

# Security analysis and improvements on a quantum electronic voting protocol

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**Abstract.** Recently, Qiu et al. proposed a quantum voting scheme based on the ring signature (International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 60: 1550–1555(2021)), in which the signer and verifier only need measure the received particles with Z-basis and perform some classical simple encryption/decryption operations on the classical message. Although their scheme is very efficient, it cannot resist against the eavesdropping attacks and forgery attack. In this paper, first, the eavesdropping attacks on Qiu et al.'s scheme are proposed. Second, we show the forgery attack on their scheme. Then, based on the GHZ-state, an improved semi-quantum electronic voting protocol is proposed. In the new protocol, the eavesdropping check technology not only can be used to detect the eavesdropping, but also can be used to share a random number. By using the random number and the shared key, the signed vote is encrypted so that it is infeasible for the adversary to trace the signer's identity and forge a valid signed vote. The new protocol overcomes all the security drawbacks of the old protocol. What is more, it has better practicability and efficiency than the similar protocol.

**Keywords:** Electronic voting scheme; Quantum ring signature; Eavesdropping attack; Forgery attack

## 1 Introduction

Electronic voting is gaining importance in the modern world. However, the security of traditional electronic voting heavily depends on solving complex mathematical problems, which may be easily solved by the quantum technologies<sup>[1,2]</sup>. Quantum computers have an incredible computing power that poses a significant threat to established electronic voting protocols. In contrast, quantum voting is more secure as it uses the principles of quantum mechanics. The unclonability and quantum entanglement of quantum states ensure the privacy and security of voting, making any potential interference easier to be detected. Therefore, designing efficient and secure quantum voting protocols is currently a significant issue.

In 2005, Christandl et al. introduced a quantum anonymous transmission protocol that uses anonymous entanglement technology to protect the sender's identity<sup>[3]</sup>. Moreover, in the same year, Vaccaro et al. introduced a quantum voting protocol based on quantum entanglement technology, which was very helpful in protecting the privacy of voters<sup>[4]</sup>. In 2006, Hillery et al. proposed a quantum voting protocol to prevent voter cheating. This protocol required each voter should submit multiple votes<sup>[5]</sup>. Later, Hillery et al. proposed the traveling ballot protocol and distributed ballot protocol, which made significant contributions to the development of quantum voting protocols<sup>[6]</sup>. These protocols acted as fundamental components, inspiring a growing number of researchers. For instance, Li et al. introduced an anonymous electronic voting protocol that used quantum entanglement to enable voting across multiple candidates<sup>[7]</sup>. To address the

challenge posed by dishonest voters and vote counters, Horoshko et al. proposed a quantum voting protocol that featured anonymous detection <sup>[8]</sup>. In addition, Jiang et al. developed a two-valued quantum voting protocol using entangled states of continuous variables <sup>[9]</sup>. However, these protocols have an intricate voting process, which can be problematic for large-scale voting. To overcome this issue, Wang et al. introduced a quantum voting protocol based on quantum teleportation specifically designed for large-scale voting <sup>[10]</sup>. Subsequently, Tian et al. introduced a quantum voting protocol based on four-qubit entangled states, demonstrating increased reliability and efficiency compared to previous protocols <sup>[11]</sup>. Thapliyal et al. further improved the security of Tian et al.'s protocol by incorporating quantum cryptographic switch technology <sup>[12]</sup>. Wang et al. presented a self-technology quantum voting approach to avoid security risks associated with third-party vote counting <sup>[13]</sup>. To improve voting function and efficiency, Qin et al. proposed a quantum voting protocol based on GHZ-like states <sup>[14]</sup>. Li et al. proposed a quantum voting protocol based on eight-qubit entangled states to reduce the complexity of the voting process by utilizing only Bell state measurements and single-particle measurements <sup>[15]</sup>. Jiang et al. proposed a solution to the difficulty of preparing entangled states by incorporating orthogonal product states into the quantum voting protocol <sup>[16]</sup>. Liu et al. proposed a more efficient quantum voting protocol by utilizing BB84 states and introducing a trusted third-party center <sup>[17]</sup>. Li et al. greatly improved the practicality of the protocol by proposing a quantum voting scheme that uses single-particle states only <sup>[18]</sup>.

A later proposed quantum e-voting system used a ring signature as an encrypted vote, which could be verified by the ring members without revealing the identity of the signer <sup>[19]</sup>. To generate and verify a ring signature, the signer and the verifier should have the ability of preparing or verifying various kinds of single qubits. They also should be able to perform the complicated quantum Fourier transform operations.

In the quantum voting protocols discussed above, it was necessary for all participants to be fully quantum ones, with the ability of preparing and measuring different types of qubits. Some protocols even required the ability to perform complex quantum operations.

To simplify the quantum protocol, Boyer et al. <sup>[20]</sup> introduced the concept of semi-quantum protocol. In this type of the protocol, there was one quantum party, while the other participants were “classical” parties. The quantum party was required to have the ability of performing complex quantum operations and preparing and measuring different types of qubits, while the classical parties were only required to perform the below simple operations:

- (1) Preparing qubits  $|0\rangle$  and  $|1\rangle$  and measuring qubits with Z-basis;
- (2) Reflecting or reordering the received qubits.

These requirements can simplify the quantum protocol, allowing classical parties to communicate with quantum parties without the need for complicated quantum devices. The classical participants can utilize simple devices, such as reflectors, Z-basis measurement devices, and delay devices to communicate quantum information with the other parties.

Recently, by calling the quantum secure direct communication protocol (QSDCP), Xu proposed a semi-quantum voting protocol that is based on the three-particle GHZ state and introduced the semi-quantum concept <sup>[21]</sup>. This protocol is more practical than previous ones as the voters only need classical capabilities to participate, which significantly reduces the need for quantum

resources. Qiu et al. introduced a new semi-quantum voting protocol that uses a ring signature to sign votes <sup>[22]</sup>. In their protocol, to generate/verify a quantum ring signature on a vote, the signer/verifier only need to perform the simple Z-basis measurement and XOR operation, which made their protocol very efficient. Their system has the properties of semi-quantum protocol. However, according to our analysis, their protocol has some issues on correctness and security. In this paper, we investigated the correctness of Qiu et al.'s protocol. What is more, we demonstrate that even if their protocol is correct, the protocol is vulnerable to eavesdropping and forgery attacks.

The following sections of this paper are as follows: Section 2 presents a review of Qiu et al.'s quantum voting protocol which uses the ring signature; Section 3 focus on analyzing the correctness of Qiu et al.'s protocol; Section 4 shows the security analysis of Qiu et al.'s protocol and demonstrates the eavesdropping attacks and forgery attack; Finally, in the last section, we present our conclusions.

## 2 Review of Qiu et al.'s quantum voting protocol

In Qiu's quantum voting protocol, the generalized GHZ state is used. The generalized GHZ state can be expressed as

$$|\Psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle^{\otimes n} + |1\rangle^{\otimes n}).$$

Assume there are  $n$  classical ring users. A trusted quantum third party(TQTP) is employed to distribute the GHZ particles to the  $n$  classical ring users. As one classical user of the ring, Alice will generate a ring signature on the vote, which can be verified by the rest  $n-1$  users. Assume Alice is the first user.

### 2.1 Initialization

**Step 1.** TQTP shares the private keys  $K_a, K_b, \dots, K_n$  with the  $n$  users in the ring by performing the secure semi-quantum key distribution protocol, respectively.

**Step 2.** When Alice signs a vote in the ring, she informs TQTP. Then, TQTP prepares  $n$  generalized GHZ states  $|\Psi_1\rangle, |\Psi_2\rangle, \dots, |\Psi_n\rangle$ . Let  $|\Psi_i^j\rangle$  denote the  $j$ -th sub-system of the  $i$ -th generalized GHZ states  $|\Psi_i\rangle$ . For  $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ , TQTP sends  $|\Psi_i^j\rangle$  to the  $j$ -th user( $j=1, 2, \dots, n$ ).

### 2.2 Voting phase

**Step 3.** After Alice receives the  $n$  particles from TQTP, she encrypts the vote  $V$  with the private key  $K_a$  and gets  $V_{K_a}$ .

**Step 4.** Alice computes the message digest  $M=H(V_{K_a})$ , where  $H$  is a hash function and the length of  $M$  is  $n$ .

**Step 5.** Alice measures all the  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  ( $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) with Z-basis and gets  $K_s=\{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n\}$ . If

the measurement result of  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  is  $|0\rangle(|1\rangle)$ ,  $a_i=0(a_i=1)$ .

**Step 6.** Alice calculates  $S=K_s \oplus M$ . Then, Alice sends the ring signature  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$  to TQTP.

### 2.3 Verification phase

**Step 7.** After getting  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$ , TQTP chooses another ring number Bob, who shared the key  $K_b$  with TQTP, to verify the ring signature. Assume Bob is the second ring member. TQTP encrypts  $S$  with key  $K_b$  and gets  $S_{kb}$ . After that, TQTP sends  $S_{kb}$  to Bob.

**Step 8.** After receiving  $S_{kb}$ , Bob decrypts it with the shared key  $K_b$  and gets  $S$ . Then, Bob measures all the received  $|\Psi_i^2\rangle$  ( $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) with Z-basis and gets  $K'_s = \{a'_1, a'_2, \dots, a'_n\}$ .

If the measurement result of  $|\Psi_i^2\rangle$  is  $|0\rangle(|1\rangle)$ ,  $a'_i = 1$  ( $a'_i = 0$ ). Bob calculates  $V_{K_b} = K'_s \oplus S$ .

Then, Bob encrypts  $V_{K_b}$  with  $K_b$  and gets  $S'_{K_b}$ . At last, he sends  $S'_{K_b}$  to TQTP.

**Step 9.** When receiving  $S'_{K_b}$ , TQTP decrypts  $S'_{K_b}$  with the shared key  $K_b$  and obtains  $V_{K_b}$ .

Then, he checks whether  $V_{K_b} = M$ . If  $V_{K_b} = M$ , TQTP decrypts  $V_{Ka}$  by the shared key  $K_a$  and gets the voting result. Otherwise, TQTP repeats Step 8 and sends  $S$  to the other two ring users Charlie and Emily. At last, he gets  $V_{Kc}$  and  $V_{Ke}$  as well. If  $V_{Kc}=V_{Ke}=M$ , this means Bob is dishonest. TQTP continues to decrypt  $V_{ka}$  with the key  $K_a$  and gets the voting result. Or it means that Alice's vote has been tampered.

### 3 Correctness analysis of Qiu et al.'s protocol

In this section, we analyze the correctness of Qiu et al.'s protocol. We prove that the encrypted vote cannot be correctly verified.

In fact, in Step 6, we know that  $S=K_s \oplus M$ . In Step 8, it follows  $V_{K_b} = K'_s \oplus S$ . According to the entanglement of the generalized GHZ state and the decryptions of Step 5 and Step 8, it follows that  $K'_s \oplus K_s = (1, 1, \dots, 1)$ . Therefore, it follows that  $V_{K_b} \neq M$ . Then, the valid  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$  cannot pass the verification. This means TQTP can never successfully check the validity of the signed vote. Therefore, Qiu et al.'s protocol lacks correctness.

### 4 Security analysis of Qiu et al.'s protocol

In this section, we prove that Qiu et al.'s protocol is insecure against the eavesdropping attacks and forgery attack.

#### 4.1 Eavesdropping attacks

In this section, we show two kinds of eavesdropping attacks, entanglement-measurement attack and intercept-measurement attack.

In the entanglement-measurement attack, the adversary tries to entangle the quantum channel

with some auxiliary particle so that he can get some information by measuring his auxiliary particle.

In the intercept-measurement attack, the adversary intercepts the transmitted quantum particle and measures it so that he can get some information about the quantum particle. Then, the adversary resends the measured particle to the receiver. He may also intercept the classical message transmitted on the classical channel.

#### 4.1.1 Entanglement-measurement attack

In this section, we demonstrate that an adversary outside the ring can eavesdrop on the quantum channel to get the session key  $K_s$  by performing the entanglement-measurement attack.

For example, in Step 2, when TQTP sends  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  ( $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) to the Alice, the adversary outside the ring can prepare an auxiliary particle  $e_i$  with initial state  $|0\rangle_{e_i}$ . Then, the adversary performs the controlled NOT operation such that  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  and  $|0\rangle_{e_i}$  are the controlled state and target state, respectively. Thus, we can get the

$$|\Psi_i'\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( |0\rangle^{\otimes n} \otimes |0\rangle_{e_i} + |1\rangle^{\otimes n} \otimes |1\rangle_{e_i} \right) \quad (i=1, 2, \dots, n). \quad (1)$$

During the voting phase, the adversary can measure each auxiliary particle  $e_i$  ( $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) with Z-basis. If the measurement result of  $e_i$  is  $|0\rangle$  ( $|1\rangle$ ), the adversary set  $x_i=0$  ( $x_i=1$ ). Thus, the adversary can get  $X=\{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$ . According to the entanglement of  $|\Psi_i'\rangle$ , it follows that  $X=K_s$ . Therefore, by eavesdropping on the quantum channel between TQTP and the ring user Alice, the adversary can get the session key  $K_s$ .

#### 4.1.2 Intercept-measurement attack

In this section, we demonstrate that an adversary outside the ring can eavesdrop on the quantum channel get the session key  $K_s$  by performing the intercept-measurement attack.

For example, when TQTP sends  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  ( $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) to Alice, the adversary intercepts all the  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  and measures them with Z-basis. According to the measurement results, the adversary can get the session key  $K_s$ . After that, the adversary resends the measured  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  ( $i=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) to Alice.

Another very simple example is that the adversary may intercept  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$  sent from Alice to Trent. Then, the adversary simply calculates  $K_s = S \oplus M$ . If necessary, he resends  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$  to Trent. In this case, the adversary can also get the session key  $K_s$ .

#### 4.2 Forgery attack

In this section, we show that an adversary Ad can forge the ring signature during the voting

phase.

Assume that during some voting phase, the ring member Alice generates the ring signature  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$  on the vote  $V$ . Then, she sends  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$  to TQTP. The adversary Ad intercepts  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$ , keeps a copy of  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$ , and resends  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$  to TQTP.

By using the  $(M, S, V_{Ka})$ , Ad can forge a new ring signature.

Assume that in another voting phase, the ring member Alice generates a new ring signature  $(M', S', V'_{Ka})$  on the new vote  $V'$ . Then, she tries to send  $(M', S', V'_{Ka})$  to TQTP. However, the adversary Ad intercepts  $(M', S', V'_{Ka})$ . What is more, by performing the eavesdropping attack discussed in section 4.1, Ad can obtain the session key  $K'_s$  used during this voting phase. Then,

Ad calculates  $S'' = K'_s \oplus M'$ . It is easy to verify that  $(M, S'', V_{Ka})$  is a valid ring signature on the vote  $V$ . At last, Ad sends  $(M, S'', V_{Ka})$  to TQTP. It is clear that  $(M, S'', V_{Ka})$  can pass the verification phase. This means that Ad can forge the signed vote.

## 5. Improvement of Qiu et al.'s protocol

In this section, we propose the improved version of Qiu et al.'s protocol so as to overcome its drawbacks.

Assume there are  $n$  classical ring users, where  $n$  is an even number. TQTP is a trusted third party who is responsible for counting the votes. Let  $E_k(\cdot)$  represents the secure one-time pad encryption, and  $D_k(\cdot)$  represents the corresponding decryption, where  $k$  is the key used in the algorithms.

### 5.1 Initialization

**IN-Step 1.** TQTP shares the private keys  $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n$  with the  $n$  users in the ring by performing the secure semi-quantum key distribution protocol<sup>[20]</sup>, respectively.

**IN-Step 2.** When Alice signs a vote in the ring, she informs TQTP. Then, TQTP prepares  $n$  generalized GHZ states  $|\Psi_1\rangle, |\Psi_2\rangle, \dots, |\Psi_n\rangle$ . Let  $|\Psi_i^j\rangle$  denotes the  $j$ -th sub-system of the  $i$ -th generalized GHZ states  $|\Psi_i\rangle$ . Let  $Q_j = \{|\Psi_i^j\rangle | i = 1, 2, \dots, n\}$ . For each  $Q_j (j=1, 2, \dots, n)$ , TQTP randomly generates a decoy state  $2n$ -length qubit sequence  $F_j$  which has a uniform distribution in the set  $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |+\rangle, |-\rangle\}$ . Suppose there are  $n/2$  states  $|0\rangle$ ,  $n/2$  states  $|1\rangle$ ,  $n/2$  states  $|+\rangle$  and  $n/2$  states  $|-\rangle$  in  $F_j$ . Then, he randomly mixes  $F_j$  with  $Q_j$  and obtains a new sequence  $Q'_j$ . Then, he sends  $Q'_j$  to the  $j$ -th user.

**IN-Step 3.** After the  $j$ -th user obtains  $Q'_j$ , TQTP publishes the locations and the corresponding basis information of all the decoy states in  $Q'_j$ . Assume the decoy states  $|0\rangle$  and  $|1\rangle$  are

distributed on the positions  $j_1, j_2, \dots, j_n$  in  $Q'_j$ . Then, the  $j$ -th user measures the  $j_l$ -th ( $l=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) state in  $Q'_j$  with Z-basis. If the measurement result is  $|0\rangle$  ( $|1\rangle$ ), the  $j$ -th user sets  $r_l^j = 0$  ( $r_l^j = 1$ ). Then, the  $j$ -user shares a random  $r_j = \{r_1^j, r_2^j, \dots, r_n^j\}$  with TQTP. Then, the  $j$ -th user selects out all the decoy states in  $Q'_j$ , rearranges and sends them back to TQTP. After TQTP receiving the returned decoy states, the  $j$ -th user publishes the new order of the decoy states. Then, TQTP measures the returned decoy states and compares their initial states with the current measurement results. If the error rate of the comparison result is more that the predefined threshold, the protocol is aborted.

**IN-Step 4.** After returning all the decoy states to TQTP, the  $j$ -th user gets  $Q_j$ .

## 5.2 Voting phase

Assume Alice is the first ring user, who will sign the vote  $V$ . Alice measures each  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  in  $Q_1$  with Z-basis. If the measurement result of  $|\Psi_i^1\rangle$  is  $|0\rangle$  ( $|1\rangle$ ), she sets  $a_i=0$  ( $a_i=1$ ). Then Alice gets  $K_s=\{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n\}$ . Next, she encrypts the vote  $V$  with the random  $r_1$  and gets  $V_1 = E_{r_1}(V)$ . After that, she calculates  $T_1=H(X_1||r_1)$ ,  $M=H(r_1//V)$  and  $S=K_s \oplus M$ , where  $H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is a public one-way hash function. Then, she encrypts the ring signature  $S$  and gets  $C_1 = E_{T_1}(S)$ . Then, Alice sends the  $V_1$  and  $C_1$  to TQTP.

## 5.3 Verification phase

**VE-Step 1.** When obtaining Alice's  $V_1$  and  $C_1$ , TQTP checks whether there exists the vote record of Alice in his database. If there exists some vote record of Alice, TQTP rejects Alice's duplicate voting and stops. Otherwise, TQTP calculates  $T_1=H(X_1||r_1)$ . Then, he decrypts  $V_1$  and  $C_1$  and gets  $V' = D_{r_1}(V_1)$  and  $S' = D_{T_1}(C_1)$ . Then, he calculates  $M'=H(r_1//V')$  and publishes  $S'$ .

**VE-Step 2.** TQTP informs another ring number Bob, who shared the  $X_2$  and  $r_2$  with TQTP, to verify the ring signature. Assume Bob is the second ring member.

**VE-Step 3.** Bob measures all the received  $Q_2$  with Z-basis. If the measurement result of  $|\Psi_i^2\rangle$  is  $|0\rangle$  ( $|1\rangle$ ), Bob sets  $k_i^2 = 0$  ( $k_i^2 = 1$ ). Thus, Bob gets  $K_2 = \{k_1^2, k_2^2, \dots, k_n^2\}$ . Then, according to the published  $S'$ , Bob calculates  $M_2=S' \oplus K_2$ . Then, Bob calculates  $T_2=H(X_2||r_2)$ . Next, he encrypts  $M_2$  and gets  $CM_2 = E_{T_2}(M_2)$ . At last, he publishes  $CM_2$ .

**VE-Step 4.** According to the shared  $X_2$  and  $r_2$ , TQTP calculates  $T_2=H(X_2||r_2)$ . Then, TQTP

decrypts the published  $CM_2$  and gets  $M'_2 = D_{T_2}(CM_2)$ . If  $M'_2 = M'$ , TQTP believes  $V'$  is a valid vote. Otherwise, TQTP repeats VE-Step 2~VE-Step 4 and informs the other two ring users Charlie and Emily to verify the signature. At last, he gets  $M'_3$  and  $M'_4$  as well. If  $M'_3 = M'_4 = M'$ , this means Bob is dishonest and TQTP believes  $V'$  is a valid vote. Or it means that Alice's vote has been tampered. If  $V'$  is valid, TQTP records (Alice,  $S'$ ,  $V'$ ,  $M'$ ,  $r_1$ ) in his database.

## 6. Security analysis

The analysis in this section centers on the secrecy of the shared keys of the voting scheme, security against eavesdropping, unconditional anonymity, unforgeability and non-repudiation of the vote.

### 6.1 Secrecy of the shared keys

As described in our scheme, users share secret keys with Trent using the semi-quantum key distribution protocol. This method has been proven to be unconditionally secure. It ensures that the attacker cannot break the shared keys between Trent and users in IN-step1.

In IN-step2, the attacker attempts to intercept  $Q'_j$  ( $j=1, 2, \dots, n$ ) to obtain information about the signing key, says,  $K_s$ . However, in our protocol, the sequence  $Q'_j$  involves decoy particles, which are used for eavesdropping detection. If an attacker attempts to eavesdrop by measuring the particles in  $Q'_j$ , his/her eavesdropping actions will inevitably disturb the decoy particles. TQTP can detect the adversary's eavesdropping by checking the decoy states. For more detail of the eavesdropping check, please refer to section 6.2.

In the voting phase, the random  $r_1$  is used to encrypted the vote  $V$  to get  $V_1 = E_{r_1}(V)$ . Note that TQTP and Alice shares  $r_1$  by measuring the decoy particle. If the adversary attempts to get  $r_1$ , he/she has to measure the decoy particles. However, by the similar security of BB84 protocol<sup>[23]</sup>, it follows that, without knowing the correct measurement basis, the adversary's measurement on the decoy particles may change their states, so the adversary's disturbance can be detected by TQTP during the eavesdropping check phase. Therefore, it is infeasible for the adversary to obtain  $r_1$ . On the other hand, it is hard for the adversary to infer  $r_1$  and  $x_1$  from  $T_1=H(X_1||r_1)$  and  $M=H(r_1//V)$  due to the one-way property of the hash function  $H$ .

### 6.2 Eavesdropping attacks

In this section, we analyze the security of the improved protocol against the famous eavesdropping attacks, including intercept-measurement attack, entanglement-measurement attack and Trojan horse attack.

### 6.2.1 Intercept-measurement attack

Interception-measurement attack refers to an adversary's attempt to eavesdrop on the quantum channel by intercepting the quantum particles sent by the sender, measuring and then resending them to the receiver. This type of attack is a serious threat to the security of quantum communication. In this section, we show that our protocol is immune to this kind of attack.

During the initialization phase, TQTP sends  $Q'_j$  to the  $j$ -th user. The attacker may attempt to intercept  $Q'_j$  and measure it so as to obtain some information about the transmitted particles.

However, because the state of each decoy particle has a uniform distribution in  $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |+\rangle, |-\rangle\}$ , the mixed state of each decoy particle can be expressed as

$$\rho_{decoy} = \frac{1}{4}|0\rangle\langle 0| + \frac{1}{4}|1\rangle\langle 1| + \frac{1}{4}|+\rangle\langle +| + \frac{1}{4}|-\rangle\langle -| = \frac{I}{2}. \quad (2)$$

Similarly, the mixed state of each sub-system of the GHZ particles can be expressed as

$$\rho_{sub-GHZ} = \frac{1}{2}|0\rangle\langle 0| + \frac{1}{2}|1\rangle\langle 1| = \frac{I}{2}. \quad (3)$$

Eqs.(2-3) show that the decoy particles and the sub-systems of GHZ particles have the same mixed state. Therefore, they are theoretically indistinguishable. For the decoy state  $|0\rangle(|1\rangle)$ , if the attacker measures it with the basis  $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ , its state of cannot be changed. However, if the attackers measures it with basis  $\{|+\rangle, |-\rangle\}$ , its state will be changed into  $|+\rangle$  or  $|-\rangle$ . In this case, the attacker's disturbance can be detected by TQTP with probability 1/2. Similarly, the attacker's disturbance on the decoy states  $|+\rangle$  and  $|-\rangle$  can be detected with probability 1/2 as well. Hence, If  $Q'_j$  contains  $2n$  decoy particles, the probability of detecting the eavesdropping is

$$p(n) = 1 - \left( \frac{1}{2} \times 1 + \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} \right)^{2n} = 1 - \left( \frac{3}{4} \right)^{2n} \rightarrow 1 (n \rightarrow \infty).$$

This means the attacker's eavesdropping will be caught when  $n$  is large enough. For example, when  $n=60$ ,  $p(60) \approx 0.9999999999999999$ .

### 6.2.2 Entanglement-measurement attack

For the entanglement-measurement attack, the adversary has the ability of entangling an ancillary probe with the particles transmitted from TQTP to the users through a unitary operation  $U$ . The adversary attempts to infer some information on the particles transmitted from TQTP to the users by the measurement on his/her probe. However, we will demonstrate below that this kind of attack is ineffective against our protocol.

Note that TQTP mixes the decoy particles into the quantum channel. In the following, let  $e$

represent the decoy particle inserted into the quantum channel and  $\mathcal{G}$  represent the adversary's auxiliary probe.

Assume that

$$U|0\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = |0\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle + |1\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{01}\rangle, \quad (4)$$

$$U|1\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = |0\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{10}\rangle + |1\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle, \quad (5)$$

$$U|+\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left[ |0\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle + |\mathcal{G}_{10}\rangle) + |1\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{01}\rangle + |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle) \right], \quad (6)$$

$$U|-\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left[ |0\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle - |\mathcal{G}_{10}\rangle) + |1\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{01}\rangle - |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle) \right]. \quad (7)$$

The detection of eavesdropping can be avoided only if the attacker's interference does not alter the states of the decoy particles. Hence, Eqs. (4-5) should satisfy

$$U|0\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = |0\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle, \quad (8)$$

$$U|1\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = |1\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle. \quad (9)$$

These mean

$$|\mathcal{G}_{01}\rangle = |\mathcal{G}_{10}\rangle = 0. \quad (10)$$

Subsequently, Eqs.(6-7) can be simplified as

$$U|+\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left[ |+\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle + |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle) + |-\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle - |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle) \right], \quad (11)$$

$$U|-\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left[ |+\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle - |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle) + |-\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle + |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle) \right]. \quad (12)$$

As previously mentioned, an eavesdropping attack will go undetected only if the attacker refrains from altering the state of the decoy particles. Therefore, Eqs.(11-12) should satisfy

$$U|+\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = \frac{1}{2} |+\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle + |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle), \quad (13)$$

$$U|-\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = \frac{1}{2} |-\rangle_e (|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle + |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle). \quad (14)$$

From Eqs.(11-14), it follows

$$|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle = |\mathcal{G}_{11}\rangle. \quad (15)$$

According to Eqs.(8-9, 13-15), we can get

$$\begin{cases} U|0\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = |0\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle \\ U|1\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = |1\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle \\ U|+\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = |+\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle \\ U|-\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}\rangle = |-\rangle_e|\mathcal{G}_{00}\rangle \end{cases} \quad (16)$$

This means the attacker's auxiliary probe is independent of the partners' quantum channel. Hence, the attacker cannot obtain useful information about the transported particles from the measurement on the auxiliary probe. Therefore, our protocol can resist the entanglement-measurement attack.

### 6.2.3 Trojan horse attack

In the Trojan horse attack <sup>[24-26]</sup>, the attacker may intercept the transmitted photons from TQTP to some ring user. Then, he/she attaches some invisible 'Trojan photons' to the intercepted photons and resends all the photons to the receiver. The attacker's goal is to steal some information on the transmitted photons by the invisible 'Trojan photons'. To detect the attacker's Trojan horse attack, the ring user can use the wavelength filter and photon number splitter technologies <sup>[26-28]</sup> to detect and remove the invisible photons before measuring the received particles. Therefore, the attacker will fail to steal the information on the transmitted photons by the Trojan horse attack.

### 6.3 Unconditional anonymity

In a voting system, each active ring user will submit his/her signed vote (ring signature). In our protocol, each active ring user encrypts her signed vote and sends the encrypted signed vote (says,  $(V_1, C_1)$ ) to TQTP. Without knowing the keys (says,  $X_1$  and  $r_1$ ), it is infeasible for the adversary to decrypt the encrypted signed vote (says,  $(V_1, C_1)$ ) and know the content of the signed vote (ring signature). Therefore, when TQTP decrypts an encrypted signed vote and publishes the ring signature (says,  $S'$ ), the adversary cannot know which ring user is the signer. What is more, in our protocol,  $S' = D_{T_1}(C_1)$  and  $C_1 = E_{T_1}(S)$ . Therefore, it follows  $S' = S = K_s \oplus M$ . Note that all the active ring users share the same signing key  $K_s = K_2 = \dots = K_n$ , which means

$$S' = K_s \oplus M = K_2 \oplus M = \dots = K_n \oplus M. \quad (17)$$

This implies that the published ring signature  $S'$  does not reveal the identity of the signer, even if they have knowledge of all the signing keys  $K_s, K_2, \dots, K_n$  are disclosed.

On the Other hand, if necessary, the trusted party TQTP can trace the identity of the signer, since TQTP has the record (Alice,  $S', V', M', r_1$ ) in his database.

### 6.4 Unforgeability

Unforgeability is one of the requirements for a secure e-voting protocol. That is, an attacker should not have the ability of forging a valid ring signature (signed vote). In our protocol, the ring signature is  $S' = S = K_s \oplus M$ . Therefore, to forge the signature  $S'$ , it is necessary for the attacker to obtain  $K_s$  and  $M$ . We know that  $K_s$  is the measurement result of  $Q_1$ . As analyzed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, the attacker cannot eavesdrop on  $Q_1$  to obtain  $K_s$ . On the other hand, the attacker may attempt to compute  $M = H(r_1 || V)$ . However, according to the analysis in Section 6.1, it follows that

it is hard for the attacker to get  $r_1$ . Without knowing  $r_1$ , it is infeasible for the attacker to compute  $M=H(r_1||V)$ .

In conclusion, the attacker is unable to forge the ring signature  $S'$ . Therefore, our protocol has the security property of unforgeability.

### 6.5 Non-repudiation

According to Section 6.4, the signature  $S'$  cannot be forged by an external attacker, implying that only an internal member of the protocol can generate it. Therefore, when the ring signature passes the validity check, it follows that it must be generated by some internal member, and the verifier cannot deny its validity because of its unforgeability. Additionally, the trusted third party TQTP can trace the signer's identity by referencing its database, which contains the voting information (Alice,  $S'$ ,  $V'$ ,  $M'$ ,  $r_1$ ). Therefore, if TQTP needs to trace the source of the signature, the signer cannot deny their own signature.

## 7 Performances comparison of the similar semi-quantum voting protocols

**Table 1.** Comparisons of the similar semi-quantum voting protocols

Protocols	Security	Quantum states	Number of Classical voters	Number of quantum partners	Need call additional quantum protocol	Qubit efficiency
Xu et al. [21]	Yes	Three-particle GHZ state	$n$	3	Yes/Need call QSDCP	$<1/[6n(1+\delta)]$
Qiu et al. [22]	No	$n$ -particle GHZ state	$n$	1	No	$1/n$
Ours	Yes	$n$ -particle GHZ state	$n$	1	No	$1/n$

In this section, we compare the performances of the similar semi-quantum voting protocol.

First, we present the qubit efficiency comparison of the similar protocols. In [29], the qubit efficiency of a quantum protocol is defined as  $\varepsilon=\gamma/\rho$ , where  $\rho$  is the total number of quantum bits distributed by the sender (ignoring the number of decoy particles), and  $\gamma$  is the number of bits authenticated by the verifier.

In Xu et al.'s protocol, it is required that  $2n^2(1+\delta)$  three-dimensional GHZ states should be distributed for  $n$  voters (where  $\delta$  is any number greater than 0), while the length of the authenticated message is  $n$ . Therefore, the qubit efficiency of Xu et al.'s protocol can be  $n/[6n^2(1+\delta)] = 1/[6n(1+\delta)]$ . In fact, in Xu et al.'s protocol, to authenticate the vote, the partners have to perform quantum protocol QSDCP many times for different voters. Therefore, many additional qubits have to be distributed by the partners to transmit the authenticated messages. Therefore, the qubit efficiency of Xu et al.'s protocol is far less than  $1/[6n(1+\delta)]$ .

In our protocol, TQTP sends  $n$  generalized GHZ states to  $n$  ring members to authenticate  $n$ -bit message digest  $M$ . Therefore, in our protocol,  $n^2$  qubits are cost, while  $n$  bits are authenticated. The efficiency of our protocol can be calculated as  $\varepsilon=n/n^2=1/n$ .

Similarly, Qiu et al.'s protocol has the qubit efficiency  $\varepsilon=1/n$  as well. However, according to the analysis in Section 3 and Section 4, their protocol suffers from correctness flaws and security

vulnerabilities.

On the other hand, in Xu et al.'s protocol, besides  $n$  classical voters, it is required that three quantum parties corporately finish the voting phase and verification phase. What is more, during the vote verification phase, the partners have to perform QSDCP protocol many times for different voter to transmit the messages, which may increase the complexity of the protocol and decrease the qubit efficiency of the protocol.

The specific comparison results are shown in Table 1.

## 8. Conclusions

First, we analyze Qiu et al.'s quantum voting protocol, which is based on the ring signature. Their protocol is very efficient because the ring members are all classical participants, who only need perform the simple measurement with Z-basis. Unfortunately, their scheme lacks correctness. What is more, the security analysis shows that their scheme is insecure against eavesdropping attack and forgery attack as well.

Then, we propose an improved semi-quantum voting protocol, which overcomes all the security holes of the old protocol. What is more, our protocol is more secure and efficient than the similar protocols.

Table 1 shows the merits of the improved protocol over the similar protocols.

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## CRedit authorship contribution statement

The correctness and security analyzed were presented by Xin Xiangjun and Qiu Shujng, and the manuscript was written by Xin Xiangjun and Qiu Shujng as well. The manuscript was reviewed by Zheng qian, Li Chaoyang and Li Fagen. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

## Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

## Data availability

The manuscript has no associated data.

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