indices.

Fig. 1: GGM for bilinear group setting $\mathcal{G} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g_1, g_2, e)$ and distribution \mathcal{D} .

using $\{\eta_{\mathbf{c}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q\}_{\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}^k}$, where $\eta_{\mathbf{c}} = 0$ for all but finite $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}^k$. Note that this expression is unique. We now begin our proof for [Theorem 6](#) below.

Proof. At a high level, we show a sequence of hybrids each of which is a game between a challenger and a PPT adversary \mathbf{A} . In the first (resp., last) hybrid, the challenger encrypts a pair (\mathbf{y}_b, m_b) corresponding to bit $b = 0$ (resp., $b = 1$). The intermediate hybrids ensure that the distributions in any pair of subsequent hybrids from the first to the last one are statistically indistinguishable.

Since the proof is in the GGM, w.l.o.g. the challenger simulates all the generic bilinear group oracle queries for \mathbf{A} . In particular, the challenger stores the actual computed elements in the list \mathcal{L}_t based on its group type $t \in \{1, 2, T\}$. The handle to an actual element stored in any of these lists are just a tuple (t, pos) specifying the group type t and its position in the table \mathcal{L}_t . Since our scheme contains several variables, we will refrain from explicitly specifying the handles to the actual elements for convenience. Further, when we move to the SGM, we will denote any literal variable v as \mathbf{v} and composite terms like $v_1 v_2$ (resp., $\frac{v_1}{v_2}$) as $\mathbf{v}_1 \mathbf{v}_2$ (resp., $\frac{\mathbf{v}_1}{\mathbf{v}_2}$) to represent an individual monomial in a (possibly multivariate) polynomial. For variables denoted with Greek alphabets, say α, β, γ , we represent their corresponding formal variables as α, β, γ . We also define $\mathbb{Z}_q\text{-span}(\mathcal{S})$ as the set of \mathbb{Z}_q -linear combinations of all elements in any set \mathcal{S} . Assume \mathbf{A} issues an arbitrary polynomial number $Q_{\text{zt}}(\lambda)$ of queries to its Zt_T oracle in each hybrid.

$\mathbf{H}_1(\lambda)$: This is the real scheme corresponding to bit $b = 0$ in the GGM. In more detail, the hybrid goes as follows.

- **Setup phase:** \mathbf{A} sends an attribute length $n = n(\lambda)$ and slot count $L = L(\lambda)$ to the challenger, upon which it first initializes $\text{ctr} = 0$, a dictionary \mathbf{D} , and the set $\mathcal{C}_L = \emptyset$ to account for corrupted slots. Next, it computes $\mathcal{G} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g_1, g_2, e) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ and initializes three tables as $\mathcal{L}_t[1] = g_t, \forall t \in \{1, 2, T\}$. The challenger prepares a tuple $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, \{(t, 1)\}_{t \in \{1, 2, T\}})$, where $(t, 1)$ represents the handle to $g_t, \forall t \in \{1, 2, T\}$. To allow \mathbf{A} to compute the group operations including the bilinear map e , the challenger also simulates all the oracles $\text{Add}_t, \text{Neg}_t, \text{Map}_e, \text{Zt}_T$ with implicit access to the lists $\{\mathcal{L}_t\}_{t \in \{1, 2, T\}}$. It then computes the crs components as follows:

1. Set $n' = n + 1$. Compute $h = g_1^\beta, \Gamma = g_1^\gamma \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $Z = e(g_1, g_2)^\alpha \in \mathbb{G}_T$ as in the real Setup algorithm. Update \mathcal{L}_1 with the elements β, γ and \mathcal{L}_T with α respectively.
2. For each slot index $i \in [0, L]$, do the following:
 - (a) $\forall w \in [n']$, compute $U_{w,i} = g_1^{u_{w,i}} \in \mathbb{G}_1$ as in the real scheme and update \mathcal{L}_1 with $u_{w,i}$.
 - (b) $\forall i > 0$, compute $A_i = g_2^{t_i}, B_i = g_2^{\alpha + \beta \cdot t_i} \in \mathbb{G}_2$ as in the real scheme and update \mathcal{L}_2 with $t_i, (\alpha + \beta \cdot t_i)$ in order.
 - (c) $\forall i > 0, w \in [n']$ and for each $j \in [0, L] \setminus \{i\}$, compute $W_{i,j,w} = g_2^{\frac{t_i \cdot u_{j,w}}{\gamma}} \in \mathbb{G}_2$ as in the real scheme and update \mathcal{L}_2 with $\frac{t_i \cdot u_{j,w}}{\gamma}$.

3. For $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0 = (\tilde{x}_{1,0}, \dots, \tilde{x}_{n',0}) \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q^{n'+}$, set $\mathbf{pk}_0 = \left(T_0, \left\{ \widetilde{W}_{i,0} \right\}_{i \in [L]} \right)$ as in the real scheme. Define $u'_0 = \sum_{w=1}^{n'} u_{w,0} \cdot \tilde{x}_{w,0} = -\text{DL}(T_0)$ so that

$$T_0 = g_1^{u'_0} \in \mathbb{G}_1 \quad , \quad \widetilde{W}_{i,0} = g_2^{\frac{t_i \cdot u'_0}{\gamma}} \in \mathbb{G}_2, \forall i \in [L].$$

Update \mathcal{L}_1 with u'_0 and \mathcal{L}_2 with $\left\{ \frac{t_i \cdot u'_0}{\gamma} \right\}_{i \in [L]}$ in order.

4. Set

$$\text{crs} = \left(\mathcal{G}, Z, h, \Gamma, \{A_i, B_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \left\{ \{U_{w,i}\}_{i \in [0,L]}, \{W_{i,j,w}\}_{i \in [L], j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \right\}_{w \in [n']}, \mathbf{pk}_0 \right).$$

5. Return to A a tuple crs' that includes $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, \{(t, 1)\}_{t \in \{1,2,T\}})$ along with the handles to all elements in the same order as they are arranged in the crs above.

• **Pre-challenge query phase:** A can issue *key generation* queries or *corruption* queries in this phase.

1. Consider the key-generation queries first. Upon getting a slot index $i \in [L]$, the challenger updates $\text{ctr} = \text{ctr} + 1$, sets $\mathbf{x}_i^{\text{ctr}} = \mathbf{x}_i$ and does the following:

- (a) Sample $\tilde{r}_i^{\text{ctr}} \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_q^+$ and compute $\mathbf{pk}_i^{\text{ctr}} = \left(T_i^{\text{ctr}}, \left\{ \widetilde{W}_{j,i}^{\text{ctr}} \right\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}} \right)$ as in KGen.
(b) Note that the element $T_i^{\text{ctr}} \in \mathbb{G}_1$ from $\mathbf{pk}_i^{\text{ctr}}$ has the following structure:

$$T_i^{\text{ctr}} = g_1^{-\tilde{r}_i^{\text{ctr}} u_{n',i}}, \text{ where } \text{sk}_i^{\text{ctr}} = \tilde{r}_i^{\text{ctr}} \text{ is the secret key.}$$

Even given the handle to $u_{n',i}$, A cannot compute a handle for $\text{DL}(T_i^{\text{ctr}}) = -\tilde{r}_i^{\text{ctr}} u_{n',i}$ on its own. Hence, the challenger updates \mathcal{L}_1 with $\text{DL}(T_i^{\text{ctr}})$.

- (c) Further, each term in $\left\{ \widetilde{W}_{j,i}^{\text{ctr}} \in \mathbb{G}_2 \right\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$ has the following structure:

$$\widetilde{W}_{j,i}^{\text{ctr}} = W_{j,i,n'}^{\tilde{r}_i^{\text{ctr}}} = g_2^{\frac{t_j u_{n',i} \cdot \tilde{r}_i^{\text{ctr}}}{\gamma}}$$

For reasons similar to Item (b) above, the challenger updates \mathcal{L}_2 with each element individually from the set $\left\{ \tilde{r}_i^{\text{ctr}} \cdot \frac{t_j u_{n',i}}{\gamma} \right\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$.

- (d) Define $\mathbf{pk}_{\text{ctr}} = \mathbf{pk}_i^{\text{ctr}}, \text{sk}_{\text{ctr}} = \text{sk}_i^{\text{ctr}}$ and $\mathbf{pk}'_{\text{ctr}}$ as a sequence of handles to all elements in the same order as they are arranged in \mathbf{pk}_{ctr} .
(e) Return the tuple $(\text{ctr}, \mathbf{pk}'_{\text{ctr}})$ to A and update $\text{D}[\text{ctr}] = (i, \mathbf{pk}_{\text{ctr}}, \text{sk}_{\text{ctr}})$.
2. When A sends $c \in [\text{ctr}]$ issuing a corruption query, the challenger returns sk' to A where $\text{D}[c] = (i', \mathbf{pk}', \text{sk}')$.

• **Challenge phase:** In this phase, A specifies the following challenge information:

$$\{(c_i, \mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{pk}_i^*)\}_{i \in [L]} \quad \text{and} \quad ((\mathbf{y}_0, m_0), (\mathbf{y}_1, m_1)) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q^{n+} \times \mathbb{G}_T)^2.$$

Preprocessing the challenge information. For each $i \in [L]$, the challenger checks that $\mathbf{x}_i \neq \mathbf{0}^n$ and does the following:

1. If $c_i \in [\text{ctr}]$, it checks $\text{D}[c_i] = (i', \mathbf{pk}', \text{sk}')$. If $i \neq i'$, it halts. Else, it sets $\mathbf{pk}_i^* = \mathbf{pk}'$. Further, if A issued a corruption query for c_i before, it updates $\mathcal{C}_L = \mathcal{C}_L \cup \{i\}$.
2. If $c_i = \perp$, \mathbf{pk}_i^* represents a corrupt secret key generated by A itself. Hence, it parses \mathbf{pk}_i^* and halts if $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \mathbf{pk}_i^*) = 0$.¹⁰ Else, it updates $\mathcal{C}_L = \mathcal{C}_L \cup \{i\}$.

¹⁰ By [Definition 4](#), A is supposed to send well-formed keys that passes the $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, \cdot, \cdot)$ test. Hence, from now on we do not mention it any more, but assume the challenger checks it implicitly.

Computing key aggregation. The challenger then computes

$$(\text{mpk}, (\text{hsk}_i)_{i \in [L]}) = \text{Aggr}(\text{crs}, ((\text{pk}_i^*, \mathbf{x}_i))_{i \in [L]}), \text{ where}$$

$$\text{mpk} = (\mathcal{G}, g, h, Z, \Gamma, \{\widehat{U}_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]}), \text{ and } \{\text{hsk}_i = (\mathcal{G}, i, A_i, B_i, \{\widehat{W}_{w,i}\}_{w \in [n'+1]})\}_{i \in [L]}.$$

Computing the challenge ciphertext. The challenger now uses mpk and the pair (\mathbf{y}_0, m_0) , and generates $c^* \leftarrow_s \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \mathbf{y}_0, m_0)$ where $c^* = (C_1, C_2, \{C_{3,w}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}, C_4)$.

1. Note that $C_1 = m_0 \cdot e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha s} \in \mathbb{G}_T$ and $C_2 = g_1^s \in \mathbb{G}_1$. Accordingly, the challenger updates \mathcal{L}_T with αs and \mathcal{L}_1 with s respectively.
2. With $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_0 = (\mathbf{y}_0, 0, 0) = (y_1^0, \dots, y_n^0, 0, 0)$, note that the elements $\{C_{3,w} \in \mathbb{G}_1\}_{w \in [n'+1]}$ have the following structure:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{for all } w \in [n], C_{3,w} &= h^{y_w^0 \cdot r + s} \cdot \widehat{U}_w^{-z} = g_1^{r\beta y_w^0 + s\beta - z \cdot u_w} \\ \text{for } w = n', C_{3,n'} &= g_1^{r\beta \cdot 0 + s\beta - z \cdot u_n'} = g_1^{s\beta - z \cdot u_{n'}} \\ \text{for } w = n' + 1, C_{3,n'+1} &= g_1^{r\beta \cdot 0 + s\beta} \cdot \widehat{U}_{n'+1}^{-z} = g_1^{s\beta} \cdot \prod_{i=0}^L T_i^{-z} \\ &= g_1^{s\beta} \cdot \prod_{i=0}^L g_1^{z \sum_{w=1}^{n'} \tilde{x}_{w,i} \cdot u_{w,i}} \\ &= g_1^{s\beta} \cdot \prod_{i=0}^L g_1^{z \cdot u_i'} = g_1^{s\beta + z \cdot u_0' - z \sum_{i=1}^L \text{DL}(T_i)} \end{aligned}$$

where $u_w = \sum_{i=0}^L u_{w,i}$, and $u_{n'} = \sum_{i=0}^L u_{n',i}$.

Accordingly, the challenger updates \mathcal{L}_1 with the elements $\{r\beta y_w^0 + s\beta - z \cdot u_w\}_{w \in [n]}$, $(s\beta - z \cdot u_{n'})$, and $[s\beta + z \cdot u_0' - z \cdot \sum_{i=1}^L \text{DL}(T_i)]$ in order.

3. Since $C_4 = g_1^{\gamma z} \in \mathbb{G}_1$, it updates \mathcal{L}_1 with $z\gamma$.

Group oracle queries. Since Aggr is deterministic, \mathbf{A} is able to compute $(\text{mpk}, (\text{hsk}_i)_{i \in [L]})$ on its own. In the GGM, \mathbf{A} is able to compute handles for the elements in mpk and $\{\text{hsk}_i\}_{i \in [L]}$. To this end, it queries the appropriate group oracles to generate such handles as follows:

1. \mathbf{A} only needs to compute the handles for $\{\widehat{U}_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]}$ to complete its information about mpk .

Note that $\forall w \in [n']$, $\widehat{U}_w = \prod_{i=0}^L U_{w,i} = g_1^{u_w}$, where $u_w = \sum_{i=0}^L u_{w,i}$. Hence, $\forall w \in [n']$, \mathbf{A} invokes the Add_1 oracle L times *iteratively* on the handles in \mathcal{L}_1 for $\{u_{w,i}\}_{i \in [0,L]}$ and gets a handle for u_w . Further, to get a handle for $\widehat{U}_{n'+1} = \prod_{i=0}^L T_i$, it has to first get a handle for each T_i that is fused with the predicate \mathbf{x}_i . Note the structure of each T_i after Step (2) in Aggr :

$$T_i = g_1^{\sum_{w=1}^{n'} -\tilde{x}_{w,i} \cdot u_{w,i}} = g_1^{\sum_{w=1}^{n'} (-x_{w,i} \cdot u_{w,i})} \times g_1^{(-\tilde{r}_i \cdot u_{n',i})} \in \mathbb{G}_1.$$

Given a handle for the second multiplicand, it is easy to note that the first one is publicly computable using Neg_1 and Add_1 oracles. Once \mathbf{A} obtains the handles for $\{T_i\}_{i \in [L]}$, it can call Add_1 oracle on these handles to get the same for $\widehat{U}_{n'+1}$.

2. \mathbf{A} only needs to compute the handles for $\{\widehat{W}_{w,i}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}$ to get complete information about hsk_i for each $i \in [L]$. Note that $\forall w \in [n']$, $\widehat{W}_{w,i} = \prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} W_{i,j,w} = g_2^{t_i \cdot (u_w - u_{w,i}) / \gamma}$, since $(u_w - u_{w,i}) = \sum_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} u_{w,j}$. It is again easy to see that a handle for such an element can be computed by calling the Add_2 oracle $L - 1$ times *iteratively* on the handles in \mathcal{L}_2 for $\{\frac{t_i \cdot u_{w,j}}{\gamma}\}_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}}$. Further, note that to get a handle for $\widehat{W}_{n'+1,i} = \prod_{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}} \widehat{W}_{i,j}^{-1}$, it has to first get a handle

for each $\widetilde{W}_{j,i}$ that is fused with the predicate \mathbf{x}_i . Note the structure of each $\widetilde{W}_{j,i}$ after Step (2) in Aggr:

$$\widetilde{W}_{j,i} = \left(\prod_{w=1}^n W_{i,j,w}^{\widetilde{x}_{w,i}} \right) \cdot W_{i,j,n'}^{\widetilde{r}_i} = g_2^{\sum_{w=1}^n \frac{t_j u_{w,i}}{\gamma} \cdot x_{w,i}} \times g_2^{\left(\frac{t_j u_{n',i}}{\gamma} \cdot \widetilde{r}_i \right)} \in \mathbb{G}_2.$$

Again, given a handle for the second multiplicand, the same can be computed publicly for the entire product using handles for $\{W_{i,j,w}\}$. Once A obtains the handles to each element in $\{\widetilde{W}_{j,i}\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$, it can call Add_2 oracle on these handles to get the same for $\widehat{W}_{n+1,i}$.

3. Finally, it defines mpk' and each hsk'_i as sequences of handles to all elements (except i, \mathbf{x}_i) in the same order as arranged in mpk and each $\text{hsk}_i, \forall i \in [L]$.

• **Output phase:** A outputs a bit $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.

For ease of presentation, in [Table 2](#) we show all unit and composite terms generated in the scheme itself, and stored in the respective lists.

$\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$: In this hybrid, we switch to the SGM *partially*. Namely, the interaction between challenger and A remains exactly as it was in $\mathbf{H}_1(\lambda)$, but now the challenger stores formal variables for all the terms from [Table 2](#) in the respective lists $\mathcal{L}_t, \forall t \in \{1, 2, \mathbb{T}\}$. Thus, all the handles A receives refer to multivariate polynomials from the following ring:

$$\zeta = \mathbb{Z}_q \left[\alpha, \beta, \gamma, u'_0, \{u_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n]}, \{\widetilde{r}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{t_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \frac{1}{\gamma}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{z}, \{y_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right].$$

Concretely, A gets handles to formal polynomials from \mathcal{L}_t for each $t \in \{1, 2, \mathbb{T}\}$, where:

1. $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}} = \{1, \alpha, \text{DL}(m) + \alpha \mathbf{s}\}$.
2. $\mathcal{L}_1 = \mathcal{L}_1^{\text{crs}} \cup \mathcal{L}_1^{\text{key}} \cup \mathcal{L}_1^c$, where
 - (a) $\mathcal{L}_1^{\text{crs}} = (1, \beta, \gamma, u'_0, \{u_{w,i}\}_{i \in [0,L], w \in [n']})$,
 - (b) $\mathcal{L}_1^{\text{key}} = \left(\{-\widetilde{r}_i^c u_{n',i}\}_{c \in [Q_k]} \right)$ for some $i \in [L]$, and
 - (c) $\mathcal{L}_1^c = \left(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{z}\gamma, \left\{ \mathbf{r}\beta y_w + \mathbf{s}\beta - \mathbf{z} \sum_{i=0}^L u_{w,i} \right\}_{w \in [n]}, \mathbf{s}\beta - \mathbf{z}u_{n'}, \mathbf{s}\beta - \mathbf{z}\text{DL}(\mathbb{T}) \right)$.
3. $\mathcal{L}_2 = \mathcal{L}_2^{\text{crs}} \cup \mathcal{L}_2^{\text{key}}$, where
 - (a) $\mathcal{L}_2^{\text{crs}} = \left(1, \{t_i, \alpha + \beta t_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \frac{t_i u'_0}{\gamma}, \left\{ \frac{t_i u_{w,j}}{\gamma} \right\}_{i \in [L], j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\}, w \in [n']} \right)$, and
 - (b) $\mathcal{L}_2^{\text{key}} = \left(\left\{ \frac{\widetilde{r}_i^c t_j u_{n',i}}{\gamma} \right\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}, c \in [Q_k]} \right)$ for some $i \in [L]$.

However, when A issues any zero-test query via $\mathbf{Zt}_{\mathbb{T}}$ oracle, the challenger replaces the formal variables with their corresponding elements from \mathbb{Z}_q . In this case, if the variable is not assigned a value in \mathbb{Z}_q , it samples the corresponding value from the same distribution as it did in $\mathbf{H}_1(\lambda)$. However, once a value is assigned to a variable, it is fixed throughout the rest of $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$. We show in [Lemma 1](#) that $\mathbf{H}_1(\lambda) \equiv \mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$. Given the tuple $\mathbf{P} = (\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2, \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}})$, we define $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}}) = \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}} \cup \{V_1 \cdot V_2 \mid \forall V_1 \in \mathcal{L}_1, V_2 \in \mathcal{L}_2\}$. Basically, it is the set of all monomials from ζ with variables in $\mathbb{G}_{\mathbb{T}}$ that A can compute querying Map_e on the handles it received for elements in $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$. We estimate the size of $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}})$ as follows. Note that we have $|\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}})| = |\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}}| + |\mathcal{L}_1| \cdot |\mathcal{L}_2|$ where $|\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}}| = 3$,

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathcal{L}_1| &= |\mathcal{L}_1^{\text{crs}}| + |\mathcal{L}_1^{\text{key}}| + |\mathcal{L}_1^c| \\ &\leq \{(L+1)n' + 4\} + LQ_k + (n+4) = L(n+Q_k+1) + 2n+9, \text{ and} \\ |\mathcal{L}_2| &= |\mathcal{L}_2^{\text{crs}}| + |\mathcal{L}_2^{\text{key}}| \\ &\leq \{2+2L+n'L^2\} + \{L(L-1)Q_k\} = L^2(n+Q_k+1) - L(Q_k-2) + 2. \end{aligned}$$

There are several variables in ζ and several terms in $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$. Hence, for brevity, we do not state all the elements of $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{T}})$ explicitly with all possible cross combinations of the monomials from $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$. However,

	\mathcal{L}_1	\mathcal{L}_2	\mathcal{L}_T
crs	$\boxed{g_1}$, $\boxed{\beta}$, $\boxed{\gamma}$ $\boxed{u'_0} = \sum_{w=1}^{n'} u_{w,0} \tilde{x}_{w,0}$, $\left\{ \boxed{u_{w,i}} \right\}_{i \in [0,L], w \in [n']}$	$\boxed{g_2}$, $\left\{ \boxed{t_i}, \boxed{\alpha + \beta t_i} \right\}_{i \in [L]}$ $\frac{\boxed{t_i u'_0}}{\boxed{\gamma}}$, $\left\{ \frac{\boxed{t_i u_{w,j}}}{\boxed{\gamma}} \right\}_{\substack{i \in [L] \\ j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\} \\ w \in [n]}}$	$\boxed{g_T}$ $\boxed{\alpha}$
$\{\text{pk}_c\}_{c \in [Q_k]}$	$\left\{ \boxed{-\tilde{r}_i^c u_{n',i}} \right\}_{c \in [Q_k]}$ (for $\{T_i^c\}_{c \in [Q_k]}$)	$\left\{ \frac{\boxed{\tilde{r}_i^c \cdot t_j u_{n',i}}}{\boxed{\gamma}} \right\}_{\substack{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\} \\ c \in [Q_k]}}$ (for $\{\widetilde{W}_{j,i}^c\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}, c \in [Q_k]}$)	–
c	\boxed{s} (for C_2) , $\boxed{z\gamma}$ (for C_4) , $\boxed{r\beta y_w^0 + s\beta - zu_w}$ (for $C_{3,w}, \forall w \in [n]$), $\boxed{s\beta - zu_{n'}}$ (for $C_{3,n'}$) , where $u_{n'} = \sum_{i=0}^L u_{n',i}$ $\boxed{s\beta - z\text{DL}(T)}$ (for $C_{3,n'+1}$) , where $\text{DL}(T) = \sum_{i=0}^L \text{DL}(T_i)$	–	$\boxed{\text{DL}(m) + \alpha s}$

Table 2. The above table shows all terms from the scheme for which handles are stored in the respective lists $\mathcal{L}_t, \forall t \in \{1, 2, T\}$. Assume \mathcal{A} issues some arbitrary polynomial number, Q_k , of key queries in the pre-challenge query phase (some of which may be corrupted). The table lists all the terms for each of these keys $\{\text{pk}_c\}_{c \in [Q_k]}$ received by \mathcal{A} in the second row. Hence, these terms are also indexed with superscripts for the key query count $c \in [Q_k]$ (along with the slot index, say $i \in [L]$, for which \mathcal{A} asked the key). The terms corresponding to mpk and hsk_i are not shown in the table, since the handles for these are publicly computable by \mathcal{A} using the group oracles. Note that such terms correspond to keys for all the registered L slots (possibly all of which may be corrupted or even adversarially generated). Hence, the individual variables in each of those terms in mpk and hsk_i are independent of the counter variable $c \in [Q_k]$ respectively. In c , observe that we also have $(\text{DL}(m) + \alpha s)$ in \mathcal{L}_T , where $\text{DL}(m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is w.r.t. g_T .

it is easy to see by inspection that the maximal total degree of each term in $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_T)$ is $d = 7$ corresponding to the term $\left[\mathbf{r}\beta \mathbf{y}_w \cdot \frac{\tilde{r}_i^c t_j u_{n',i}}{\gamma} \right]$ for any $w \in [n'], i \in [L], j \in [0, L] \setminus \{i\}, c \in [Q_k]$. We also note that any handle submitted by \mathcal{A} to the Zt_T oracle during its interaction refers to a polynomial $f \in \zeta$ as

$$f \left(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, u'_0, \{u_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n]}, \{\tilde{r}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{t_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \frac{1}{\gamma}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{z}, \{y_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right) = \sum_{\theta \in \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_T)} \eta_\theta \theta,$$

where the coefficients $\{\eta_\theta \in \mathbb{Z}_q\}_{\theta \in \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_T)}$ can be computed efficiently. Further, since all the monomials in $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_T)$ are distinct, the coefficients η_θ are unique.

$\mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$: In this hybrid, *all* queries to \mathbf{Zt}_\top oracle are answered using formal variables. Namely, for any \mathbf{Zt}_\top query on a handle to a polynomial $f \in \zeta$, the challenger returns 1 if:

$$f \left(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \frac{1}{\gamma}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{z}, \{\mathbf{y}_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right) = 0.$$

We show in [Lemma 2](#) that $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$.

$\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda)$: In this hybrid, the challenge ciphertext computes an encryption of m_0 with respect to \mathbf{y}_1 . That is, everything remains as it is in $\mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$ except that the challenger generates

$$c^* = (C_1, C_2, \{C_{3,w}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}, C_4) \leftarrow^s \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \mathbf{y}_1, m_0).$$

We show in [Lemma 3](#) that $\mathbf{H}_3 \approx \mathbf{H}_4$.

From here on, the challenger moves to $\mathbf{H}_6(\lambda)$ directly if $m_0 = m_1$. Else if $m_0 \neq m_1$, it still moves to $\mathbf{H}_6(\lambda)$, but via the next hybrids.

$\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$: In this hybrid, $Z^s \in \mathbb{G}_\top$ is replaced with $\mathfrak{U} \leftarrow^s \mathbb{G}_\top$. We show in [Lemma 4](#) that $\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$.

$\mathbf{H}_{5,2}(\lambda)$: In this hybrid, the challenge ciphertext encrypts m_1 instead of m_0 .

$\mathbf{H}_{5,3}(\lambda)$: In this hybrid, \mathfrak{U} is changed to the honestly computed Z^s again. Since these hybrids are standard, we show that directly in [Lemma 5](#) that $\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,2}(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,3}(\lambda)$.

$\mathbf{H}_6(\lambda)$: In this hybrid, the challenger moves to GGM from the symbolic setting of SGM. This is the real scheme corresponding to bit $b = 1$ in the GGM and [Lemma 6](#) shows that $\mathbf{H}_{5,3}(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_6(\lambda)$.

Hybrid Indistinguishability. Here, we show the indistinguishability of consecutive hybrids.

Lemma 1 ($\mathbf{H}_1(\lambda) \equiv \mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$). $\mathbf{H}_1(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$ are perfectly indistinguishable.

Proof. Note that \mathbf{A} sees the same handles in both $\mathbf{H}_1(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$. So it can notice a difference between the hybrids only if some zero-test query via the \mathbf{Zt}_\top oracle is answered differently. However, these zero-test queries are answered using values sampled from the same distribution in both the hybrids. Thus \mathbf{A} 's view remains the same in both the hybrids.

Lemma 2 ($\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$). $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$ are statistically indistinguishable.

Proof. Note that $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$ differs only when \mathbf{A} submits a handle for some $f \in \zeta$ satisfying

$$f \left(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{u_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \frac{1}{\gamma}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{z}, \{y_w^0\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right) = 0, \text{ and}$$

$$f \left(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \frac{1}{\gamma}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{z}, \{\mathbf{y}_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right) \neq 0$$

to the \mathbf{Zt}_\top oracle. Denote this event as $\mathbf{E}_{2,3}$. It suffices to bound the probability of $\mathbf{E}_{2,3}$ occurring in $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$. To this end, recall that the maximal total degree of any such polynomial $f \in \zeta$ that could be formed by linear combinations of the monomials in $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{L}_\top)$ is $d = 7$. Further, for any such $f \in \zeta$ in $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda)$, observe that all variables input to f are randomly sampled except $\{y_w^0\}_{w \in [n'+1]}$. In particular, we have $\mathbf{y}_0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+}$ supplied by \mathbf{A} itself and $y_{n'}^0, y_{n'+1}^0 = 0$. Thus, fixing $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_0$, the maximal degree of each monomial in f becomes $d - 1 = 6$.

We then define a new polynomial $g \in \mathbb{Z}_q \left[\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \{\mathbf{y}_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right]$ as

$$g \left(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \{y_w^0\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right) =$$

$$\gamma \cdot f \left(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \frac{1}{\gamma}, \{y_w^0\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right).$$

The polynomial g is introduced to clear any γ from the denominator that may appear in f and to make sure that g is in the ring

$$\mathbb{Z}_q \left[\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \{\mathbf{y}_w\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right]$$

and not ζ . Note that since $\gamma \neq 0$, $\mathbf{E}_{2,3}$ occurs if and only if

$$g \left(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \{y_w^0\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right) = 0$$

and

$$g \left(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{u}'_0, \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [L], w \in [n']}, \{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\}_{i \in [L], c \in [Q_k]}, \{\mathbf{t}_i\}_{i \in [L]}, \{y_w^0\}_{w \in [n'+1]} \right) \neq 0.$$

However, this implies that $\deg(g) \leq 7$ (γ may increase the maximal degree of each monomial by 1, even if $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_0$ is fixed). We now note that all the remaining inputs in g are sampled independently and uniformly at random. Hence, by Schwarz-Zippel lemma we have that $\Pr[\mathbf{E}_{2,3}] \leq \frac{7}{q}$. As \mathbf{A} issues $Q_{\mathbf{zt}}(\lambda)$ queries to the \mathbf{Zt}_T oracle, a union bound implies that \mathbf{A} can distinguish the two hybrids with probability at most $\frac{7 \cdot Q_{\mathbf{zt}}(\lambda)}{q}$. Thus, $\mathbf{H}_2(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$.

Lemma 3 ($\mathbf{H}_3(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_4(\lambda)$). $\mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda)$ are statistically indistinguishable.

Proof. In $\mathbf{H}_3(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda)$, \mathbf{A} interacts with the challenger in the SGM. In particular, all elements from $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T are treated “symbolically” and indexed by their discrete logarithms. The only information that \mathbf{A} can learn in the SGM is by querying \mathbf{Zt}_T oracle. Without loss of generality, we need to care only about the *successful* queries to the \mathbf{Zt}_T oracle. Recall the challenge ciphertext $c^* = (C_1, C_2, \{C_{3,w}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}, C_4)$. The heart of this analysis is to prove properties about the coefficients that \mathbf{A} assigns to the discrete logarithms of the elements in $(C_{3,1}, \dots, C_{3,n'+1})$. These are the most important coefficients because the above group elements are the only ones depending on the challenge attribute vector \mathbf{y}_b . Recall that $\forall w \in [n'+1]$, we have

$$C_{3,w} = h^{\tilde{y}_w^b \cdot r + s} \cdot \hat{U}_w^{-z} = g_1^{\tilde{y}_w^b \cdot r \beta + s \beta} \cdot \hat{U}_w^{-z} = g_1^{r \beta \tilde{y}_w^b + s \beta - z \chi},$$

where $\chi \in \{u_1, \dots, u_{n'}, \text{DL}(T)\}$. We now proceed with the following claims.

Claim 1 *The coefficients of all the terms $(C_{3,1}, \dots, C_{3,n'+1})$ that are **not** paired with some A_i must be equal to zero.*

Proof. Note that the only *symbolic* elements that \mathbf{A} can access in \mathbb{G}_2 , apart from \mathbf{t}_i (representing A_i) for any $i \in [L]$, are the following:

1. 1 (representing g_2).
2. $\alpha + \beta \mathbf{t}_i$ (representing B_i), $\forall i \in [L]$.
3. $\frac{\mathbf{t}_i \mathbf{u}'_0}{\gamma}$ (representing $\tilde{W}_{i,0}$), $\forall i \in [L]$.
4. $\left\{ \frac{\mathbf{t}_i \mathbf{u}_{w,j}}{\gamma} \right\}_{\substack{j \in [0,L] \setminus \{i\} \\ w \in [n']}}$ (representing $W_{i,j,w}$), $\forall i \in [L]$.
5. $\left\{ \frac{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c \mathbf{t}_j \mathbf{u}_{n',i}}{\gamma} \right\}_{\substack{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\} \\ c \in [Q_k]}}$ (representing $W_{j,i,n'}^{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c}$ from the product $\tilde{W}_{j,i}^c$ in \mathbf{pk}_c), $\forall i \in [L]$.
6. Any arbitrary linear combination amongst the above 5 items (and possibly with \mathbf{t}_i).

Observe that items 2, 3, 4 and 5 are all linearly independent. In particular, they do not cancel out internally as well as with each other. E.g., for $i, j \in [0, L], i \neq j$, $(\alpha + \beta \mathbf{t}_i)$ cannot cancel out $(\alpha + \beta \mathbf{t}_j)$, or they also do not cancel out with $\frac{\mathbf{t}_i \mathbf{u}'_0}{\gamma}$, $\frac{\mathbf{t}_i \mathbf{u}_{w,j}}{\gamma}$ or $\frac{\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c \mathbf{t}_j \mathbf{u}_{n',i}}{\gamma}$. We will now establish that they cannot cancel even when \mathbf{A} uses the Map_e oracle to form products with the terms available to \mathbf{A} from \mathbb{G}_1 . We focus particularly on the terms representing $C_{3,w} s'$ and C_4 . The other terms in \mathbb{G}_1 from crs , $\{\mathbf{pk}_c\}_{c \in [Q_k]}$ and $C_2 \in c^*$ follow from a simple inspection. For any $i \in [L]$, let us look at the coefficients of the symbolic representation for any $C_{3,w}$ (from

above) multiplied with anything available from the same for elements in \mathbb{G}_2 . For convenience, we argue both in the language of pairings and the equivalent symbolic setting in the following, switching between them as and when required. In particular, we focus on the variable \mathbf{z} , which is present only in the terms representing $C_{3,w}$ and C_4 . Define $\Delta = \{\mathbf{u}_1, \dots, \mathbf{u}_{n'}, \text{DL}(\mathbf{T})\}$. Below we look at all possible pairings and show that they have linearly independent symbolic terms that cannot be cancelled out, so long as we forbid A_i in the pairing.

1. $e(C_{3,w}, g_2)$: Here we have the *unique* terms $\mathbf{z}\chi, \forall \chi \in \Delta$ (no $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mathbf{t}_i$).
2. $e(C_{3,w}, A_i)$: Here we have the *unique* terms $\mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i\chi, \forall \chi \in \Delta$ (no α, β, γ). Note that this is the one that we are excluding, but we still have to consider it to make sure that it does not cancel out with the *other* pairings of $C_{3,w}$.
3. $e(C_{3,w}, B_i)$: Here we have the *unique* terms $\mathbf{z}\alpha\chi$ and $\mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i\beta\chi, \forall \chi \in \Delta$ (no γ).
4. $e(C_{3,w}, \widetilde{W}_{i,0})$: Here we have the *unique* terms $\mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i\mathbf{u}'_0\chi/\gamma, \forall \chi \in \Delta$ (no α, β).
5. $e(C_{3,w}, W_{i,j,w})$: Here we have the *unique* terms $\mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i\mathbf{u}_{w,j}\chi/\gamma, \forall \chi \in \Delta$ (no α, β).
6. $e(C_{3,w}, W_{j,i,n'}^{\widetilde{r}_i^c})$: Here we have the *unique* terms $\mathbf{z}\widetilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\mathbf{t}_j\mathbf{u}_{n',i}\chi/\gamma, \forall \chi \in \Delta$ (no α, β).
7. $e(C_4, g_2)$: Here we have the *unique* term $\mathbf{z}\gamma$ (no $\alpha, \beta, \mathbf{t}_i$).
8. $e(C_4, A_i)$: Here we have the *unique* term $\mathbf{z}\gamma\mathbf{t}_i$ (no α, β).
9. $e(C_4, B_i)$: Here we have the *unique* terms $\mathbf{z}\gamma\alpha$ (no β) and $\mathbf{z}\gamma\beta\mathbf{t}_i$ (no α).
10. $e(C_4, \widetilde{W}_{i,0})$: Here we have the *unique* term $\mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i\mathbf{u}'_0$ (no α, β).
11. $e(C_4, W_{i,j,w})$: Here we have the terms $\mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i\mathbf{u}_{w,j}$ (no α, β, γ). Note that this term includes terms from Item-(2) above setting $\chi = \mathbf{u}_w = \sum_{k=0}^L u_{w,k}$. Hence, it is *not* a unique term. But we are anyway excluding A_i from this inspection.
12. $e(C_4, W_{j,i,n'}^{\widetilde{r}_i^c})$: Here we have the *unique* terms $\mathbf{z}\widetilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\mathbf{t}_j\mathbf{u}_{n',i}$ (no α, β, γ).

By inspection, we see that these monomials are indeed unique across all possible pairings (except A_i) and thus, are also linearly independent among each other. It is easy to see that the same holds true for the initial terms in $C_{3,w}$ as well. In particular, observe that for any $w \in [n' + 1]$, $C_{3,w}$ is represented symbolically by the general term $(\mathbf{r}\beta\mathbf{y}_w + \mathbf{s}\beta - \mathbf{z}\chi)$ for $\chi \in \Delta$. The presence of \mathbf{r} in $\mathbf{r}\beta\mathbf{y}_w$ and β in $\mathbf{s}\beta$ makes all their possible combinations unique and linearly independent. Hence, no cross cancellations can occur if we forbid pairing $C_{3,w}$ with A_i . Formally, define

$$\Psi = \left\{ 1, \left\{ \mathbf{t}_i, \alpha + \beta\mathbf{t}_i, \frac{\mathbf{t}_i\mathbf{u}'_0}{\gamma} \right\}_{i \in [L]}, \left\{ \frac{\mathbf{t}_i\mathbf{u}_{w,j}}{\gamma} \right\}_{\substack{i \in [L], j \in [0, L] \setminus \{i\} \\ w \in [n']}}, \left\{ \frac{\widetilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c\mathbf{t}_j\mathbf{u}_{n',i}}{\gamma} \right\}_{\substack{i \in [L], j \in [L] \setminus \{i\} \\ c \in [Q_k]}} \right\}.$$

The above then implies that for any term $\psi \in \mathbb{Z}_q\text{-span}(\Psi) \setminus \mathbb{Z}_q\text{-span}(\{\mathbf{t}_1, \dots, \mathbf{t}_L\})$:

$$\sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \eta_w \cdot (\mathbf{r}\beta\mathbf{y}_w + \mathbf{s}\beta - \mathbf{z}\chi) \cdot \psi = \psi \sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \eta_w \cdot (\mathbf{r}\beta\mathbf{y}_w + \mathbf{s}\beta - \mathbf{z}\chi) = 0.$$

To reiterate informally, we can consider the coefficients $C_{3,w}$ paired with *anything* (that is not A_i) individually since (i) all the “anything” are linearly independent and all “anything” paired with $C_{3,w}$ do not cancel out. We now show it must be the case that $\eta_w = 0, \forall w \in [n' + 1]$. Substituting the discrete logarithm of $C_{3,w}$ and only looking at the terms involving \mathbf{z} , we have:

$$\sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \eta_w \cdot \text{DL}(\widehat{\mathbf{u}}_w^{-z}) = -z \sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \eta_w \cdot \text{DL}(\widehat{\mathbf{u}}_w) = 0.$$

We consider two cases:

- $\eta_{n'+1} = 0$: Recall that for all $w \in [n']$ we have

$$\text{DL}(\widehat{\mathbf{u}}_w) = \text{DL} \left(\prod_{i \in [0, L]} g_1^{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}} \right) = \mathbf{u}_w.$$

The variable \mathbf{u}_w is formed from the terms $\{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{i \in [0, L]}$ which are unit variables. Hence, the expression above never evaluates to 0 symbolically, unless all of the coefficients $(\eta_1, \dots, \eta_{n'})$ are 0. Thus in this case, the coefficients must be all 0.

– $\eta_{n'+1} \neq 0$: Recall that

$$\text{DL}(\widehat{\mathbf{U}}_{n'+1}) = \text{DL}\left(\prod_{i \in [0, L]} \mathbf{T}_i\right) = \text{DL}(\mathbf{T}) = \text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_0) + \sum_{i \in [L]} \text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_i).$$

Further, recall that there is at least one honest public-key in the above sum (namely \mathbf{T}_0). Hence, it follows that $\text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_0) = -\mathbf{u}'_0$ is a unit variable. Note that the coefficient $\eta_{n'+1}$ is multiplied by $[\dots] \cdot \mathbf{z} \cdot \mathbf{u}'_0$. The only other way to obtain the term $\mathbf{z} \cdot \text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_0)$ is to pair C_4 with $\widetilde{W}_{i,0}$ (this contains $\text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_0)$ as part of the user's key). However, depending on what $\psi \in \Psi$ is, we additionally have (or do not have) one of the following coefficients:

- $\psi = 1$: Here we do not have t_i .
- $\psi = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{t}_i$: Here we have an extra β .
- $\psi = \frac{\mathbf{t}_i \mathbf{u}_{w,j}}{\gamma}$: Here we have an extra $1/\gamma$.
- $\psi = \frac{\widetilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c \mathbf{t}_j \mathbf{u}_{w,i}}{\gamma}$: Here we have the extra terms $\widetilde{\mathbf{r}}_i^c, 1/\gamma$.

Thus, $\eta_{n'+1}$ is multiplied with a variable that is not obtainable anywhere else. Hence, it must be the case that $\eta_{n'+1} = 0$. This establishes **Claim 1**.

Claim 2 *The coefficients of all the terms $(C_{3,1}, \dots, C_{3,n'+1})$, when paired with A_i (for some $i \in [L]$), must form a vector orthogonal to $\mathbf{y}_b, \forall b \in \{0, 1\}$.*

Proof. Recall that $\forall w \in [n'+1]$, the symbolic discrete logarithm of $C_{3,w}$ is $(\mathbf{r}\beta \mathbf{y}_w + \mathbf{s}\beta - \mathbf{z}\chi)$ for $\chi \in \Delta$. After mapping it to \mathbb{G}_T (for example, via pairing with $A_i = g_2^{\mathbf{t}_i}$ for some $i \in [L]$), the variable \mathbf{r} cancels out only when

$$\sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \mathbf{r}\beta \mathbf{t}_i \cdot \mathbf{y}_w \cdot \eta_w = \mathbf{r}\beta \mathbf{t}_i \cdot \sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \eta_w \cdot \mathbf{y}_w = 0$$

where $(\eta_1, \dots, \eta_{n'+1})$ denote the coefficients of the above terms. This must be the case as \mathbf{r} is present in the first summand of $C_{3,w}$'s and nowhere else. This establishes **Claim 2**.

Claim 3 *The coefficients of all the terms $(C_{3,1}, \dots, C_{3,n'+1})$ when paired with A_i (for some $i \in [L]$) must be of the form $c \cdot \widetilde{\mathbf{x}}_i$, for some non-zero constant $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^+$, or all 0.*

Proof. Observe that **Claim 2** also shows that the only way for \mathbf{A} to obtain some information is to use the coefficients corresponding to a “valid” predicate \mathbf{x}_i for some $i \in [L]$, (i.e., one which allows to decrypt the ciphertext). We establish in this claim that such an \mathbf{x}_i is also registered.

On pairing $C_{3,w}$ with A_i for some $i \in [L]$, symbolically, a successful zero-test looks like:

$$\sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \eta_w \cdot (\mathbf{r}\beta \mathbf{y}_w + \mathbf{s}\beta - \mathbf{z}\chi) \cdot \mathbf{t}_i = 0 \tag{5}$$

In the above equation, we have $\chi = \mathbf{u}_w, \forall w \in [n']$ and for $w = n'+1$, we have $\chi = \text{DL}(\mathbf{T})$. The case where $\eta_w = 0, \forall w \in [n'+1]$ is trivial. So we consider the case where there exists some $w \in [n'+1]$ such that $\eta_w \neq 0$. Note that it suffices to consider each $A_i (= g_2^{\mathbf{t}_i})$ separately, since each \mathbf{t}_i are unit variables, and in particular they are linearly independent. We look at the last term in above equation again, namely:

$$\sum_{w \in [n'+1]} -\eta_w \cdot \chi \cdot \mathbf{t}_i \cdot \mathbf{z}.$$

For $w \in [n']$, within each $\chi = \mathbf{u}_w = \sum_{k \in [0, L]} \mathbf{u}_{w,k}$, we isolate $\mathbf{u}_{w,i}$, since the terms $\{\mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i \mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{w \in [n']}$ are not present anywhere else, nor obtainable via any pairing. However, this is not the case for the terms $\mathbf{u}_{w,j}$ for

$j \neq i$. So we can ignore them for clarity (though they are part of the sum). Similarly, for $w = n' + 1$, we isolate the term $\text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_i)$ from $\chi = \text{DL}(\mathbf{T}) = \sum_{k \in [L]} \text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_k)$. [Equation \(5\)](#) with [Claim 2](#) then implies the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \mathbf{s}\beta\mathbf{t}_i \cdot \eta_w - \sum_{w \in [n'+1]} \mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i\chi \cdot \eta_w = 0 \text{ (from Claim 2)} \\
\Rightarrow & \sum_{w \in [n']} \eta_w \cdot \mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i \cdot \mathbf{u}_{w,i} = -\eta_{n'+1} \cdot \mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i \cdot \text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_i) \text{ (since } \mathbf{s}\beta\mathbf{t}_i \text{ and } \mathbf{z}\mathbf{t}_i\chi \text{ are linearly independent)} \\
\Rightarrow & \sum_{w \in [n']} \eta_w \cdot \mathbf{u}_{w,i} = \eta_{n'+1} \cdot \sum_{w \in [n']} \tilde{x}_{w,i} \mathbf{u}_{w,i} \text{ (since } \text{DL}(\mathbf{T}_i) = - \sum_{w \in [n']} \tilde{x}_{w,i} \mathbf{u}_{w,i})} \\
\Rightarrow & (\eta_1, \dots, \eta_{n'}) = \underbrace{\eta_{n'+1}}_c \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i \text{ (since } \{\mathbf{u}_{w,i}\}_{w \in [n']} \text{ are linearly independent)}
\end{aligned}$$

If $c \neq 0$, this is already consistent with the claim. If $c = 0$, it must be that $\eta_w = 0, \forall w \in [n']$, since $\mathbf{u}_{w,i}$ are linearly independent variables that do not cancel out. This establishes [Claim 3](#).

[Claims 1 to 3](#) together implies that the only non-trivial queries that \mathbf{A} can issue are by using vectors in the span of both “registered” and “valid” $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n'}$. Thus, switching \mathbf{y}_0 to \mathbf{y}_1 does not create any difference in \mathbf{A} 's view. Hence, $\mathbf{H}_3 \approx \mathbf{H}_4$.

Lemma 4 ($\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$). $\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$ are statistically indistinguishable.

Proof. Both $\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$ are in SGM, and so [Claims 1 to 3](#) still hold. However, note that \mathbf{A} is admissible and we are in the setting where $m_0 \neq m_1$. Hence, \mathbf{A} can only ask keys for predicates $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n'}$ which are invalid (i.e. they do not allow decrypting c^*). In this case, by [Claims 1 to 3](#), we have that $\eta_w = 0, \forall w \in [n'+1]$. Hence, we can safely ignore the ciphertext components $\{C_{3,w}\}_{w \in [n'+1]}$. The rest of the proof follows simply from the fact that \mathbf{A} cannot get enough information about the component $C_1 = m_0 \cdot Z^s = m_0 \cdot e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha s}$. In particular, $\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$ could be distinguished if \mathbf{A} could gather information on $e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha s}$ (possibly using its oracles in SGM). From [Table 2](#), note that no information about α (resp., \mathbf{s}) is ever released in \mathbb{G}_1 (resp., \mathbb{G}_2). So the only avenue left to \mathbf{A} is to infer information about g_2^α (which can then be paired with $C_1 = g_1^s \in c^*$). This is impossible as \mathbf{A} only has access to $\text{DL}(B_i) = \alpha + \beta\mathbf{t}_i \in \mathbb{G}_2$, where no other components allows it to learn anything about $\beta\mathbf{t}_i \in \mathbb{G}_2$. Hence, $\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$.

Lemma 5 ($\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,2}(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,3}(\lambda)$). $\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$, $\mathbf{H}_{5,2}(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_{5,3}(\lambda)$ are statistically indistinguishable.

Proof. In $\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda)$, Z^s has been replaced with a uniformly sampled $\mathfrak{U} \in \mathbb{G}_T$. Switching from m_0 to m_1 is thus information-theoretically secure, i.e., $\mathbf{H}_{5,1}(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,2}(\lambda)$. Further, an analysis similar to [Lemma 4](#) shows that $\mathbf{H}_{5,2}(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_{5,3}(\lambda)$.

Lemma 6 ($\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_6(\lambda)$ or $\mathbf{H}_{5,3}(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_6(\lambda)$). $\mathbf{H}_4(\lambda) \approx \mathbf{H}_6(\lambda)$ are statistically indistinguishable (when $m_0 = m_1$). Else, $\mathbf{H}_{5,3}(\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{H}_6(\lambda)$ are statistically indistinguishable.

Proof. The proof follows similar to [Lemmas 1 and 2](#) (in the reverse order).

Final pairing-based RIPE scheme. By combining the slotted RIPE scheme of [Construction 1](#) and the “powers-of-two” transformation of [Construction 3](#) ([Appendix C](#)), we obtain a secure registered IPE with an extra $O(\log L)$ factor in its compactness and efficiency measures. Formally, we obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 1. *In the GGM, there exists a secure and perfectly correct RIPE scheme with message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}_T$ and attribute space $\mathcal{U} = \mathbb{Z}_q^{n'}$, satisfying the following properties:*

- $(n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L), n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L), n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L))$ -compactness, and
- $(L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L), n \cdot L^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L), O(\log L), n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L))$ -efficiency.

Recall that L stands for the maximum bound on the number of supported users (bounded case).

Proof. The corollary follows by combining [Definition 6](#) with [Theorems 3 to 6](#) and [11 to 13](#). □

7 Implementation and Benchmarks

We have developed a Python prototype¹¹ of the sRIPE construction as outlined in Section 6. We have chosen the BLS12-381 elliptic curve for the pairings, which we implemented via the `petrelc` Python wrapper [LG22] around RELIC [AGM⁺20]. This configuration allows each element in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ to be represented using 49, 97, and 384 bytes respectively. Our machine has been able to perform exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 in an average time of 0.13 and 0.18 milliseconds respectively, and each pairing evaluation is completed in 0.68 milliseconds on average.

Benchmarks. We provide benchmarks in Figure 2, displaying the sizes of `mpk` and `crs` as well as the execution times of the setup, aggregate, encrypt, and decrypt algorithms in relation to parameters L and n . For encryption and decryption, we executed the algorithm 100 times for each pair (L, n) , then calculated the average runtime. The setup and aggregate were run once for each unique pair of (L, n) . We did not plot the sizes of ciphertexts, but these can be deterministically determined based on n as $|c| = 580 + 49n$ bytes. The size of the helper secret key for each user will be $|\text{hsk}| = 340 + 97n$ bytes. The benchmarks were conducted on a personal computer with an Intel Core i7-10700 3.8GHz CPU and 128GB of RAM running Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS with kernel 5.15.0-58-generic.




Fig. 2: Benchmarks for $L \in \{100, 200, \dots, 1000\}$ and $n \in \{10, 20, \dots, 100\}$

¹¹ <https://anonymous.4open.science/r/slotted-ripe-DD12/>

Acknowledgments. The first author was supported by the Carlsberg Foundation under the Semper Ardens Research Project CF18-112 (BCM). The second and the sixth author were partially supported by project SERICS (PE00000014) under the NRRP MUR program funded by the EU - NGEU and by Sapienza University under the project SPECTRA. The third author was partially supported by the European Union (ERC AdG REWORC - 101054911), and by True Data 8 (Distributed Ledger & Multiparty Computation) under the Hessen State Ministry for Higher Education, Research and the Arts within their joint support of the National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE. The fourth author was partially funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the course of the 6GEM research hub under grant number 16KISK038 and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy - EXC 2092 CASA – 390781972.

References

- ABSV15. Prabhanjan Ananth, Zvika Brakerski, Gil Segev, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. From selective to adaptive security in functional encryption. In Rosario Gennaro and Matthew J. B. Robshaw, editors, *CRYPTO 2015, Part II*, volume 9216 of *LNCS*, pages 657–677. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2015.
- AGM⁺20. D. F. Aranha, C. P. L. Gouvêa, T. Markmann, R. S. Wahby, and K. Liao. RELIC is an Efficient Library for Cryptography. <https://github.com/relic-toolkit/relic>, 2020.
- Agr19. Shweta Agrawal. Indistinguishability obfuscation without multilinear maps: New methods for bootstrapping and instantiation. In Yuval Ishai and Vincent Rijmen, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2019, Part I*, volume 11476 of *LNCS*, pages 191–225. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2019.
- AHY15. Nuttapon Attrapadung, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Shota Yamada. Conversions among several classes of predicate encryption and applications to ABE with various compactness tradeoffs. In Tetsu Iwata and Jung Hee Cheon, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2015, Part I*, volume 9452 of *LNCS*, pages 575–601. Springer, Heidelberg, November / December 2015.
- AJ15. Prabhanjan Ananth and Abhishek Jain. Indistinguishability obfuscation from compact functional encryption. In Rosario Gennaro and Matthew J. B. Robshaw, editors, *CRYPTO 2015, Part I*, volume 9215 of *LNCS*, pages 308–326. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2015.
- AJL⁺19. Prabhanjan Ananth, Aayush Jain, Huijia Lin, Christian Matt, and Amit Sahai. Indistinguishability obfuscation without multilinear maps: New paradigms via low degree weak pseudorandomness and security amplification. In Alexandra Boldyreva and Daniele Micciancio, editors, *CRYPTO 2019, Part III*, volume 11694 of *LNCS*, pages 284–332. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2019.
- AKM⁺22. Shweta Agrawal, Fuyuki Kitagawa, Anuja Modi, Ryo Nishimaki, Shota Yamada, and Takashi Yamakawa. Bounded functional encryption for turing machines: Adaptive security from general assumptions. In *Theory of Cryptography: 20th International Conference, TCC 2022, Chicago, IL, USA, November 7–10, 2022, Proceedings, Part I*, pages 618–647. Springer, 2022.
- AMVY21. Shweta Agrawal, Monosij Maitra, Narasimha Sai Vempati, and Shota Yamada. Functional encryption for turing machines with dynamic bounded collusion from LWE. In Tal Malkin and Chris Peikert, editors, *CRYPTO 2021, Part IV*, volume 12828 of *LNCS*, pages 239–269, Virtual Event, August 2021. Springer, Heidelberg.
- AS17. Prabhanjan Ananth and Amit Sahai. Projective arithmetic functional encryption and indistinguishability obfuscation from degree-5 multilinear maps. In Jean-Sébastien Coron and Jesper Buus Nielsen, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2017, Part I*, volume 10210 of *LNCS*, pages 152–181. Springer, Heidelberg, April / May 2017.
- AV19. Prabhanjan Ananth and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Optimal bounded-collusion secure functional encryption. In Dennis Hofheinz and Alon Rosen, editors, *TCC 2019, Part I*, volume 11891 of *LNCS*, pages 174–198. Springer, Heidelberg, December 2019.
- AY20. Shweta Agrawal and Shota Yamada. Optimal broadcast encryption from pairings and LWE. In Anne Canteaut and Yuval Ishai, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2020, Part I*, volume 12105 of *LNCS*, pages 13–43. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2020.
- BCFG17. Carmen Elisabetta Zaira Baltico, Dario Catalano, Dario Fiore, and Romain Gay. Practical functional encryption for quadratic functions with applications to predicate encryption. In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, editors, *CRYPTO 2017, Part I*, volume 10401 of *LNCS*, pages 67–98. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2017.

- BDGM20. Zvika Brakerski, Nico Döttling, Sanjam Garg, and Giulio Malavolta. Candidate iO from homomorphic encryption schemes. In Anne Canteaut and Yuval Ishai, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2020, Part I*, volume 12105 of *LNCS*, pages 79–109. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2020.
- BDGM22. Zvika Brakerski, Nico Döttling, Sanjam Garg, and Giulio Malavolta. Factoring and pairings are not necessary for io: Circular-secure lwe suffices. In *49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)*. Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2022.
- BFF⁺19. Gilles Barthe, Edvard Fagerholm, Dario Fiore, John C. Mitchell, Andre Scedrov, and Benedikt Schmidt. Automated analysis of cryptographic assumptions in generic group models. *Journal of Cryptology*, 32(2):324–360, April 2019.
- BGG⁺14. Dan Boneh, Craig Gentry, Sergey Gorbunov, Shai Halevi, Valeria Nikolaenko, Gil Segev, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy. Fully key-homomorphic encryption, arithmetic circuit ABE and compact garbled circuits. In Phong Q. Nguyen and Elisabeth Oswald, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2014*, volume 8441 of *LNCS*, pages 533–556. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2014.
- BGI⁺12. Boaz Barak, Oded Goldreich, Russell Impagliazzo, Steven Rudich, Amit Sahai, Salil Vadhan, and Ke Yang. On the (im) possibility of obfuscating programs. *Journal of the ACM (JACM)*, 59(2):1–48, 2012.
- Bit20. Nir Bitansky. Verifiable random functions from non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs. *Journal of Cryptology*, 33(2):459–493, April 2020.
- BS15. Zvika Brakerski and Gil Segev. Function-private functional encryption in the private-key setting. In Yevgeniy Dodis and Jesper Buus Nielsen, editors, *TCC 2015, Part II*, volume 9015 of *LNCS*, pages 306–324. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2015.
- BSW11. Dan Boneh, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Functional encryption: Definitions and challenges. In Yuval Ishai, editor, *TCC 2011*, volume 6597 of *LNCS*, pages 253–273. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2011.
- BV15. Nir Bitansky and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Indistinguishability obfuscation from functional encryption. In Venkatesan Guruswami, editor, *56th FOCS*, pages 171–190. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2015.
- CDSG⁺20. Jérémy Chotard, Edouard Dufour-Sans, Romain Gay, Duong Hieu Phan, and David Pointcheval. Dynamic decentralized functional encryption. In Daniele Micciancio and Thomas Ristenpart, editors, *CRYPTO 2020, Part I*, volume 12170 of *LNCS*, pages 747–775. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2020.
- CES21. Kelong Cong, Karim Eldefrawy, and Nigel P. Smart. Optimizing registration based encryption. In Maura B. Paterson, editor, *18th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding*, volume 13129 of *LNCS*, pages 129–157. Springer, Heidelberg, December 2021.
- DKL⁺23. Nico Döttling, Dimitris Kolonelos, Russell W. F. Lai, Chuanwei Lin, Giulio Malavolta, and Ahmadreza Rahimi. Efficient laconic cryptography from learning with errors. In Carmit Hazay and Martijn Stam, editors, *Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023*, pages 417–446, Cham, 2023. Springer Nature Switzerland.
- FFMV23. Danilo Francati, Daniele Friolo, Giulio Malavolta, and Daniele Venturi. Multi-key and multi-input predicate encryption from learning with errors. In *Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2023: 42nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Lyon, France, April 23–27, 2023, Proceedings, Part III*, pages 573–604. Springer, 2023.
- GGH⁺13. Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Mariana Raykova, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Candidate indistinguishability obfuscation and functional encryption for all circuits. In *54th FOCS*, pages 40–49. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2013.
- GGHZ16. Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and Mark Zhandry. Functional encryption without obfuscation. In Eyal Kushilevitz and Tal Malkin, editors, *TCC 2016-A, Part II*, volume 9563 of *LNCS*, pages 480–511. Springer, Heidelberg, January 2016.
- GHKW17. Rishab Goyal, Susan Hohenberger, Venkata Koppula, and Brent Waters. A generic approach to constructing and proving verifiable random functions. In Yael Kalai and Leonid Reyzin, editors, *TCC 2017, Part II*, volume 10678 of *LNCS*, pages 537–566. Springer, Heidelberg, November 2017.
- GHM⁺19. Sanjam Garg, Mohammad Hajiabadi, Mohammad Mahmoody, Ahmadreza Rahimi, and Sruthi Sekar. Registration-based encryption from standard assumptions. In Dongdai Lin and Kazue Sako, editors, *PKC 2019, Part II*, volume 11443 of *LNCS*, pages 63–93. Springer, Heidelberg, April 2019.
- GHMR18. Sanjam Garg, Mohammad Hajiabadi, Mohammad Mahmoody, and Ahmadreza Rahimi. Registration-based encryption: Removing private-key generator from IBE. In Amos Beimel and Stefan Dziembowski, editors, *TCC 2018, Part I*, volume 11239 of *LNCS*, pages 689–718. Springer, Heidelberg, November 2018.
- GJLS21. Romain Gay, Aayush Jain, Huijia Lin, and Amit Sahai. Indistinguishability obfuscation from simple-to-state hard problems: New assumptions, new techniques, and simplification. In Anne Canteaut and

- François-Xavier Standaert, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2021, Part III*, volume 12698 of *LNCS*, pages 97–126. Springer, Heidelberg, October 2021.
- GKMR22. Noemi Glaeser, Dimitris Kolonelos, Giulio Malavolta, and Ahmadreza Rahimi. Efficient registration-based encryption. *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, Paper 2022/1505, 2022.
- GKP⁺13. Shafi Goldwasser, Yael Tauman Kalai, Raluca A. Popa, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Nikolai Zeldovich. Reusable garbled circuits and succinct functional encryption. In Dan Boneh, Tim Roughgarden, and Joan Feigenbaum, editors, *45th ACM STOC*, pages 555–564. ACM Press, June 2013.
- GLSW15. Craig Gentry, Allison Bishop Lewko, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Indistinguishability obfuscation from the multilinear subgroup elimination assumption. In Venkatesan Guruswami, editor, *56th FOCS*, pages 151–170. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2015.
- GP21. Romain Gay and Rafael Pass. Indistinguishability obfuscation from circular security. In *Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 736–749, 2021.
- GPSZ17. Sanjam Garg, Omkant Pandey, Akshayaram Srinivasan, and Mark Zhandry. Breaking the sub-exponential barrier in obustopia. In Jean-Sébastien Coron and Jesper Buus Nielsen, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2017, Part III*, volume 10212 of *LNCS*, pages 156–181. Springer, Heidelberg, April / May 2017.
- GV20. Rishab Goyal and Satyanarayana Vusirikala. Verifiable registration-based encryption. In Daniele Micciancio and Thomas Ristenpart, editors, *CRYPTO 2020, Part I*, volume 12170 of *LNCS*, pages 621–651. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2020.
- GVW12. Sergey Gorbunov, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Hoeteck Wee. Functional encryption with bounded collusions via multi-party computation. In *Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2012: 32nd Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19-23, 2012. Proceedings*, pages 162–179. Springer, 2012.
- HJO⁺16. Brett Hemenway, Zahra Jafargholi, Rafail Ostrovsky, Alessandra Scafuro, and Daniel Wichs. Adaptively secure garbled circuits from one-way functions. In Matthew Robshaw and Jonathan Katz, editors, *CRYPTO 2016, Part III*, volume 9816 of *LNCS*, pages 149–178. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2016.
- HLWW22. Susan Hohenberger, George Lu, Brent Waters, and David J Wu. Registered attribute-based encryption. *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2022.
- HW15. Pavel Hubacek and Daniel Wichs. On the communication complexity of secure function evaluation with long output. In Tim Roughgarden, editor, *ITCS 2015*, pages 163–172. ACM, January 2015.
- JLMS19. Aayush Jain, Huijia Lin, Christian Matt, and Amit Sahai. How to leverage hardness of constant-degree expanding polynomials over \mathbb{R} to build $i\mathcal{O}$. In Yuval Ishai and Vincent Rijmen, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2019, Part I*, volume 11476 of *LNCS*, pages 251–281. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2019.
- JLS21. Aayush Jain, Huijia Lin, and Amit Sahai. Indistinguishability obfuscation from well-founded assumptions. In *Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 60–73, 2021.
- JLS22. Aayush Jain, Huijia Lin, and Amit Sahai. Indistinguishability obfuscation from LPN over \mathbb{F}_p , DLIN, and PRGs in NC^0 . In Orr Dunkelman and Stefan Dziembowski, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2022, Part I*, volume 13275 of *LNCS*, pages 670–699. Springer, Heidelberg, May / June 2022.
- KSW08. Jonathan Katz, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Predicate encryption supporting disjunctions, polynomial equations, and inner products. In Nigel P. Smart, editor, *EUROCRYPT 2008*, volume 4965 of *LNCS*, pages 146–162. Springer, Heidelberg, April 2008.
- LG22. Wouter Lueks Laurent Girod. petrelic is a python wrapper around relic. <https://github.com/springepfl/petrelic>, 2022.
- Lin16. Huijia Lin. Indistinguishability obfuscation from constant-degree graded encoding schemes. In Marc Fischlin and Jean-Sébastien Coron, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2016, Part I*, volume 9665 of *LNCS*, pages 28–57. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2016.
- MQR22. Mohammad Mahmood, Wei Qi, and Ahmadreza Rahimi. Lower bounds for the number of decryption updates in registration-based encryption. *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, Report 2022/1285, 2022. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1285>.
- O’N10. Adam O’Neill. Definitional issues in functional encryption. *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, Report 2010/556, 2010. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/556>.
- OPWW15. Tatsuaki Okamoto, Krzysztof Pietrzak, Brent Waters, and Daniel Wichs. New realizations of somewhere statistically binding hashing and positional accumulators. In Tetsu Iwata and Jung Hee Cheon, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2015, Part I*, volume 9452 of *LNCS*, pages 121–145. Springer, Heidelberg, November / December 2015.
- Sha84. Adi Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In G. R. Blakley and David Chaum, editors, *CRYPTO’84*, volume 196 of *LNCS*, pages 47–53. Springer, Heidelberg, August 1984.
- SSW09. Emily Shen, Elaine Shi, and Brent Waters. Predicate privacy in encryption systems. In Omer Reingold, editor, *TCC 2009*, volume 5444 of *LNCS*, pages 457–473. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2009.

- SW05. Amit Sahai and Brent R. Waters. Fuzzy identity-based encryption. In Ronald Cramer, editor, *EUROCRYPT 2005*, volume 3494 of *LNCS*, pages 457–473. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2005.
- SW14. Amit Sahai and Brent Waters. How to use indistinguishability obfuscation: deniable encryption, and more. In David B. Shmoys, editor, *46th ACM STOC*, pages 475–484. ACM Press, May / June 2014.
- WW21. Hoeteck Wee and Daniel Wichs. Candidate obfuscation via oblivious LWE sampling. In Anne Canteaut and François-Xavier Standaert, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2021, Part III*, volume 12698 of *LNCS*, pages 127–156. Springer, Heidelberg, October 2021.

Supplementary Material

A Registered Functional Encryption

We focus on RFE supporting a function space \mathcal{F} of exponential size. An RFE scheme with message space \mathcal{M} and function space $\mathcal{F} = \{f_i : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ is composed of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

Setup($1^\lambda, |\mathcal{F}|$): On input the security parameter 1^λ , the size parameter $|\mathcal{F}|$ (in binary) of the function space \mathcal{F} , the randomized setup algorithm outputs a common reference string crs .

KGen(crs, α): On input the common reference string crs and a (possibly empty) state α , the randomized key-generation algorithm outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk .

RegPK($\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}, f$): On input the common reference string crs , a (possibly empty) state α , a public key pk , and a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$, the deterministic registration algorithm outputs a master public key mpk and a new state α' .

Enc(mpk, m): On input the master public key mpk and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, the randomized encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c .

Update($\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}$): On input the common reference string crs , a state α , and a public key pk , the deterministic update algorithm outputs an helper decryption key hsk .

Dec(sk, hsk, c): On input a secret key sk , an helper decryption key hsk , and a ciphertext c , the deterministic decryption algorithm outputs a message $m \in \mathcal{Y} \cup \{\perp, \text{getUpdate}\}$.

Correctness, compactness, and efficiency. An RFE scheme must be *correct*, i.e., an honest user, which has registered its public key under a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$, will be able to decrypt all future ciphertexts, obtaining $f(m)$. In addition, RFE must satisfy some efficiency requirements defined over the following aspects: (i) size of crs , (ii) **KGen**'s running time, (iii) **RegPK**'s running time, (iv) size of mpk , (v) size of hsk , and (vi) maximum number of updates that each user needs to receive during the lifetime of the system.¹² Optimally, each of these requirements should be bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$, where L represents the number of users currently registered in the system. Moreover, all the above properties (i.e., correctness and efficiency requirements) must hold even in the presence of an adversary that register arbitrary (e.g., malformed) public keys.

Definition 5 ((Perfect) Correctness of RFE). *We say an RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{RFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{RegPK}, \text{Enc}, \text{Update}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and function space \mathcal{F} is correct (resp. perfectly correct) if for every unbounded adversary \mathbf{A} making at most a polynomial number of queries, we have:*

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbf{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{RFE}}, \mathbf{A}}^{\text{corr-rfe}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \left(\text{resp. } \mathbb{P}\left[\mathbf{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{RFE}}, \mathbf{A}}^{\text{corr-rfe}}(\lambda) = 1\right] = 0\right),$$

where experiment $\mathbf{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{RFE}}, \mathbf{A}}^{\text{corr-rfe}}(\lambda)$ is defined as follows:

- **Setup phase:** The challenger computes $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, |\mathcal{F}|)$ and initializes both the state $\alpha = \perp$ and the initial master public key $\text{mpk}_0 = \perp$. Also, the challenger initializes three counters $\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}} = 0$, $\text{ctr}_{\text{enc}} = 0$, $\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}^* = \perp$ to keep track of the number of registration queries, the number of encryption queries, and the index of the target key, respectively. Also, it sets $\text{out} = 0$ (this variable defines the output of the experiment). Finally, the challenger sends crs to the adversary \mathbf{A} .
- **Query phase:** The adversary \mathbf{A} can submit the following queries to the challenger:
 - **Register non-target key query:** \mathbf{A} sends a public key pk and a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ to the challenger which proceeds as follows:
 - It increments $\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}} = \text{ctr}_{\text{reg}} + 1$ and computes $(\text{mpk}_{\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}}, \alpha') = \text{RegPK}(\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}, f)$.
 - Finally, it updates $\alpha = \alpha'$ and sends $(\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}, \text{mpk}_{\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}}, \alpha)$ to \mathbf{A} .

¹² Following previous work, we measure the running times of algorithms in the RAM model of computation. In such a model, the running time of an algorithm can be sublinear in the size of its inputs.

- **Register target key query:** A sends a target function $f^* \in \mathcal{F}$ to the challenger. If $\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}^* \neq \perp$ (i.e., the adversary has already submitted a target key query), the challenger returns \perp . Otherwise, it proceeds as follows:
 - It increments $\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}} = \text{ctr}_{\text{reg}} + 1$, and computes $(\text{pk}^*, \text{sk}^*) \leftarrow_{\$} \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, \alpha)$ and $(\text{mpk}_{\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}}, \alpha') = \text{RegPK}(\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}^*, f^*)$.
 - It updates $\alpha = \alpha'$, $\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}^* = \text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}$ and computes $\text{hsk}^* = \text{Update}(\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}^*)$.
 - Finally, the challenger sends $(\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}, \text{mpk}_{\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}}, \alpha, \text{pk}^*, \text{hsk}^*, \text{sk}^*)$ to A .
- **Encryption query:** The adversary A chooses an index i of a public key such that $\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}^* \leq i \leq \text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}$, and a message $m_{\text{ctr}_{\text{enc}}} \in \mathcal{M}$. If $\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}^* = \perp$, the challenger returns \perp . Otherwise, the challenger sets $\text{ctr}_{\text{enc}} = \text{ctr}_{\text{enc}} + 1$ and computes $c_{\text{ctr}_{\text{enc}}} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}_i, m_{\text{ctr}_{\text{enc}}})$. Finally, it returns $(\text{ctr}_{\text{enc}}, c_{\text{ctr}_{\text{enc}}})$ to A .
- **Decryption query:** The adversary A selects an index $j \in [\text{ctr}_{\text{reg}}]$. The challenger computes $y_j = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}^*, \text{hsk}^*, c_j)$. If $y_j = \text{getUpdate}$, it updates the helper decryption key $\text{hsk}^* = \text{Update}(\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}^*)$ and recompute $y_j = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}^*, \text{hsk}^*, c_j)$. If $y_j \neq f^*(m_j)$, the challenger sets $\text{out} = 1$ (i.e., the adversary manages to break correctness).
- **End phase:** After the adversary A has finished making queries, the challenger returns out as the output of the experiment.

Definition 6 (Compactness and efficiency of RFE). We say an RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{RFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{RegPK}, \text{Enc}, \text{Update}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and function space \mathcal{F} is $(t_{\text{crs}}, t_{\text{mpk}}, t_{\text{hsk}})$ -compact and $(t_{\text{KGen}}, t_{\text{RegPK}}, t_{\text{num}}, t_{\text{Update}})$ -efficient if for every unbounded adversary A making at most a polynomial number of queries, the following conditions hold in each step of the execution of experiment $\text{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{RFE}}, A}^{\text{corr-rfe}}(\lambda)$:

$(t_{\text{crs}}, t_{\text{mpk}}, t_{\text{hsk}})$ -compactness.

- t_{crs} -compact crs : The size of the common reference string is bounded by t_{crs} .
- t_{mpk} -compact mpk : The size of the each master public key is bounded by t_{mpk} .
- t_{hsk} -compact hsk : The size of the each helper decryption key is bounded by t_{hsk} .

$(t_{\text{KGen}}, t_{\text{RegPK}}, t_{\text{num}}, t_{\text{Update}})$ -efficiency.

- t_{KGen} -efficient KGen : The key-generation (worst-case) running time is bounded by t_{KGen} .
- t_{RegPK} -efficient RegPK : The registration (worst-case) running time is bounded by t_{RegPK} .
- $(t_{\text{num}}, t_{\text{Update}})$ -efficient Update : The challenger executes Update at most (worst-case) t_{num} times and each invocation runs in time (worst-case) t_{Update} .

The running times of the above algorithms are in the RAM model of computation.

Security. Security of RFE is intuitive: An adversary cannot distinguish between $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_0)$ and $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_1)$ if it holds secret keys, registered to functions f_1, \dots, f_n , such that $f_i(m_0) = f_i(m_1)$ for $i \in [n]$. This is formalized by an experiment in which the adversary can register honest users (whose secret keys are kept secret) or register corrupted users (whose public keys can be arbitrarily and maliciously chosen by the adversary).

Definition 7 (Security of RFE). An RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{RFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{RegPK}, \text{Enc}, \text{Update}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and function space \mathcal{F} is secure if for every PPT valid adversary A , we have:

$$\left| \mathbb{P} \left[\text{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{RFE}}, A}^{\text{rfe}}(\lambda, 0) = 1 \right] - \mathbb{P} \left[\text{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{RFE}}, A}^{\text{rfe}}(\lambda, 1) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where the experiment $\text{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{RFE}}, A}^{\text{rfe}}(\lambda, b)$ is defined as follows:

- **Setup phase:** The challenger computes $\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, |\mathcal{F}|)$ and initializes both the state $\alpha = \perp$ and the master public key $\text{mpk} = \perp$. Also, it initializes a counter $\text{ctr} = 0$ (for the number of honest registration queries submitted by the adversary), a set of corrupted public keys $\mathcal{C} = \emptyset$, and a dictionary $\mathcal{D} = \emptyset$ (storing the mapping between registered public keys and their corresponding functions). Finally, the challenger sends crs to the adversary A .
- **Query phase:** The adversary A can submit the following queries:

- **Register corrupted key query:** A sends a public key pk and a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ to the challenger which proceeds as follows:
 - It computes $(\text{mpk}', \alpha') = \text{RegPK}(\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}, f)$.
 - It updates $\alpha = \alpha'$, $\text{mpk} = \text{mpk}'$, $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C} \cup \{\text{pk}\}$, and $D[\text{pk}] = D[\text{pk}] \cup \{f\}$.
 - Finally, it returns (α, mpk) to A .
- **Register honest key query:** A sends a target function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ which proceeds as follows:
 - It sets $\text{ctr} = \text{ctr} + 1$ and computes $(\text{pk}_{\text{ctr}}, \text{sk}_{\text{ctr}}) \leftarrow \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, \alpha)$.
 - It registers the key $(\text{pk}_{\text{ctr}}, f)$ by executing $(\text{mpk}', \alpha') = \text{RegPK}(\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}_{\text{ctr}}, f)$.
 - It updates $\alpha = \alpha'$, $\text{mpk} = \text{mpk}'$, and $D[\text{pk}_{\text{ctr}}] = D[\text{pk}_{\text{ctr}}] \cup \{f\}$.
 - Finally, it returns $(\text{ctr}, \alpha, \text{mpk}, \text{pk}_{\text{ctr}})$ to A .
- **Corrupt honest key:** A selects an index $i \in [\text{ctr}]$. The challenger updates $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C} \cup \{\text{pk}_i\}$ and returns sk_i to A where $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ is the i -th public and secret key generated during the i -th honest registration query.
- **Challenge phase:** A chooses two messages (m_0^*, m_1^*) . The challenger returns $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_b^*)$.
- **Output phase:** A returns a bit b' which is also the output of the experiment.

An adversary A is considered valid if $f(m_0^*) = f(m_1^*)$ for every $f \in \{f \in D[\text{pk}] \mid \text{pk} \in \mathcal{C}\}$ (i.e., for every function, whose registered secret key is known by the adversary, we have the same output).

Remark 2 (Bounded vs. Unbounded number of users). The setup algorithm of RFE does not take as input a bound on the maximum number of registered users, i.e., the crs will allow the KC to handle any number of users. Our iO-based construction achieves this notion. Through the paper, we also consider the notion of *bounded* RFE in which there is a bound on the number of registered users (this will apply to our pairing-based RIPE construction). In the case of bounded RFE, we abuse notation and denote by L the a-priori bounded number of users (recall that, in the case of unbounded RFE, L instead denotes the current number of registered users). Here, the setup algorithm takes as input L in unary (i.e., $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^L, |\mathcal{F}|)$). Analogously, during the execution of the security experiment (Definition 7) for bounded RFE, the adversary can specify the bound 1^L and, in turn, submit at most L registration queries (the challenger will reply with \perp after L queries are submitted).

Remark 3 (On the security of RFE without post-challenge queries). Definition 7 does not allow the adversary to submit queries after the challenge phase. For the case of RABE, Hohenberger *et al.* [HLWW22] showed that security without post-challenge queries implies security with post-challenge queries. Intuitively, this is because the deterministic RegPK and Update algorithms are publicly computable (they do not require knowledge of any secret) and their behavior can be simulated by the adversary. The exact same result holds for RFE. This follows by using the same technique of [HLWW22, Remark 4.5 and Lemma 4.10] except that the validity of the RABE adversary (i.e., $f(x) = 0$ where f is the policy and x are the attributes) is replaced with the validity of the RFE adversary (i.e., $f(m_0) = f(m_1)$). An identical argument applies to slotted RFE (Definition 11). We refer the reader to [HLWW22, Remark 4.5 and Lemma 4.10] for more details.

A.1 Slotted Registered Functional Encryption

We now formalize the notion of slotted RFE (for function spaces \mathcal{F} of exponential size) generalizing from the slotted RIPE defined in Section 5.1. Formally, a slotted RFE with message space \mathcal{M} and function space $\mathcal{F} = \{f_i : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^L, |\mathcal{F}|)$: On input the security parameter 1^λ , the slot parameter 1^L , and the size $|\mathcal{F}|$ (in binary) of the function space \mathcal{F} , the randomized setup algorithm outputs a common reference string crs .
- $\text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i)$: On input the common reference string crs and a slot index $i \in [L]$, the randomized key generation outputs a public and secret key pair $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$.
- $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i)$: On input the common reference string crs , a slot index $i \in [L]$, and a public key pk_i , the algorithm outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ deterministically.

Aggr(crs, $((pk_i, f_i))_{i \in [L]}$): On input the common reference string crs and L pairs $(pk_1, f_1), \dots, (pk_L, f_L)$ each composed of a public key pk_i and its corresponding function $f_i \in \mathcal{F}$, the deterministic aggregation algorithm outputs a master public key mpk and L helper decryption keys hsk_1, \dots, hsk_L .

Enc(mpk, m): On input the master public key mpk and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, the randomized encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c .

Dec(sk, hsk, c): On input a secret key sk, a helper decryption key hsk, and a ciphertext c , decryption deterministically outputs a message $m \in \mathcal{Y} \cup \{\perp\}$.

Definition 8 (Completeness of slotted RFE). A slotted RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{sRFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and function space \mathcal{F} is complete if, $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \forall L \in \mathbb{N}$, and $\forall i \in [L]$, we have:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, pk_i) = 1 \mid \text{crs} \leftarrow_s \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^L, |\mathcal{F}|), (pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow_s \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i) \right] = 1$$

Definition 9 (Perfect Correctness of slotted RFE). A slotted RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{sRFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and function space \mathcal{F} is perfectly correct if, $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \forall L \in \mathbb{N}$, $\forall i \in [L], \forall \text{crs}$ output by $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^L, |\mathcal{F}|)$, $\forall (pk_i, sk_i)$ output by $\text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i)$, for all collection of public key $\{pk_j\}_{j \in [L] \setminus \{i\}}$ such that $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, j, pk_j) = 1, \forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \forall f_1, \dots, f_L \in \mathcal{F}$, we have:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\text{Dec}(sk_i, hsk_i, c) = f_i(m) \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{msk}, (hsk_i)_{i \in [L]}) = \text{Aggr}(\text{crs}, ((pk_j, f_j))_{j \in [L]}), \\ c \leftarrow_s \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m) \end{array} \right] = 1$$

Definition 10 (Compactness and Efficiency of slotted RFE). We say a slotted RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{sRFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and function space \mathcal{F} is $(t_{\text{crs}}, t_{\text{mpk}}, t_{\text{hsk}})$ -compact and $(t_{\text{KGen}}, t_{\text{IsValid}}, t_{\text{Aggr}})$ -efficient if the following conditions hold:

$(t_{\text{crs}}, t_{\text{mpk}}, t_{\text{hsk}})$ -compactness. This is identical to that of [Definition 6](#).

$(t_{\text{KGen}}, t_{\text{IsValid}}, t_{\text{Aggr}})$ -efficiency.

- t_{KGen} -efficient **KGen**: This is identical to that of [Definition 6](#).
- t_{IsValid} -efficient **IsValid**: The validation (worst-case) running time is bounded by t_{IsValid} .
- t_{Aggr} -efficient **Aggr**: The aggregation (worst-case) running time is bounded by t_{Aggr} .

The (worst-case) running times of the above algorithms are measured in the RAM model of computation.

Definition 11 (Security of slotted RFE). A slotted RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{sRFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and function space \mathcal{F} is secure if for every PPT valid adversary A , we have:

$$\left| \mathbb{P} \left[\mathbf{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{sRFE}}, A}^{\text{slot-rfe}}(\lambda, 0) = 1 \right] - \mathbb{P} \left[\mathbf{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{sRFE}}, A}^{\text{slot-rfe}}(\lambda, 1) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where the experiment $\mathbf{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{sRFE}}, A}^{\text{slot-rfe}}(\lambda, b)$ is defined in the following way:

- **Setup phase**: The adversary A sends a slot parameter 1^L to the challenger. The challenger initializes a counter $\text{ctr} = 0$, a dictionary $D = \emptyset$, and a set of corrupted slot indexes $C = \emptyset$. Finally, it sends crs to A where $\text{crs} \leftarrow_s \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^L, |\mathcal{F}|)$.
- **Query phase**: The adversary A can submit queries to the following oracles:
 - **Honest key-generation query**: A sends $i \in [L]$. The challenger computes $\text{ctr} = \text{ctr} + 1, (pk_{\text{ctr}}, sk_{\text{ctr}}) \leftarrow_s \text{KGen}(\text{crs}, i)$, and sets $D[\text{ctr}] = (i, pk_{\text{ctr}}, sk_{\text{ctr}})$. Finally, it returns $(\text{ctr}, pk_{\text{ctr}})$ to A .
 - **Corruption query**: A sends $j \in [\text{ctr}]$. The challenger returns sk' where $(i', pk', sk') = D[j]$. Let $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{Corr}}$ be the set of corruption queries submitted by the adversary.
- **Challenge phase**: A sends the challenge $((c_i^*, f_i^*, pk_i^*)_{i \in [L]}, m_0^*, m_1^*)$ where $c_i^* \in [\text{ctr}] \cup \{\perp\}$.¹³ Then, for every $i \in [L]$, it proceeds as follows:

¹³ If $c_i^* \neq \perp$, then pk_i refers to a public key generated by the challenger. On the other hand, if $c_i^* = \perp$, then pk_i is an arbitrary public key chosen by A .

- If $c_i^* \in [\text{ctr}]$, the challenger retrieves $(i', \text{pk}', \text{sk}') = \text{D}[c_i^*]$. If $i' = i$, it sets $\text{pk}_i = \text{pk}'$. In addition, if $c_i^* \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Corr}}$, the challenger updates $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C} \cup \{i\}$. Otherwise, if $i' \neq i$, the challenger aborts.
- If $c_i^* = \perp$, the challenger checks the validity of pk_i^* . If $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i^*) = 0$, it aborts; otherwise (i.e., $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i^*) = 1$), the challenger sets $\text{pk}_i = \text{pk}_i^*$ and updates $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C} \cup \{i\}$.

Finally, the challenger sends $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_i^*)$ to the adversary where $(\text{mpk}, \text{hsk}_1, \dots, \text{hsk}_L) = \text{Aggr}(\text{crs}, (\text{pk}_1, f_1^*), \dots, (\text{pk}_L, f_L^*))$.¹⁴

- **Output phase:** The adversary A outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ which is also the output of the experiment.

An adversary A is considered valid if $f_i^*(m_0^*) = f_i^*(m_1^*)$ for every $i \in \mathcal{C}$.

B Slotted RFE from Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Here, we build slotted RFE for arbitrary (exponentially large) function spaces. The construction leverages iO, SSB hash functions, and PRGs.

B.1 Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Let $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be an ensemble of circuits. An indistinguishability obfuscator (iO) [BGI⁺12] is a PPT algorithm Obf that, on input the security parameter 1^λ and a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, it outputs an obfuscation $\text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C)$ of C . An iO obfuscator Obf must (i) preserve the functionality of the original circuit C (correctness), and (ii) produce obfuscations of “small” size (polynomial slowdown), i.e., polynomial in the size $|C|$ of the original circuit C . As for security, iO guarantees that, for every pair of functionally-equivalent circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ (i.e., $\forall x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$), the obfuscations $\text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_0)$ and $\text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_1)$ are computational indistinguishable.

We recall the formal definition below.

Definition 12 (Indistinguishability obfuscation). Let $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ an ensemble of circuits. A PPT algorithm Obf is an iO obfuscator if the following conditions hold:

Correctness. $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \forall C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda, \forall x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, we have $C'(x) = C(x)$ where $C' \leftarrow \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C)$.

Polynomial slowdown. There exists a polynomial $p(\cdot)$ such that for every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, we have $|\text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C)| \leq p(|C|)$.

Indistinguishability. For every pair of functionally-equivalent circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, for every PPT adversary D , we have that

$$|\mathbb{P}[\text{D}(1^\lambda, \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_0)) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[\text{D}(1^\lambda, \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_1)) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

B.2 Somewhere Statistically Binding Hash Functions

A somewhere statistically binding (SSB) hash function [HW15, OPWW15] (supporting local openings) with block length $\ell_{\text{blk}} = \ell_{\text{blk}}(\lambda)$, output length $\ell_{\text{out}} = \ell_{\text{out}}(\lambda)$, and opening length $\ell_{\text{open}} = \ell_{\text{open}}(\lambda)$, is composed of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

Setup($1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, N, i$): On input the security parameter 1^λ , a block size $1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}$, a message length $N \leq 2^\lambda$, and an index $i \in [N]$, the randomized setup algorithm outputs a key hk . Here, we assume that N and i are encoded in binary, i.e., the size of both N and $i \in [N]$ are bounded by $O(\log(N))$.

Hash($\text{hk}, (x_i)_{i \in [N]}$): On input a key hk and an input $(x_i)_{i \in [N]}$ (where $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}$), the deterministic hash algorithm outputs an hash $h \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}}}$.

Open($\text{hk}, (x_i)_{i \in [N]}, i$): On input a key hk , an input $(x_i)_{i \in [N]}$ (where $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}$), and an index $i \in [N]$, the deterministic open algorithm outputs an opening $\pi_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{open}}}$.

¹⁴ Note that the challenger does not send the master public key mpk and the helper decryption keys $\text{hsk}_1, \dots, \text{hsk}_L$ to the adversary A since Aggr is deterministic, i.e., A can compute both mpk and $\text{hsk}_1, \dots, \text{hsk}_L$ by itself.

$\text{Verify}(\text{hk}, h, i, x_i, \pi_i)$: On input a key hk , an hash $h \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}}}$, an index $i \in [N]$, an input $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}$, and an opening $\pi_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{open}}}$, the deterministic algorithm outputs a decision bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Correctness of SSB says that honest openings always verify. As for security, SSB guarantees *index hiding* and *somewhere statistically binding*. The former guarantees that an adversary cannot distinguish whether hk is generated (on setup) under an index $i_0 \in [N]$ or index $i_1 \in [N]$. On the other hand, the latter guarantees that, whenever hk is generated w.r.t. an index $i \in [N]$ (i.e., $\text{dk} \leftarrow_s \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, N, i)$), the i -th slot is statistically binding, i.e., it does not exist $h \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}}}$ and $(x, \pi), (x', \pi') \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{blk}}} \times \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{open}}}$ such that $x \neq x'$ and $\text{Verify}(\text{hk}, h, i, x, \pi) = \text{Verify}(\text{hk}, h, i, x', \pi') = 1$.

Definition 13 (Correctness). A SSB scheme $\Pi_{\text{SSB}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{Open}, \text{Verify})$ is correct if, $\forall \lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $\forall \ell_{\text{blk}} = \ell_{\text{blk}}(\lambda)$, \forall integers $N \leq 2^\lambda$, $\forall i^*, i \in [N]$, and $\forall (x_i)_{i \in [N]} \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{blk}} \cdot N}$, we have:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\text{Verify}(\text{hk}, h, i, x_i, \pi_i) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{hk} \leftarrow_s \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, N, i^*), \\ h = \text{Hash}(\text{hk}, (x_i)_{i \in [N]}), \\ \pi_i = \text{Open}(\text{hk}, (x_i)_{i \in [N]}, i) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

Definition 14 (Index Hiding). A SSB scheme $\Pi_{\text{SSB}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{Open}, \text{Verify})$ satisfies index hiding if for every PPT adversary D , for every $\ell_{\text{blk}} = \ell_{\text{blk}}(\lambda)$, for every integer $N \in \mathbb{N}$, for every indexes $i_0, i_1 \in [N]$, we have:

$$\left| \mathbb{P}[\mathsf{D}(1^\lambda, \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, N, i_0)) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[\mathsf{D}(1^\lambda, \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, N, i_1)) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 15 (Somewhere Statistically Binding). A SSB scheme $\Pi_{\text{SSB}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{Open}, \text{Verify})$ is somewhere statistically binding if, for every $\ell_{\text{blk}} = \ell_{\text{blk}}(\lambda)$, for every $N \leq 2^\lambda$, for every $i \in [N]$, we have:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\begin{array}{l} \exists (h, x, x', \pi, \pi') \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}} + 2\ell_{\text{blk}} + 2\ell_{\text{open}}} \\ \text{s.t. } x \neq x' \text{ and} \\ \text{Verify}(\text{hk}, h, i, x, \pi) = 1 \text{ and} \\ \text{Verify}(\text{hk}, h, i, x', \pi') = 1 \end{array} \mid \text{hk} \leftarrow_s \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, N, i) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

In addition to the above properties, we focus on succinct and efficient SSB schemes which can be built from different assumptions such as DDH, ϕ -Hiding, DCR, and LWE [HW15, OPWW15].

Definition 16 (Succinctness and efficiency of SBB). A SSB scheme $\Pi_{\text{SSB}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Hash}, \text{Open}, \text{Verify})$ is succinct and efficient if

Succinctness. The output length ℓ_{out} , the opening length ℓ_{open} , and the size of hk (output by $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, N, i)$) are bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}}, \log N)$.

Efficiency. The running times of Setup , Hash , and Open are bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}}, \log N)$, $N \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}})$, and $\text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}}, \log N)$, respectively.

B.3 Pseudorandom Generators

Let $\ell_{\text{in}} = \ell_{\text{in}}(\lambda)$, $\ell_{\text{out}} = \ell_{\text{out}}(\lambda)$, and $\mathsf{G} : \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{in}}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}}}$ be two polynomials (in the security parameters) such that $\ell_{\text{in}}(\lambda) < \ell_{\text{out}}(\lambda)$ and an efficiently computable function G , respectively. We say that G is a pseudorandom generator (PRG) if $\mathsf{G}(s)$ and $y \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}}}$ are computationally indistinguishable whenever $s \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{in}}}$.

Definition 17 (Pseudorandomness). A PRG $\mathsf{G} : \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{in}}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}}}$ is secure if for every PPT adversary D we have that

$$\left| \mathbb{P}[\mathsf{D}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{G}(s)) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[\mathsf{D}(1^\lambda, y) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $s \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{in}}}$ and $y \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}}}$.

B.4 Construction

Construction 2 Let $\mathcal{F} = \{f_i : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ be a function space of exponential size. Without loss of generality, we assume that any function $f_i \in \mathcal{F}$ can be described (in binary) using $O(\log(|\mathcal{F}|))$ bits. Also, consider the following ingredients:

- A length-doubling PRG $G : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ (Appendix B.3).
- A SSB scheme $\Pi_{\text{SSB}} = (\text{SSB.Setup}, \text{SSB.Hash}, \text{SSB.Open}, \text{SSB.Verify})$ (Appendix B.2).
- An iO obfuscator Obf (Appendix B.1).

We build a slotted RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{sRFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{IsValid}, \text{Aggr}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^*$ and function space $\mathcal{F} = \{f_i : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ as follows:

Setup($1^\lambda, 1^L, |\mathcal{F}|$): On input the security parameter 1^λ , the slot parameter 1^L , and the size $|\mathcal{F}|$ (in binary) of the function space \mathcal{F} , the randomized setup algorithm sets $\ell_{\text{blk}} = 2\lambda + O(\log(|\mathcal{F}|))$ and samples a hash key $\text{hk} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, 1)$. It outputs $\text{crs} = \text{hk}$.

KGen(crs, i): On input the common reference string $\text{crs} = \text{hk}$, the randomized key generation algorithm samples a random seed $s \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$. It outputs the public key $\text{pk} = G(s)$ and the secret key $\text{sk} = s$.

IsValid($\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i$): On input the common reference string $\text{crs} = \text{hk}$, an index $i \in [L]$, and a public key pk , the deterministic validation algorithm outputs 1 if $\text{pk} \in \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$.

Aggr($\text{crs}, ((\text{pk}_i, f_i))_{i \in [L]}$): On input the common reference string $\text{crs} = \text{hk}$, and L pairs $(\text{pk}_1, f_1), \dots, (\text{pk}_L, f_L)$ each composed of a public key $\text{pk}_i \in \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ and a function $f_i \in \mathcal{F}$ (recall that f_i can be represented using a binary string of size $O(\log(|\mathcal{F}|))$), the deterministic aggregation algorithm sets $\text{mpk} = (\text{hk}, h)$ where $h = \text{SSB.Hash}(\text{hk}, ((\text{pk}_i, f_i))_{i \in [L]})$. Then, for each user $i \in [L]$, it computes the helper decryption key $\text{hsk}_i = (i, \text{pk}_i, f_i, \pi_i)$ where $\pi_i = \text{SSB.Open}(\text{hk}, ((\text{pk}_j, f_j))_{j \in [L]}, i)$. Finally, it outputs mpk and $\text{hsk}_1, \dots, \text{hsk}_L$.

Enc(mpk, m): On input the master public key $\text{mpk} = (\text{hk}, h)$ and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, the randomized encryption algorithm outputs $c = C' \leftarrow_{\$} \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk}, h, m})$ where the circuit $C_{\text{hk}, h, m}$ is defined in the following way:

$C_{\text{hk}, h, m}(i, \text{pk}_i, f_i, \pi_i, \text{sk}_i)$
If $\text{SSB.Verify}(\text{hk}, h, i, (\text{pk}_i, f_i), \pi_i) = 1 \wedge \text{pk}_i = G(\text{sk}_i)$ then: return $f_i(m)$ Else: return \perp

Circuit $C_{\text{hk}, h, m}$ is padded to match the size $\gamma = \max\{C_{\text{hk}, h, m}, C_{\text{hk}, h, m, m', 0}, \dots, C_{\text{hk}, h, m, m', L}\}$ where $C_{\text{hk}, h, m, m', j}$ is defined in the proof of Theorem 10.

Dec(sk, hsk, c): On input the secret key sk , the helper decryption key $\text{hsk} = (i, \text{pk}_i, f_i, \pi_i)$, and a ciphertext $c = C'$, the deterministic decryption algorithm outputs $C'(i, \text{pk}_i, f_i, \pi_i, s)$.

We start with proving that Construction 2 is complete, correct, and efficient.

Theorem 7 (Completeness of Construction 2). Let $G, \Pi_{\text{SSB}}, \text{Obf}$ as above. The slotted RFE scheme Π_{sRFE} from Construction 2 is complete (Definition 8).

Proof. Completeness follows by observing that $\text{IsValid}(\text{crs}, i, \text{pk}_i) = 1$ whenever $|\text{pk}_i| = 2\lambda$ (the output size of the PRG G). \square

Theorem 8 (Perfect correctness of Construction 2). Let $G, \Pi_{\text{SSB}}, \text{Obf}$ as above. If Π_{SSB} is perfectly correct (Definition 13), and Obf is correct (Definition 12), then the slotted RFE scheme Π_{sRFE} from Construction 2 is correct (Definition 9).

Proof. Correctness follows by the correctness of the underlying Π_{SSB} and Obf schemes. \square

Theorem 9 (Compactness and efficiency of Construction 2). Let $G, \Pi_{\text{SSB}}, \text{Obf}$ as above. If Π_{SSB} is succinct and efficient (Definition 16), then the slotted RFE scheme Π_{sRFE} from Construction 2 is

- $(\text{poly}(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|), \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|), \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|))$ -compact;
- $(\text{poly}(\lambda), \text{poly}(\lambda), L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|))$ -efficient (*Definition 10*).

Proof. We demonstrate each property individually.

- **poly** $(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|)$ -compact crs: The common reference string crs is composed of $\text{hk} \leftarrow \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, 1)$. Hence, the property holds by leveraging the succinctness of Π_{SSB} , i.e., the size of crs is bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}}, \log L)$ where $\ell_{\text{blk}} = 2\lambda + O(\log |\mathcal{F}|)$.
- **poly** $(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|)$ -compact mpk: The master public keys mpk are composed of $\text{mpk} = (\text{hk}, h)$ where $\text{k} \leftarrow \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, 1)$ and $h = \text{SSB.Hash}(\text{hk}, ((\text{pk}_i, f_i))_{i \in [L]})$. Hence, the property holds by leveraging the succinctness of Π_{SSB} , i.e., the size of mpk is bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}}, \log L)$ where $\ell_{\text{blk}} = 2\lambda + O(\log(|\mathcal{F}|))$.
- **poly** $(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|)$ -compact hsk: The helper decryption keys hsk_i are composed of $\text{hsk}_i = (i, \text{pk}_i, f_i, \pi_i)$ where $\pi_i = \text{SSB.Open}(\text{hk}, ((\text{pk}_j, f_j))_{j \in [L]}, i)$ and $\text{pk}_i \in \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$. By leveraging the compactness of SSB we have $|\pi_i| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}}, \log L)$ where $\ell_{\text{blk}} = 2\lambda + O(\log |\mathcal{F}|)$. Moreover, by definition we have $|\text{pk}_i| = 2\lambda$, $|f_i| \leq O(\log |\mathcal{F}|)$, and $|i| \leq O(\log L)$. Hence, the size of hsk is bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log L, \log(|\mathcal{F}|))$.
- **poly** (λ) -efficient KGen: The key generation algorithm KGen performs a single PRG evaluation. Hence, the running time of KGen is bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda)$.
- **poly** (λ) -efficient IsValid: The validation algorithm simply checks if $|\text{pk}_i| \leq 2\lambda$. Hence, IsValid running time is polynomial in the security parameter.
- $(L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|))$ -efficient Aggr: The aggregation algorithm Aggr executes SSB.Hash once. Moreover, it executes L times (one for each aggregated public key) the SBB opening algorithm SSB.Open. Hence, by leveraging the efficiency of SSB (i.e., running times of SSB.Hash and SSB.Open are bounded by $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}})$ and $\text{poly}(\lambda, \ell_{\text{blk}}, \log L)$), we have that the running time of Aggr is bounded by $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log L, \log |\mathcal{F}|)$ where $\ell_{\text{blk}} = 2\lambda + O(\log |\mathcal{F}|)$.

□

Theorem 10 (Security). *Let \mathcal{G} , Π_{SSB} , Obf as above. If \mathcal{G} is secure (*Definition 17*), Π_{SSB} is index hiding (*Definition 14*) and somewhere statistically binding (*Definition 15*), and Obf is secure (*Definition 12*), then the slotted RFE scheme Π from *Construction 2* is secure (*Definition 11*).*

Proof. Consider the following hybrid experiments:

$\mathbf{H}_{-1}^b(\lambda)$: This is exactly the experiment $\mathbf{Game}_{\Pi_{\text{SRFE}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{slot-rfe}}(\lambda, b)$ where the challenge bit is b .

$\mathbf{H}_0^b(\lambda)$: Same as \mathbf{H}_{-1}^b except that the challenge ciphertext is computed as $c = C' \leftarrow \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk}, h, m_0^*, m_1^* - b, j})$ where $j = 0$, m_0^* and m_1^* are the challenge messages output by the adversary, and the circuit $C_{\text{hk}, h, m, m', j}$ is defined as follows:

$C_{\text{hk}, h, m, m', j}(i, \text{pk}_i, f_i, \pi_i, \text{sk}_i)$
If $\text{SSB.Verify}(\text{hk}, h, i, (\text{pk}_i, f_i), \pi_i) = 1 \wedge \text{pk}_i = \mathcal{G}(\text{sk}_i)$ then:
If $i > j$ then: return $f_i(m)$
Else: return $f_i(m')$
Else: return \perp

The circuit $C_{\text{hk}, h, m, m', j}$ is padded to match the size γ defined as $\gamma = \max\{C_{\text{hk}, h, m}, C_{\text{hk}, h, m, m', 0}, \dots, C_{\text{hk}, h, m, m', L}\}$ where $C_{\text{hk}, h, m}$ is defined in *Construction 2*.

$\mathbf{H}_i^b(\lambda)$: Same as \mathbf{H}_{i-1}^b except that the challenge ciphertext is computed as $c = C' \leftarrow \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk}, h, m_0^*, m_1^* - b, j})$ where $j = i$ (instead of $j = i - 1$).

$\mathbf{H}_{L+1}^b(\lambda)$: Same as \mathbf{H}_L^b except that the challenge ciphertext is computed as $c = C' \leftarrow \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk}, h, m_0^*, m_1^* - b})$ where the circuit $C_{\text{hk}, h, m}$ is defined as in *Construction 2*. Observe that this is exactly the experiment $\mathbf{H}_{-1}^{1-b}(\lambda)$.

Also, consider the following intermediate hybrid experiment that will help us demonstrating the computational indistinguishability of \mathbf{H}_i^b and \mathbf{H}_{i+1}^b :

$\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$: Same as \mathbf{H}_i^b except that the challenger computes $\text{hk} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, i+1)$ (instead of $\text{hk} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, 1)$).

We now prove the following lemmas.

Lemma 7. $\mathbf{H}_{-1}^b(\lambda) \approx_c \mathbf{H}_0^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Proof. The lemma follows by simply observing that $C_{\text{hk}, h, m_b^*, j}$ and $C_{\text{hk}, h, m_b^*, m_{1-b}^*, j}$ are functionally-equivalent when $j = 0$. Hence, the lemma follows by the security of the iO obfuscator \mathbf{Obf} .

Lemma 8. $\mathbf{H}_i^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L]$.

Proof. Suppose that exists a PPT adversary \mathbf{A} with a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing between $\mathbf{H}_i^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$. We construct an adversary \mathbf{A}' that breaks the index hiding property of Π_{SSB} . \mathbf{A}' is defined as follows:

1. Receive the number of slots 1^L by \mathbf{A} .
2. Send the parameters $\ell_{\text{blk}} = 2\lambda + \log(|\mathcal{F}|)$, $N = L$, and the challenge indexes ($i_0 = 1, i_1 = i+1$) to the challenger. The challenger will play the index hiding experiment with respect to ℓ_{blk} , N and indexes (i_0, i_1) .
3. Receive hk^* from the challenger and send $\text{crs} = \text{hk}^*$ to \mathbf{A} .
4. Play the rest of the experiment as defined in $\mathbf{H}_i^b(\lambda)$.
5. Return the output of \mathbf{A} .

Let d be the challenge bit sampled by the challenger. If $d = 0$, \mathbf{A}' correctly simulates $\mathbf{H}_i^b(\lambda)$ since hk^* is generated as $\text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, 1)$. On the other hand, if $d = 1$, \mathbf{A}' simulates $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$ since hk^* is generated as $\text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, i+1)$. Thus, \mathbf{A}' has the same non-negligible advantage of \mathbf{A} . This concludes the proof.

Lemma 9. $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L-1]$.

Proof. Fix $i \in \{0\} \cup [L-1]$. Let $\mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i$ be an event that occurs when the following two conditions hold:

1. $c_{i+1}^* \in [\text{ctr}]$ (see [Definition 11](#)). This implies that the $(i+1)$ -th public key pk_{i+1}^* (chosen by the adversary during the challenge phase) has been generated by the challenger on the (c_{i+1}^*) -th key-generation query submitted by the adversary.
2. $c_{i+1}^* \notin \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Corr}}$ where $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{Corr}}$ is the set of corruption queries submitted by the adversary to the corruption oracle during the query phase.

Observe that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1] &= \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i] + \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \overline{\mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i}], \\ \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda) = 1] &= \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i] + \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \overline{\mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i}]. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, it suffices to prove that the following two equations hold:

$$\left| \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i] - \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda), \quad \text{and} \quad (6)$$

$$\left| \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \overline{\mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i}] - \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \overline{\mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i}] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). \quad (7)$$

Indeed, $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda)$ would then follow by the triangular inequality and the combination of [Equations \(6\)](#) and [\(7\)](#).

Claim 4 ([Equation \(6\)](#)) *If $\mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i$ occurs then $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L-1]$.*

Proof. This claim implies that Equation (6) holds. The proof relies on the fact that **NonCorrupt**_{*i*} occurs, i.e., the (*i* + 1)-th slot is not corrupted.

Consider the following intermediate hybrid experiments:

$\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$: Same as $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$ except that the challenger samples $k \leftarrow_s [K]$ where $K = K(\lambda)$ is a bound on the number of key generation queries submitted by the adversary during the query phase. Let \mathbf{pk}_k be the public key returned by the challenger as the answer of the k -th key generation query (if there is one). The challenger aborts if either of the following condition hold:

1. The challenge (*i* + 1)-th tuple $(c_{i+1}^*, f_{i+1}^*, \mathbf{pk}_{i+1}^*)$ (chosen by the adversary during the challenge phase) satisfies $c_{i+1}^* \neq k$.
2. $k \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Corr}}$ where $\mathcal{Q}_{\text{Corr}}$ is the set of corruption queries submitted by the adversary during the query phase.

Otherwise, the challenger proceeds as in $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$.

$\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$: Same as $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$ except that \mathbf{pk}_k is sampled at random from $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$.

$\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{3,i}^b(\lambda)$: Same as $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$ except that the challenge ciphertext is computed as $c = C' \leftarrow_s \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,j})$ where $j = i + 1$.

$\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{4,i}^b(\lambda)$: Same as $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{3,i}^b(\lambda)$ except that \mathbf{pk}_k is computed as $\mathbf{pk}_k = \mathbf{G}(s)$ where $s \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}^\lambda$.

$\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{5,i}^b(\lambda)$: Same as $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{4,i}^b(\lambda)$ except that for the following differences:

If $i + 2 \leq L$: The challenger computes $\text{hk} \leftarrow_s \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, i+2)$ (instead of $\text{hk} \leftarrow_s \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{blk}}}, L, i + 1)$).

If $i + 2 > L$: $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{5,i}^b(\lambda)$ is identical to $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{4,i}^b(\lambda)$.

Subclaim 1 For $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$, we have that

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i\right] = K \cdot \mathbb{P}\left[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda) = 1\right].$$

Proof. $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$ are identical except for the aborting condition of $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$. If $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$ outputs 1 (i.e., the challenger does not abort during the execution of $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$), then it must be that $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1$, $c_{i+1} = k$, and $k \notin \mathcal{Q}_{\text{Corr}}$. In other words, the event **NonCorrupt**_{*i*} must occur. As a consequence,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}\left[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda) = 1\right] &= \mathbb{P}\left[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i \wedge k = c_{i+1}^*\right] \\ &= \mathbb{P}\left[k = c_{i+1} \mid \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i\right] \cdot \mathbb{P}\left[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i\right] \\ &= 1/K \cdot \mathbb{P}\left[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i\right], \end{aligned}$$

In the latter equality we used the fact that $c_{i+1}^* \in [\text{ctr}] \subseteq [K]$ and the challenger (in $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$) samples k randomly in $[K]$.

Subclaim 2 $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$.

Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary **A** with a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing between $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$. We construct an adversary **A'** that breaks the security of the PRG **G**. **A'** is defined as follows:

1. Receive y from the challenger.
2. Sample $k \leftarrow_s [K]$ and play the rest of the experiment as defined in $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$ except that, on k -th key-generation query, set $\mathbf{pk}_k = y$. Moreover, if **A** submits k to the corruption oracle, **A'** aborts as in $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$.
3. Return the output of **A**.

Note that both $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$ output 0 (i.e., abort condition) if the adversary \mathbf{A} submits a corruption query on index k . This means that \mathbf{A}' does not need to know the seed $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ (i.e., the secret key associated to the k -th public key) sampled by the challenger during our reduction. Having said that, if $y = \mathbf{G}(s)$, \mathbf{A}' perfectly simulates $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda)$. On the other hand, if $y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$, \mathbf{A} perfectly simulates $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$. This concludes the proof.

Subclaim 3 $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{3,i}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$.

Proof. The only difference between $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{3,i}^b(\lambda)$ the challenge ciphertext is computed as $\text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i})$ and $\text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i+1})$. We show that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of hk and pk_k , these two circuits are functionally-equivalent. Let $x = (i_x, \text{pk}_x, f_x, \pi_x, \text{sk}_x)$ be an input for the above circuits. Then, the following conditions hold:

Case $i_x \neq i + 1$: Both circuits $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i}$ and $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i+1}$ have identical input/output behavior.

Case $i_x = i + 1 \wedge (\text{pk}_x, f_x) \neq (\text{pk}_{i+1}^*, f_{i+1}^*)$: In both $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{3,i}^b(\lambda)$, hk and h are generated as $\text{hk} \leftarrow \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{hk}}}, L, i + 1)$ and $h = \text{SSB.Hash}(\text{hk}, ((\text{pk}_1^*, f_1^*), \dots, (\text{pk}_L^*, f_L^*)))$. This means that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of hk , the SSB's instantiation (with respect to hk) is statistically binding ([Definition 15](#)) on position $i + 1$. As a consequence, with overwhelming probability, there does not exist a $(\text{pk}_x, f_x, \pi_x)$ such that $(\text{pk}_x, f_x) \neq (\text{pk}_{i+1}^*, f_{i+1}^*)$ and $\text{SSB.Ver}(\text{hk}, h, i + 1, (\text{pk}_x, f_x), \pi_x) = 1$. This implies that, with overwhelming probability, both circuits output \perp .

Case $i_x = i + 1 \wedge (\text{pk}_x, f_x) = (\text{pk}_{i+1}^*, f_{i+1}^*)$: Assume that $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{2,i}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{3,i}^b(\lambda)$ do not abort. This implies that $\text{pk}_x = \text{pk}_{i+1}^* = \text{pk}_k$ is sampled at random from $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$ where pk_k is the public key sampled in the k -th key-generation query. Since \mathbf{G} is a length-doubling PRG, the following probability hold:

$$\mathbb{P}[\exists \text{sk} \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda, \mathbf{G}(\text{sk}) = \text{pk}_k \mid \text{pk}_k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}] \leq 2^\lambda / 2^{2\lambda} = 2^{-\lambda}.$$

This implies that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of pk_k , both circuits output \perp .

By combining the above cases, we conclude that the circuits $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i}$ and $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i+1}$ are functionally-equivalent with overwhelming probability over the choice of hk and pk_k . Hence, the claim follows by the security of the iO obfuscator Obf .

Subclaim 4 $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{3,i}^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{4,i}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$.

Proof. The claim follows by using an identical argument to that of [Subclaim 2](#).

Subclaim 5 $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{4,i}^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{5,i}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$.

Proof. By definition, $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{4,L-1}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{5,L-1}^b(\lambda)$ are identical, for $i = L - 1$. On the other hand, for $i < L - 1$, the claim follows by the index hiding property of SSB and the proof is identical to that of [Lemma 8](#).

Subclaim 6 For $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$, we have that

$$\mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i] = K \cdot \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{5,i}^b(\lambda) = 1].$$

Proof. The claim follows by using an identical argument to that of [Subclaim 1](#).

By combining [Subclaims 2](#) to [4](#) we have that $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{5,i}^b(\lambda)$. Moreover, by leveraging [Subclaims 1](#) and [6](#) we conclude that:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i] &= K \cdot \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{1,i}^b(\lambda) = 1] \leq K \cdot \left(\mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{5,i}^b(\lambda) = 1] + \text{negl}(\lambda) \right), \text{ and} \\ \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda) = 1 \wedge \mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i] &= K \cdot \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{5,i}^b(\lambda) = 1]. \end{aligned}$$

By taking into account that $K \in \text{poly}$, the above equations imply that $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda)$ whenever $\mathbf{NonCorrupt}_i$ occurs ([Equation \(6\)](#)). This concludes the proof of [Claim 4](#).

Claim 5 (Equation (7)) If $\overline{\text{NonCorrupt}}_i$ occurs then $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$.

Proof.

This claim implies that Equation (7) holds. The proof relies on the fact that $\overline{\text{NonCorrupt}}_i$ occurs, i.e., the $(i + 1)$ -th slot is corrupted. Hence, the adversary must be valid, i.e., $f_{i+1}^*(m_0^*) = f_{i+1}^*(m_1^*)$.

Consider the following intermediate hybrid experiments:

$\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{6,i}^b(\lambda)$: Same as $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$ except that the challenge ciphertext is computed as $c = C' \leftarrow_s \text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,j})$ where $j = i + 1$.

$\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{7,i}^b(\lambda)$: Same as $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{6,i}^b(\lambda)$ except for the following differences:

If $i + 2 \leq L$: The challenger computes $\text{hk} \leftarrow_s \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{bk}}}, L, i+2)$ (instead of $\text{hk} \leftarrow_s \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{bk}}}, L, i + 1)$).

If $i + 2 > L$: $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{7,i}^b(\lambda)$ is identical to $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{6,i}^b(\lambda)$.

Note that, in both cases, $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{7,i}^b(\lambda)$ is exactly the experiment $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{i+1}^b(\lambda)$.

Subclaim 7 If $\overline{\text{NonCorrupt}}_i$ occurs then $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{6,i}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$.

Proof. The only difference between $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{6,i}^b(\lambda)$ is that the challenge ciphertext is computed as $\text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i})$ and $\text{Obf}(1^\lambda, C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i+1})$, respectively. We show that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of hk , these two circuits are functionally-equivalent. Let $x = (i_x, \text{pk}_x, f_x, \pi_x, \text{sk}_x)$ be an input for the above circuits. Then, the following conditions hold:

Case $i_x \neq i + 1$: Both circuits $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i}$ and $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i+1}$ have identical input/output behavior.

Case $i_x = i + 1 \wedge (\text{pk}_x, f_x) \neq (\text{pk}_{i+1}^*, f_{i+1}^*)$: In both $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_i^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{6,i}^b(\lambda)$, hk is generated as $\text{hk} \leftarrow_s \text{SSB.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\ell_{\text{bk}}}, L, i + 1)$. Hence, with overwhelming probability over the choice of hk , the SSB's scheme is somewhere statistically binding (Definition 15) on position $i + 1$, i.e., there does not exist a $(\text{pk}_x, f_x, \pi_x)$ such that $(\text{pk}_x, f_x) \neq (\text{pk}_{i+1}^*, f_{i+1}^*)$ and $\text{SSB.Ver}(\text{hk}, h, i + 1, (\text{pk}_x, f_x), \pi_x) = 1$. This implies that, with overwhelming probability, both circuits output \perp .

Case $x = i + 1 \wedge (\text{pk}_x, f_x) = (\text{pk}_{i+1}^*, f_{i+1}^*)$: We consider the following cases.

1. If $\text{SSB.Ver}(\text{hk}, h, i + 1, (\text{pk}_x, f_x), \pi_x) = 0 \vee \text{G}(\text{sk}_x) \neq \text{pk}_x$, both circuits output \perp .
2. Otherwise (i.e., $\text{SSB.Ver}(\text{hk}, h, i + 1, (\text{pk}_x, f_x), \pi_x) = 1 \wedge \text{G}(\text{sk}_x) = \text{pk}_x$), $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i}$ and $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i+1}$ output $f_x(m_0^*)$ and $f_x(m_1^*)$, respectively. Since $\overline{\text{NonCorrupt}}_i$ occurs, the adversary must be valid (with respect to the $(i + 1)$ -th slot). Hence, the circuits return the same output $f_{i+1}^*(m_0^*) = f_x(m_0^*) = f_x(m_1^*) = f_{i+1}^*(m_1^*)$.

By combining the above cases, we conclude that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of hk , $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i}$ and $C_{\text{hk},h,m_b^*,m_{1-b}^*,i+1}$ are functionally-equivalent. Hence, Subclaim 7 follows by the security of the iO obfuscator Obf .

Subclaim 8 $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{6,i}^b(\lambda) \approx_c \tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{7,i}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{0\} \cup [L - 1]$.

Proof. By definition, $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{6,L-1}^b(\lambda)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{H}}_{7,L-1}^b(\lambda)$ are identical, for $i = L - 1$. On the other hand, for $i < L - 1$, the claim follows by the index hiding property of SSB and the proof is identical to that of Lemma 8.

Claim 5 follows by combining Subclaims 7 and 8.

Finally, by combining Claim 4 and Claim 5, Equations (6) and (7), and the triangular inequality, we conclude that Lemma 9 holds.

Lemma 10. $\mathbf{H}_L^b(\lambda) \approx_c \mathbf{H}_{L+1}^b(\lambda)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Proof. The lemma follows by using an identical argument to that of Lemma 7.

By combining Lemmas 7 to 10 and the fact that $\mathbf{H}_{L+1}^b(\lambda) \equiv \mathbf{H}_{-1}^{1-b}(\lambda)$, we conclude that Construction 2 is secure.

Final iO-based RFE scheme. By combining the slotted RFE scheme of [Construction 2](#) and the (“power-of-two”) transformation of [Construction 3](#) ([Appendix C](#)), we obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 2. *Under (succinct and efficient) SSB hash functions and iO, there exists a secure and perfectly correct RFE scheme supporting any class of functions $\mathcal{F} = \{f_i : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$ of size $|\mathcal{F}| = 2^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ and satisfying the following properties:*

- (poly(λ), poly(λ), poly(λ))-compactness;
- (poly(λ), $L \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $O(\log L)$, poly(λ))-efficiency.

Recall that L stands for current number of registered users (unbounded case).

Proof. The corollary follows by leveraging [Definition 16](#), [Theorems 7 to 13](#) and by setting the maximum number of users/slots 2^ℓ of [Construction 3](#) and [Theorem 12](#) to 2^λ . \square

C From slotted RFE to RFE

In this section, we show a construction that transform a slotted RFE to (standard) RFE. The construction is identical to that proposed by Hohenberger *et al.* [[HLWW22](#)] (for the RABE case). For self-containment, we recall the construction below.

Construction 3 *Let $\Pi_{\text{sRFE}} = (\text{sRFE.Setup}, \text{sRFE.KGen}, \text{sRFE.IsValid}, \text{sRFE.Aggr}, \text{sRFE.Enc}, \text{sRFE.Dec})$ be a slotted RFE scheme with message space \mathcal{M} and function space $\mathcal{F} = \{f_i : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}\}$. We build a RFE scheme $\Pi_{\text{RFE}} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KGen}, \text{RegPK}, \text{Enc}, \text{Update}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} and function space \mathcal{F} as follows. The construction makes use of the following conventions:*

- Without loss of generality, we assume that the number of users is a power of two $L = 2^\ell$ for $\ell \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$.
- The construction uses $\ell + 1$ independent instantiations of Π_{sRFE} . The k -th slotted RFE handles 2^{k-1} slots where $k \in [\ell + 1]$.
- The state α (managed by the KC) is composed of the following elements:
 - A counter ctr that tracks the current number of registered users.
 - A dictionary D_1 that maps $(k, i) \in [\ell + 1] \times [2^{k-1}]$ into pairs (pk, f) , i.e., it stores the public key and the corresponding function associated to the i -th slot of the k -th slotted RFE scheme (observe that the k -th slotted RFE scheme supports 2^{k-1} slots).
 - A dictionary D_2 that maps $(k, i) \in [\ell + 1] \times [L]$ into an helper decryption key $\text{hsk}_{k,i}$, i.e., it stores the helper decryption key $\text{hsk}_{k,i}$ of the i -th slot of the k -th slotted RFE scheme.
 - The current master public key $\text{mpk} = (\text{ctr}, \text{mpk}_1, \dots, \text{mpk}_{\ell+1})$.

On initialization, the initial state is set to $\alpha = \perp$ which is parsed as $\alpha = (\text{ctr}, \text{D}_1, \text{D}_2, \text{mpk})$ where $\text{ctr} = 0$, $\text{D}_1 = \emptyset$, $\text{D}_2 = \emptyset$, and $\text{mpk} = (0, \perp, \dots, \perp)$.

Setup($1^\lambda, 1^L, |\mathcal{F}|$): On input the security parameter 1^λ , a bound (represented in unary) on the number of users 1^L , and the size $|\mathcal{F}|$ (in binary) of the function space \mathcal{F} , the randomized setup algorithm computes $\text{crs}_i \leftarrow \text{sRFE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^L, |\mathcal{F}|)$ for $i \in [\ell + 1]$, and outputs $\text{crs} = (\text{crs}_1, \dots, \text{crs}_{\ell+1})$.

KGen(crs, α): On input the common reference string $\text{crs} = (\text{crs}_1, \dots, \text{crs}_{\ell+1})$ and a state $\alpha = (\text{ctr}, \text{D}_1, \text{D}_2, \text{mpk})$, the randomized key-generation algorithm runs $(\text{pk}_k, \text{sk}_k) \leftarrow \text{sRFE.KGen}(\text{crs}_k, i_k)$ for each $k \in [\ell + 1]$ where $i_k = (\text{ctr} \bmod 2^{k-1}) + 1 \in [2^{k-1}]$ is the slot index corresponding to the k -th slotted RFE scheme. Finally, it outputs the public key $\text{pk} = (\text{ctr}, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_{\ell+1})$ and the secret key $\text{sk} = (\text{ctr}, \text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_{\ell+1})$.

RegPK($\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}, f$): On input the common reference string $\text{crs} = (\text{crs}_1, \dots, \text{crs}_{\ell+1})$, a state $\alpha = (\text{ctr}_\alpha, \text{D}_1, \text{D}_2, \text{mpk} = (\text{ctr}_\alpha, \text{mpk}_1, \dots, \text{mpk}_{\ell+1}))$, a public key $\text{pk} = (\text{ctr}_{\text{pk}}, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_{\ell+1})$, and a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$, the deterministic registration algorithm proceeds as follows:

1. For each $k \in [\ell + 1]$, let $i_k = (\text{ctr}_\alpha \bmod 2^{k-1}) + 1 \in [2^{k-1}]$ be the slot index corresponding to the k -th slotted RFE.
2. For each $k \in [\ell + 1]$, if $(\text{sRFE.IsValid}(\text{crs}_k, i_k, \text{pk}_k) = 0 \vee \text{ctr}_{\text{pk}} \neq \text{ctr}_\alpha)$ then the registration algorithm halts and returns the state α and master public key mpk (i.e., registration failed).

3. Otherwise, for each $k \in [\ell + 1]$, the registration algorithm sets $D_1[k, i_k] = (\text{pk}, f)$. Moreover, proceeds as follows:
- If $i_k = 2^{k-1}$ (i.e., the k -th slotted RFE scheme is full) executes the following steps:
 - (a) Compute $(\text{mpk}'_k, \text{hsk}'_{k,1}, \dots, \text{hsk}'_{k,2^{k-1}}) = \text{sRFE.Aggr}(\text{crs}_k, D_1[k, 1], \dots, D_1[k, 2^{k-1}])$, i.e., it aggregates all the public keys associated to the k -th slotted RFE scheme.
 - (b) Set $D_2[\text{ctr}_\alpha + 1 - 2^{k-1} + i, k] = \text{hsk}'_{k,i}$ for every $i \in [2^{k-1}]$.
 - If $i_k \neq 2^{k-1}$, it sets $\text{mpk}'_k = \text{mpk}_k$ (the k -th master public key of the k -th slotted RFE is unchanged).

Finally, it returns the new master public key $\text{mpk}' = (\text{ctr}_\alpha + 1, \text{mpk}'_1, \dots, \text{mpk}'_{\ell+1})$ and the new state $\alpha' = (\text{ctr}_\alpha + 1, D_1, D_2, \text{mpk}')$.

Enc(mpk, m): On input the master public key $\text{mpk} = (\text{ctr}, \text{mpk}_1, \dots, \text{mpk}_{\ell+1})$ and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, the randomized encryption algorithm proceeds as follows:

1. For every $k \in [\ell + 1]$ such that $\text{mpk}_k \neq \perp$, it computes $c_k \leftarrow \text{sRFE.Enc}(\text{mpk}_k, m)$.
2. For every $k \in [\ell + 1]$ such that $\text{mpk}_k = \perp$, it sets $c_k = \perp$.

Finally, it outputs $c = (\text{ctr}, c_1, \dots, c_{\ell+1})$.

Update($\text{crs}, \alpha, \text{pk}$): On input the common reference string $\text{crs} = (\text{crs}_1, \dots, \text{crs}_{\ell+1})$, the state $\alpha = (\text{ctr}_\alpha, D_1, D_2, \text{mpk})$, and a public key $\text{pk} = (\text{ctr}_{\text{pk}}, \text{pk}_1, \dots, \text{pk}_{\ell+1})$, the deterministic update algorithm returns \perp if $\text{ctr}_{\text{pk}} \geq \text{ctr}_\alpha$.

Otherwise, it returns $\text{hsk} = (\text{hsk}_1, \dots, \text{hsk}_{\ell+1})$ where $\text{hsk}_k = D_2[\text{ctr}_{\text{pk}} + 1, k]$ for every $k \in [\ell + 1]$.

Dec(sk, hsk, m): On input a secret key $\text{sk} = (\text{ctr}_{\text{sk}}, \text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_{\ell+1})$, an helper description key $\text{hsk} = (\text{hsk}_1, \dots, \text{hsk}_{\ell+1})$, and a ciphertext $c = (\text{ctr}_c, c_1, \dots, c_{\ell+1})$, the deterministic decryption algorithm returns \perp if $\text{ctr}_c \leq \text{ctr}_{\text{sk}}$.

Otherwise, it computes the largest $k \in [\ell + 1]$ such that the k -th bit of ctr_c and ctr_{sk} differ (here, we assume that bits are 1-indexed starting from the least significant bit). If $\text{hsk}_k = \perp$, then the decryption algorithm returns getUpdate . Otherwise, it returns $y = \text{sRFE.Dec}(\text{sk}_k, \text{hsk}_k, c_k)$.

Correctness, efficiency, and security of [Construction 3](#) follow by using an identical argument to that of [\[HLWW22\]](#).

Theorem 11 (Perfect correctness of [Construction 3](#)). Let Π_{sRFE} as above. If Π_{sRFE} is complete ([Definition 8](#)) and perfectly correct ([Definition 9](#)), then Π_{RFE} from [Construction 3](#) is perfectly correct ([Definition 5](#)).

Proof. The theorem follows by using an identical argument to that of [\[HLWW22, Theorem 6.2\]](#). \square

Theorem 12 (Compactness and efficiency of [Construction 3](#)). Let Π_{sRFE} as above where \mathcal{F} is the class of functions supported by Π_{sRFE} . and $t_{\text{crs}} = t_{\text{crs}}(\lambda, L, |\mathcal{F}|)$, $t_{\text{mpk}} = t_{\text{mpk}}(\lambda, L, |\mathcal{F}|)$, $t_{\text{hsk}} = t_{\text{hsk}}(\lambda, L, |\mathcal{F}|)$, $t_{\text{KGen}} = t_{\text{KGen}}(\lambda, L, |\mathcal{F}|)$, $t_{\text{IsValid}} = t_{\text{IsValid}}(\lambda, L, |\mathcal{F}|)$, $t_{\text{Aggr}} = t_{\text{Aggr}}(\lambda, L, |\mathcal{F}|)$ be polynomials in the security parameter, L , and $|\mathcal{F}|$. If Π_{sRFE} is $(t_{\text{crs}}, t_{\text{mpk}}, t_{\text{hsk}})$ -compact and $(t_{\text{KGen}}, t_{\text{IsValid}}, t_{\text{Aggr}})$ -efficient ([Definition 10](#)), then Π_{RFE} from [Construction 3](#) is

- $(O(t_{\text{crs}} \cdot \log L), O(t_{\text{mpk}} \cdot \log L), O(t_{\text{hsk}} \cdot \log L))$ -compact, and
- $(O(t_{\text{KGen}} \cdot \log L), O(t_{\text{IsValid}} \cdot \log L + t_{\text{Aggr}} + t_{\text{hsk}} \cdot \tilde{L}), O(\log \tilde{L}), O(t_{\text{hsk}} \cdot \log L))$ -efficient ([Definition 6](#)),

where $L = 2^\ell$ is the maximum number of supported users (see [Construction 3](#)) and $\tilde{L} \leq L$ is the current number of registered users at the time of execution.

Proof. Let $L = 2^\ell$ (as in [Construction 3](#)). We demonstrate each property individually:

- $O(t_{\text{crs}} \cdot \log L)$ -compact **crs**: The common reference string (of [Construction 3](#)) is composed of $\ell + 1$ common reference strings (each of size t_{crs}) of the underlying slotted RFE scheme. See also [\[HLWW22, Theorem 6.5\]](#).
- $O(t_{\text{mpk}} \cdot \log L)$ -compact **mpk**: Each master public key (generated by [Construction 3](#)) is composed of a counter ctr (of size $|\text{ctr}| \leq \ell$) and $\ell + 1$ master public keys (each of size t_{mpk}) of the underlying slotted RFE scheme. See also [\[HLWW22, Theorem 6.5\]](#).
- $O(t_{\text{hsk}} \cdot \log L)$ -compact **hsk**: Similarly, each helper decryption key (generated by [Construction 3](#)) is composed of $\ell + 1$ helper decryption keys (each of size t_{hsk}) of the underlying slotted RFE scheme. See also [\[HLWW22, Theorem 6.5 and 6.6\]](#).

- $O(t_{\text{KGen}} \cdot \log L)$ -efficient **KGen**: The key-generation (of [Construction 3](#)) executes $\ell + 1$ times the key-generation algorithm of the underlying slotted RFE. Hence, its running time is bounded by $O(t_{\text{KGen}} \cdot \log L)$ where t_{KGen} is the running time of the slotted RFE key-generation algorithm.
- $O(t_{\text{IsValid}} \cdot \log L + t_{\text{Aggr}} + \tilde{L} \cdot t_{\text{hsk}})$ -efficient **RegPK**: The (worst-case) running time of **RegPK** can be derived by estimating the running time for registering a generic $\tilde{L} = 2^k$ -th user (for $k \in [\ell + 1]$). In such a case, the running time of **RegPK** is composed of $\ell + 1$ executions of **IsValid** and a single execution of **Aggr** whose (individual) running times are bounded by t_{IsValid} and t_{Aggr} , respectively. In addition, the newly generated $\tilde{L} = 2^k$ helper decryption keys (output by **Aggr**) are stored into the dictionary \mathcal{D}_2 (this takes time linear in $2^k = \tilde{L}$ in the RAM model of computation) and each helper decryption key (of the underlying slotted RFE) is of size t_{hsk} . Hence, the final (worst-case) running time of the registration algorithm is $O(t_{\text{IsValid}} \cdot \log L + t_{\text{Aggr}} + t_{\text{hsk}} \cdot \tilde{L})$ in the RAM model of computation.
- $(O(\log \tilde{L}), O(t_{\text{hsk}} \cdot \log L))$ -efficient **Update**: The challenger executes **Update** at most $O(\log \tilde{L})$ (for a generic number $\tilde{L} = 2^k$ of current registered users) because of the following reasons: (i) each helper decryption key hsk is composed of $\ell + 1$ helper decryption keys $(\text{hsk}_1, \dots, \text{hsk}_{\ell+1})$ of the underlying slotted RFE scheme, (ii) **Update** is invoked (by an user) only when one of the $\ell + 1$ helper decryption keys hsk_i is \perp , and (iii) after the execution of **Update**, hsk_i is no longer \perp .
Regarding the running time, **Update** simply compares two $(\ell + 1)$ -bits counters and looks up for the $\ell + 1$ helper decryption keys stored in the dictionary \mathcal{D}_2 . Moreover, by definition, each helper decryption key of slotted RFE is of size t_{hsk} . We conclude that **Update** runs in time $O(t_{\text{hsk}} \cdot \log L)$ in the RAM model of computation.
See also [\[HLWW22, Theorem 6.6\]](#).

□

Theorem 13 (Security of [Construction 3](#)). *Let Π_{sRFE} as above. If Π_{sRFE} is secure ([Definition 11](#)), then Π_{RFE} from [Construction 3](#) is secure ([Definition 7](#)).*

Proof. The theorem follows by using an identical argument to that of [\[HLWW22, Theorem 6.7\]](#) except that we make use of the validity of the adversary with respect to the RFE experiment (instead of the validity for the RABE case). □

Remark 4. As noted by [\[HLWW22\]](#), if the running time of **Setup** and the sizes of crs , mpk , and hsk (of the underlying slotted RFE) are all poly-logarithmic in the number of users, the resulting RFE scheme (output by [Construction 3](#)) supports an arbitrary number of users. This is because the resulting RFE will have the same poly-logarithmic efficiency/compactness and, in turn, this allows us to set $L = 2^\lambda$ to support an arbitrary polynomial number of users. Note that our iO-based slotted RFE scheme satisfy this requirements (see [Theorem 9](#)).