Paper 2023/422
A Differential Fault Attack against Deterministic Falcon Signatures
, Siemens AG, Siemens AGAbstract
We describe a fault attack against the deterministic variant of the Falcon signature scheme. It is the first fault attack that exploits specific properties of deterministic Falcon. The attack works under a very liberal and realistic single fault random model. The main idea is to inject a fault into the pseudo-random generator of the pre-image trapdoor sampler, generate different signatures for the same input, find reasonably short lattice vectors this way, and finally use lattice reduction techniques to obtain the private key. We investigate the relationship between fault location, the number of faults, computational effort for a possibly remaining exhaustive search step and success probability.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Fault attackPost-quantum cryptographyDigital signature schemesLattice-based cryptographyFalcon
- Contact author(s)
-
svenbauer @ siemens com
fabrizio desantis @ siemens com - History
- 2023-03-24: approved
- 2023-03-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/422
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/422,
author = {Sven Bauer and Fabrizio De Santis},
title = {A Differential Fault Attack against Deterministic Falcon Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/422},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/422}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/422}
}
