




# A Simpler and More Efficient Reduction of DLog to CDH for Abelian Group Actions

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**Abstract.** Abelian group actions appear in several areas of cryptography, especially isogeny-based post-quantum cryptography. A natural problem is to relate the analogues of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and discrete logarithm (DLog) problems for abelian group actions. Galbraith, Panny, Smith and Vercauteren (Mathematical Cryptology '21) gave a quantum reduction of DLog to CDH, assuming a CDH oracle with perfect correctness. Montgomery and Zhandry (Asiacrypt '22, best paper award) showed how to convert an unreliable CDH oracle into one that is correct with overwhelming probability. However, while a theoretical breakthrough, their reduction is quite inefficient: if the CDH oracle is correct with probability  $\epsilon$  then their algorithm to amplify the success requires on the order of  $1/\epsilon^{21}$  calls to the CDH oracle.

We revisit this line of work and give a much simpler and tighter algorithm. Our method only takes on the order of  $1/\epsilon^4$  CDH oracle calls and is conceptually simpler than the Montgomery-Zhandry reduction. Our algorithm is also fully black-box, whereas the Montgomery-Zhandry algorithm is slightly non-black-box. Our main tool is a thresholding technique that replaces the comparison of distributions in Montgomery-Zhandry with testing equality of thresholded sets.

## 1 Introduction

Abelian group actions appear in several areas of cryptography. In isogeny-based post-quantum cryptography there have been several new instantiations of group actions, such as CSIDH [CLM<sup>+</sup>18], CSI-FiSh [BKV19, EKP20], and SCALLOP [FFK<sup>+</sup>23]. Isogeny-based group actions have been proven to be versatile in many applications, including but not limited to signature schemes [BKV19, EKP20, DG19], UC-secure oblivious transfer protocols [LGD21, BMM<sup>+</sup>23], threshold signatures [DM20], (linkable/accountable) ring and group signatures [BKP20, BDK<sup>+</sup>22], blind signatures [KLLQ23], QROM-secure KEMs [DHK<sup>+</sup>22], and PAKE [AEK<sup>+</sup>22].

A natural problem is to relate the analogues of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and discrete logarithm (DLog) problems for abelian group actions, which we abbreviate GA-CDH and GA-DLog, respectively, since key exchange protocols based on these instantiations are built upon the group action CDH assumption (GA-CDH) but the underlying group action DLog assumptions (GA-DLog) are much better studied and understood from a hardness perspective. Galbraith, Panny, Smith and Vercauteren [GPSV21] gave a quantum reduction of GA-DLog to GA-CDH, assuming a GA-CDH oracle with *perfect correctness*. Subsequently, Montgomery and Zhandry [MZ22] devised a novel approach and a series of sophisticated procedures to transform an unreliable GA-CDH oracle into one that is correct with an overwhelming probability and showed how to use this in the [GPSV21] framework to build a full quantum reduction of GA-DLog to GA-CDH.

However, [MZ22] is quite inefficient: more precisely, if a GA-CDH oracle is correct with probability  $\epsilon$ , then the Montgomery-Zhandry algorithm to amplify the success probability to an exponentially low amount, which is necessary for their reduction from GA-CDH to GA-DLog to work, takes on the order of  $1/\epsilon^{21}$  calls to the original GA-CDH oracle. To put this into perspective, given a GA-CDH oracle with success rate  $1/8$ , it requires at least  $2^{63}$  oracle calls in [MZ22] to obtain a GA-CDH a GA-DLog solver with an overwhelming advantage. While [MZ22] was a theoretical breakthrough, its inefficiency means it can only have an extremely limited effect on practical parameter setting for group actions or isogenies.

This brings us to the primary objective of this work:

*Can we have tighter and simpler approaches for the reduction between CDH and DLog and to amplify a CDH circuit for abelian group actions?*

We answer this question in the affirmative. We show a GA-CDH to GA-DLog reduction that only requires on the order of  $1/\epsilon^4$  calls to a GA-CDH oracle that succeeds with probability  $\epsilon$ . Moreover, our techniques are considerably simpler than the heavy mathematical machinery used in [MZ22], providing a much more understandable reduction as well.

## 1.1 Group Actions and Computational Problems

Let  $G$  be an abelian group acting transitively on set  $\mathcal{X}$  via the operation  $\star$ . We denote group actions as tuples  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$ . In this paper we assume this is an effective group action (EGA), meaning that there is an efficient algorithm to compute  $g \star x$  for any  $g \in G$  and  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ . The isogeny-based primitive CSIDH [CLM<sup>+</sup>18], which is one of the main motivations for this work, was originally not known to be an effective group action, but recent work by Page and Robert [PR23] gives a solution to this problem, and in the context of our work this issue can be bypassed using a technique of Wesolowski [Wes22]. We note there are seemingly hard barriers to making a GA-DLog to GA-CDH reduction work for non-EGAs (*restricted* effective group actions), and we refer interested readers to [MZ22] for this, where there is an extensive discussion on the topic.

We now introduce the two main computational problems that arise in (abelian) group action cryptography. The discrete logarithm problem is also known as *vectorization*, and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem as *parallelization*.

**GA-DLog:** Given  $(x, g \star x) \in \mathcal{X}^2$ , compute  $g$ .

**GA-CDH:** Given  $(x, a \star x, b \star x) \in \mathcal{X}^3$ , compute  $(ab) \star x$ .

Galbraith, Panny, Smith and Vercauteren [GPSV21] showed a quantum reduction of GA-DLog to GA-CDH (vectorization to parallelization) for *perfect* adversaries. At a high level the idea is the following: let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a (quantum) oracle such that  $\mathcal{A}(a \star x, b \star x) = (ab) \star x$  with overwhelming correctness. Given a GA-DLog instance  $(x, a \star x)$  one can use the oracle as  $\mathcal{A}(a^m \star x, a^n \star x) = (a^{m+n}) \star x$  to compute  $(a^t) \star x$  for any desired  $t \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Suppose for simplicity that  $G$  is cyclic and let  $g$  be a generator of  $G$ . Define  $f : \mathbb{Z}^2 \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$  by  $f(s, t) = (g^s) \star (a^t) \star x$ . One can compute  $f$  using the oracle  $\mathcal{A}$ . Applying Shor’s algorithm [Sho94] for the hidden subgroup problem returns an element in the lattice  $L = \{(s, t) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : g^s a^t = 1\}$ . If  $\gcd(t, |G|) = 1$  then we can solve the discrete logarithm of  $a$  to the base  $g$ , and hence can compute  $a$ .

The intuition of [GPSV21] is that the ability to compute GA-CDH allows us to turn a group action into a group, since we can “multiply” elements using the GA-CDH oracle. This means we can directly apply Shor’s algorithm for solving discrete log on groups.

## 1.2 The Montgomery-Zhandry Approach

Montgomery and Zhandry [MZ22] showed how to handle an oracle that is only correct with probability  $\epsilon$ . Since the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem for group actions is hard, and since we lack the algebraic tools used in to resolve this problem in the case of CDH in groups, there seems to be no easy way to determine whether or not an output of the oracle is correct or not. We sketch some of the main ideas of their work.

For  $y, z \in \mathcal{X}$  define  $\mathcal{A}_0(y, z)$  to be the algorithm that samples uniformly at random group elements  $a', b' \in G$ , and returns  $(a'b')^{-1} \star \mathcal{A}(a' \star y, b' \star z)$ . Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be the output distribution of  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ . Montgomery and Zhandry show that  $\Pr[x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}] = \epsilon$  and that the output distribution of  $\mathcal{A}_0(a \star x, b \star x)$  is the same as the shift of the distribution  $\mathcal{D}$ , which we denote as  $(ab) \star \mathcal{D}$  (meaning  $\Pr[w \leftarrow (ab) \star \mathcal{D}] := \Pr[(ab)^{-1} \star w \leftarrow \mathcal{D}]$ ). We also use  $\mathcal{A}_0$  in this work, as it is a very basic self-reduction. We explain  $\mathcal{A}_0$  in more detail in the body of the paper.

The next core component of [MZ22] is an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1(y, z)$  that runs  $\mathcal{A}_0(y, z)$  for a number  $T$  (to be determined later) of times to get a list  $L$  of outputs (some may be repeated multiple times), which provides an empirical distribution  $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}$  of the distribution  $\mathcal{D}$ . When  $T \gg 1/\epsilon$ , the correct answer  $(ab) \star x$  will be on the list with an overwhelming probability. Then for each  $w \in L$ , they run  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, w)$  for  $T$  times. When  $w = (ab) \star x$  then the resulting distribution will be the same as  $\mathcal{D}$ . The idea is that if  $w \neq (ab) \star x$  then we would like to eliminate it from the list, but this does not always work. We will use a simi-

lar “shifting” approach here, but our algorithm is somewhat different and our analysis is considerably different from [MZ22].

One of the main insights of [MZ22] is that the only obstruction is due to small subgroups. We briefly explain this now.

Define  $\mathcal{D}_w$  to be the output distribution of  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, w)$ , and let  $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_w$  be an empirical distribution of  $\mathcal{D}_w$  obtained by taking  $T$  samples from  $\mathcal{D}_w$ . Let  $\Delta(\cdot, \cdot)$  be the statistical distance function. [MZ22] considers the distance function  $\|\mathcal{D} - \mathcal{D}'\|_\infty = \max_{u \in \mathcal{X}} |\Pr[u \leftarrow \mathcal{D}] - \Pr[u \leftarrow \mathcal{D}']|$ . Let  $L'' \subseteq G$  be the set of  $g \in G$  such that  $\Delta(\mathcal{D}_{g \star x}, \mathcal{D}) \leq \delta/2$ . Let  $H$  be the subgroup of  $G$  generated by  $L''$ . Montgomery and Zhandry show (Lemma 15 of [MZ22]) that if  $\delta \leq \epsilon^4/8$  then  $|H| < 1/\epsilon + 1$ .

The full specification of algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1(y, z)$  is as follows:

1. Run  $\mathcal{A}_0(y, z)$  for  $T$  times to get a list  $L$  of outputs and an estimate  $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}$  of the distribution  $\mathcal{D}$ .
2. Set  $L' = \{\}$ .
3. For each  $w \in L$ , run  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, w)$  for  $T$  times and calculate estimate  $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_w$  of distribution  $\mathcal{D}_w$ .
4. If  $\Delta(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_w, \tilde{\mathcal{D}}) \leq \delta/2$  then add  $w$  to  $L'$ .
5. Return  $L'$ .

Montgomery and Zhandry then define an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_2(y, z)$  that “fills out” the subgroup so that it outputs the set  $\{(gab) \star x : g \in H\}$ , where  $H$  is the subgroup abovementioned. This algorithm now has overwhelming success. The analysis of  $\mathcal{A}_2$  is intricate, and we have intentionally omitted it from our own work. We refer an interested reader to [MZ22].

The full [MZ22] reduction on input a GA-DLog instance  $(x, a \star x)$  and with quantum access to circuit  $\mathcal{A}$  is as follows:

1. Choose the parameters  $\delta, T$ .
2. Determine  $H$ .
3. Run the algorithm of [GPSV21] with respect to action of  $G/H$  on  $(G/H) \star x$ , using the  $\mathcal{A}_2(\cdot, \cdot)$  as the parallelization circuit. Here  $G/H$  and  $(G/H) \star x$  are represented in  $O(1/\epsilon + 1)$  space as cosets/orbits. The algorithm returns the coset  $aH$  with noticeable probability.
4. Perform a brute-force search over all elements  $g$  within the coset  $aH$ , where  $a \in aH$ , to deduce the group element  $a$  using the known set element of  $a \star x$ .

Our overall approach in this work is similar, although our parameterizations and algorithms are quite different.

Finally, we note that in their published work, Montgomery and Zhandry claim the number of queries to  $\mathcal{A}$  is  $O(1/\epsilon^{13})$ . However, there is a miscalculation in the complexity of the algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1$  as presented in [MZ22]. According to their analysis, the algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1$  requires  $T^2 + T$  queries of the circuit  $\mathcal{A}$ , where  $T$  is taken to be  $T = \tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-8})$ . It is crucial to note that the condition  $T = \tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-8})$  is necessary to ensure that the subgroup generated by the error terms of  $\mathcal{A}_1$  approximates  $\epsilon^{-1}$ . However, due to this requirement, it actually implies that  $\mathcal{A}_1$  performs  $\tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-16})$  queries to  $\mathcal{A}$  instead of the originally stated  $\tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-8})$ .

Consequently, when provided with a GA-CDH oracle with a success rate of  $\epsilon$ , solving a GA-DLog problem using  $\mathcal{A}_1$  would actually require  $\tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-21})$  queries to the CDH oracle, as opposed to the claim of  $\tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-13})$  made in the paper.

### 1.3 Technical Overview

We show a new approach to the problem based on thresholding. For a GA-CDH challenge  $(a \star x, b \star x)$ , we essentially show that there is a set of “heavy” elements that contains the required value  $(ab) \star x$  that can be accurately computed using a sufficient number of queries to the oracle. Unlike in [MZ22], we can show that, across different queries the same set of elements, up to shifting by some value, always shows up in an output set. This makes our statistical analysis much easier and more lightweight— [MZ22] has to use a number of complicated theorems from algebra, while the most complicated math we use is a simple Chernoff bound—as well as dramatically more efficient. We outline the steps in our reduction in the remainder of this subsection.

We also assume in this overview we are working with a regular group action  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  with origin element  $x$ . Consider a GA-CDH oracle  $\mathcal{A}$  that outputs the correct set element with probability  $\epsilon$ . We show how to use  $\mathcal{A}$  to build an algorithm that outputs either the correct set element or all elements in a coset of a subgroup containing the correct set element with extremely high probability; from there, we can apply the work of [GPSV21] and [MZ22] to complete the GA-CDH to GA-DLog reduction.

*The simple randomized self-reduction.* As we outlined earlier, one of the core algorithms in [MZ22] and in our work is the simple random self-reduction  $\mathcal{A}_0$  for GA-CDH instances on a group action. Suppose we are given GA-CDH challenge set elements  $(y = a \star x, z = b \star x)$  and want to query  $\mathcal{A}$  to output  $(ab) \star x$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  could just refuse to work on certain inputs; its success probability is over all combinations of set elements. However, we can have an efficient self-reduction: by randomly selecting  $g$  and  $h$  from the group  $G$  and calculating  $(gh)^{-1} \star \mathcal{A}(g \star x, h \star y)$ , we obtain the correct result if and only if  $\mathcal{A}$  correctly evaluates the query. Furthermore, since  $g \star x$  and  $h \star y$  constitute uniformly random and independent set elements (we assume here that the group action is regular), we obtain the distribution that represents the “average” output of the adversary.

Following [MZ22] we refer to this algorithm as  $\mathcal{A}_0$ . The distribution resulting from  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$  is denoted as  $\mathcal{D}$ , and can be viewed as the “reference” distribution. We adopt straightforward proofs from [MZ22] to establish that, for any  $g \in G$ ,  $g \star \mathcal{D} = \mathcal{A}_0(x, g \star x)$ , which we denote as  $\mathcal{D}_g$ .

In essence, we are asserting that if we modify the input to  $\mathcal{A}_0$ , the distribution of the adversary’s output will shift accordingly. This is because the inputs to  $\mathcal{A}$  from  $\mathcal{A}_0$  are entirely randomized, preventing  $\mathcal{A}$  from engaging in any strategic maneuvers or attempts to deceive.

*Approximating the oracle’s success probability  $\epsilon$ .* In contrast to [MZ22], our reduction commences with a concrete approximation of the given GA-CDH oracle’s

success probability, denoted as  $\epsilon$ . Establishing a tight lower bound on  $\epsilon$ , denoted by  $\epsilon_{\min}$ , is a crucial step in our reduction process. This lower bound serves a vital role in enabling a *fully black-box reduction*, a distinction from [MZ22].

To determine  $\epsilon_{\min}$ , we execute  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$  a sufficient number of times and count the instances where  $x$  is the output. Given that we are aware of the value of  $x$  and its correctness as a solution to a CDH query on  $(x, x)$ , this procedure is straightforward and efficient. For the sake of simplicity in this overview, we assume that  $\epsilon = \epsilon_{\min}$  and that we know the value of  $\epsilon$ . However, it's important to note that our results do not hinge on this assumption being the case.

*Building a threshold list.* As per our assumption above, we know the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds with probability  $\epsilon$ , and we can leverage  $\mathcal{A}_0$  to ensure this success rate on any query. Our next goal is to show we can, requiring roughly (asymptotically)  $1/\epsilon^3$  queries to  $\mathcal{A}_0$ , “threshold” the output such that, in response to any CDH challenge query  $(y, z)$ , we generate a list of precisely  $I$  elements. Here,  $I$  is a fixed integer where  $I = O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right)$ , and this list consists of the top  $I$  elements from the distribution  $\mathcal{A}_0(y, z)$ .<sup>4</sup>

By assumption, we have that the adversary must output the correct answer to the CDH challenge with probability  $\epsilon$ . Suppose we rank the elements output by  $\mathcal{D}$ —the output distribution of  $\mathcal{A}_0$  by likelihood of appearing. The most likely element  $x_1$  occurs with probability  $p_1$ , the second most likely element  $x_2$  occurs with probability  $p_2$ , and so forth. If  $x_c$  is the correct element, we claim that there must be some elements  $x_i, x_{i+1}$  where  $i \geq c$  and  $p_i - p_j \geq k\epsilon^2$  for some constant  $k$  and some  $i \leq \frac{2}{\epsilon}$ . This follows from summing the  $p_i$ s using the Gaussian summation formula (see, we told you, simple math!): if there is no gap of the appropriate size, the probabilities will sum to something larger than 1.

It turns out that if we sample  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$  enough times, we can find  $I$  and this gap by just seeing where a large gap lies. We use Chernoff bounds to show that asymptotically  $1/\epsilon^3$  samples are enough to do this, and this turns out to be the bulk of the writing in our proof. If we provided the Chernoff bounds out of thin air, then our already short proof would be extremely short. We call this algorithm for gap-finding  $\mathcal{A}_I$ , and we note that it works, for any input values  $(x, y)$ . We do, however, write down and keep track of  $I$  for our future algorithms, because it could be possible that there are two gaps of similar size, and we want to make sure that we use the same set of elements (of the same size) every time we attempt to threshold.

*A “shifting” algorithm.* At this point, we borrow conceptually from [MZ22], but our algorithms will be different. We define a new algorithm which we refer to as  $\mathcal{A}_1$ , which is conceptually similar to the algorithm of the same name from [MZ22].  $\mathcal{A}_1$  does almost the exact same thing as  $\mathcal{A}_I$ , except it uses the knowledge of  $I$  to always output  $I$  elements. So,  $\mathcal{A}_1(y, z)$  outputs a set of  $I$  elements  $z_1, \dots, z_I$ , one of which must be the correct GA-CDH answer. Suppose, for each  $z_i$ , we compute  $\mathcal{A}_1(x, z_i)$ . For the correct  $z_i$ , we know that  $\mathcal{D}_{y,z} = \mathcal{D}_{x,z_i}$ , where we are

<sup>4</sup> Note this is very different from the algorithm of the same name in [MZ22].

overloading the notation of  $\mathcal{D}$  in the natural way, because  $\mathcal{A}_0$  is “shift invariant.” Hence, it is very straightforward to see that, with an overwhelming chance, we have  $\mathcal{A}_1(y, z) = A_1(x, z_i)$ , if  $z_i$  is the correct answer. As a result, after the execution of  $\mathcal{A}_1(x, z_i)$  for each  $i$ , we can eliminate all  $z_i$  for which  $\mathcal{A}_1(y, z) \neq A_1(x, z_i)$  from our candidate list of correct solutions. We will call this algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_2$  and denote the resulting list  $L$ .

The authors of [MZ22] opt for a more intricate shifting and pruning algorithm. Without thresholding, they cannot ensure that each “run” of their  $\mathcal{A}_1$  will consistently produce the same list of elements (although they may be shifted). This crucial distinction is the primary reason why our algorithm stands out as simpler and significantly more efficient than theirs.

*Why we have a full subgroup.* The primary challenge, which is also a key source of inefficiency in [MZ22], revolves around the necessity of finding a “complete” coset (i.e. the set elements generated by  $H \star x$  for some subgroup  $H$ ). In the reduction, this step is indispensable, as it paves the way for the application of Shor’s algorithm in the final step. However, in our case here, it is straightforward to show that the list  $L$  constitutes a complete coset already. To see this, every element in  $L$  needs to be “shift invariant” onto the set  $L$  with respect to  $\mathcal{A}_1$ : in other words, we have  $\mathcal{A}_1(x, L) = L$ , or else  $\mathcal{A}_2$  would have pruned these elements. It is straightforward to derive a contradiction if  $L$  is not a complete coset: we either break the “shift invariance” of  $\mathcal{A}_0$  and  $\mathcal{A}_1$ , or the fact that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  should have eliminated certain elements.

*Cleaning up.* Now that we have outlined how our improved reduction outputs a set  $L$  that is a complete coset containing the correct solution to a GA-CDH instance, all that remains is to show that we can clean up correctly. We do this exactly as in [MZ22] and [GPSV21]. We can use  $L$  and Shor’s algorithm to find a subgroup  $H$  that generates  $L$  from the correct solution, run the core algorithm from [GPSV21] on the induced group action  $(G/H, G/H \star x, \star)$ , and then “brute force” over all elements of  $H$  to get a final answer.

Our total running time is proportional to  $1/\epsilon^4$  and some polynomial in  $\log(|G|)$ , which is a substantial improvement over  $\tilde{O}(\epsilon^{-21})$  from the previous work.

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## 2 Preliminaries

We begin by defining basic background material. A reader knowledgeable in group actions and cryptography may safely skip this section.

## 2.1 Cryptographic Group Actions

We define cryptographic group actions following Alapati *et al.* [ADMP20], which are based on those of Brassard and Yung [BY91] and Couveignes [Cou06]. Our presentation here is based on that of [MZ22].

**Definition 1.** (Group Action) *A group  $G$  is said to act on a set  $\mathcal{X}$  if there is a map  $\star : G \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$  that satisfies the following two properties:*

1. *Identity: If  $e$  is the identity of  $G$ , then  $\forall x \in \mathcal{X}$ , we have  $e \star x = x$ .*
2. *Compatibility: For any  $g, h \in G$  and any  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , we have  $(gh) \star x = g \star (h \star x)$ .*

We may use the abbreviated notation  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  to denote a group action. We extensively consider group actions that are *regular*:

**Definition 2.** *A group action  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  is said to be regular if, for every  $x_1, x_2 \in \mathcal{X}$ , there exists a unique  $g \in G$  such that  $x_2 = g \star x_1$ .*

We emphasize that most results in group action-based cryptography have focused on regular actions. As emphasized by [ADMP20], if a group action is regular, then for any  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , the map  $f_x : g \mapsto g \star x$  defines a bijection between  $G$  and  $\mathcal{X}$ ; in particular, if  $G$  (or  $\mathcal{X}$ ) is finite, then we must have  $|G| = |\mathcal{X}|$ .

In this paper, unless we specify otherwise, we will work with *effective* group actions (EGAs). An effective group action  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  is, informally speaking, a group action where all of the (well-defined) group operations and group action operations are efficiently computable, there are efficient ways to sample random group elements, and set elements have unique representation. Since the focus of this paper is on abelian group actions in a quantum world, we note that we can efficiently map any abelian group to  $Z_p$  for some integer  $p$ , and all of the less obvious properties needed for EGAs follow automatically. Formally speaking, we define an *effective group action* (EGA) as follows:

**Definition 3.** (Effective Group Action) *A group action  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  is effective if the following properties are satisfied:*

1. *The group  $G$  is finite and there exist efficient (PPT) algorithms for:*
  - (a) *Membership testing, i.e., to decide if a given bit string represents a valid group element in  $G$ .*
  - (b) *Equality testing, i.e., to decide if two bit strings represent the same group element in  $G$ .*
  - (c) *Sampling, i.e., to sample an element  $g$  from a distribution  $\mathcal{D}_G$  on  $G$ . In this paper, We consider distributions that are statistically close to uniform.*
  - (d) *Operation, i.e., to compute  $gh$  for any  $g, h \in G$ .*
  - (e) *Inversion, i.e., to compute  $g^{-1}$  for any  $g \in G$ .*
2. *The set  $\mathcal{X}$  is finite and there exist efficient algorithms for:*
  - (a) *Membership testing, i.e., to decide if a bit string represents a valid set element.*



- (b) *Unique representation, i.e., given any arbitrary set element  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , compute a string  $\hat{x}$  that canonically represents  $x$ .*
- 3. *There exists a distinguished element  $x_0 \in \mathcal{X}$ , called the origin, such that its bit-string representation is known.*
- 4. *There exists an efficient algorithm that given (some bit-string representations of) any  $g \in G$  and any  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ , outputs  $g \star x$ .*

## 2.2 Computational Problems

We next define problems related to group action security. We emphasize that we are defining *problems* here and not *assumptions* because these are easier to use in reductions. Again our presentation is based on that of [MZ22].

**Definition 4.** (Group Action Discrete Logarithm (DLog)) *Given a group action  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  and distributions  $(\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{D}_G)$ , the group action discrete logarithm problem is defined as follows: sample  $g \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_G$  and  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$ , compute  $y = g \star x$ , and create the tuple  $T = (x, y)$ . We say that an adversary solves the group action discrete log problem if, given  $T$  and a description of the group action and sampling algorithms, the adversary outputs  $g$ .*

**Definition 5.** (Group Action Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)) *Given a group action  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  and distributions  $(\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{D}_G)$ , the group action CDH problem is defined as follows: sample  $g \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_G$  and  $x, x' \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$ , compute  $y = g \star x$ , and create the tuple  $T = (x, y, x')$ . We say that an adversary solves the group action CDH problem if, given  $T$  and a description of the group action and sampling algorithms, the adversary outputs  $y' = g \star x'$ .*

*Remark 1.* The above definitions allow for different distributions  $\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$  on  $\mathcal{X}$ . In particular,  $\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$  could be uniform over  $\mathcal{X}$ , or it could be a singleton distribution that places all its weight on a single fixed  $x$ . Whether  $x$  is fixed or uniform potentially changes the nature of these problems (see [BMZ19] for an exploration in the group-based setting). Looking ahead, as in [MZ22], our reduction between DLog and CDH will preserve  $x$ , and therefore it works no matter how  $x$  is modeled.

## 2.3 Chernoff Bounds

In our forthcoming argument, we will rely on Chernoff bounds. To this end, we present a specific formulation of a Chernoff bound below.

**Theorem 1.** *Let  $X = \sum_{i=1}^T X_i$ , where  $X_i$  are independent random variables with a Bernoulli distribution with  $\Pr[X_i = 1] = p_i$  and  $\Pr[X_i = 0] = 1 - p_i$ . Let  $\mu = \mathbb{E}[X] = \sum_{i=1}^T p_i$ . Then, we have*

$$\Pr[X - \mu \geq \eta\mu] \leq e^{-\mu\eta^2/(2+\eta)}$$

for any  $\eta \geq 0$ , and

$$\Pr[X - \mu \leq -\eta\mu] \leq e^{-\mu\eta^2/2}$$

for any  $\eta \in (0, 1)$ .

If  $p_i = p$  for all  $i \in [T]$  for some  $p \in [0, 1]$ , then we can restate the inequalities as follows:

$$\Pr [X - Tp \geq \eta Tp] \leq e^{-Tp\eta^2/(2+\eta)}$$

for any  $\eta \geq 0$ , and

$$\Pr [X - Tp \leq -\eta Tp] \leq e^{-Tp\eta^2/2}$$

for any  $\eta \in (0, 1)$ . Moreover, for any  $\eta \in (0, 1)$  we have

$$\Pr [|X - Tp| \geq \eta Tp] \leq 2e^{-Tp\eta^2/3}.$$

### 3 The main reduction

We state our main result.

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  be an effective group action. If DLog is post-quantum hard in  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$ , then so is CDH. More precisely, given a CDH adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists an oracle algorithm  $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{A}, (G, \mathcal{X}, \star)}(y)$  that runs in time  $O(\text{poly}(\log |G|)/\epsilon^4)$  with  $\text{poly}(\log |G|)/\epsilon^4$  queries to  $\mathcal{A}$  and the group action  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$  such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DLog}}^{(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)} \left( \mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{A}, (G, \mathcal{X}, \star)} \right) \geq 0.99,$$

where  $\epsilon := \text{Adv}_{\text{CDH}}^{(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)}(\mathcal{A})$ .

The running time and number of calls to  $\mathcal{A}$  of the black-box reduction  $\mathcal{R}$  depend on the success probability  $\epsilon$  of  $\mathcal{A}$ . Nonetheless, we are not required to know  $\epsilon$  in advance and the estimation is also a part of our reduction. The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 2.

#### 3.1 Preparation

Our basic setup very closely mirrors that of [MZ22], so we borrow their presentation for much of the beginning of this section. Let  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  be a fixed set element. Define CDH to be the function which correctly solves CDH relative to  $x$ :  $\text{CDH}(a \star x, b \star x) = (ab) \star x$ . We extend the oracle CDH to accept a vector of elements as input, operating as follows:  $\text{CDH}(a_1 \star x, \dots, a_n \star x) = (a_1 \cdots a_n) \star x$ . Moreover, we permit CDH to process distribution(s) over the set  $\mathcal{X}$  as input. In such cases, CDH will naturally yield a corresponding distribution as its output. We will later use a very similar argument as in [MZ22] in Section 3.9 and explain how to extend our reduction to non-regular abelian actions.

Let  $a, b \in G$  be group elements, and let  $y = a \star x$  and  $z = b \star x$ . Suppose  $\mathcal{A}$  is an efficient (quantum) algorithm such that

$$\epsilon := \text{Adv}_{\text{CDH}}^{(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr_{a, b \in G} [\mathcal{A}(x, a \star x, b \star x) = (ab) \star x]$$

is a non-negligible function in the security parameter, where  $a$  and  $b$  are random elements in  $G$ , and the probability is over the randomness of  $a$  and  $b$  and  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Our goal is to turn  $\mathcal{A}$  into a quantum algorithm for discrete logarithms. As a first step, we will introduce the basic random self-reduction for CDH from [MZ22].

Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_0$ .

- On input  $y = a \star x, z = b \star x$ , choose elements  $a', b' \in G$  uniformly at random.
- Assign  $(y', z') \leftarrow (a' \star y, b' \star z)$ .
- Run  $w' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x, y', z')$ .
- Output  $w \leftarrow (a'b')^{-1} \star w'$ .

Note that each run of  $\mathcal{A}_0$  runs  $\mathcal{A}$  exactly once, and uses a constant number of group action operations. This reduction preserves the correctness of  $\mathcal{A}$ , since, if  $\mathcal{A}$  is correct, then we output

$$w = (a'b')^{-1} \star \text{CDH}((a'a) \star x, (b'b) \star x) = (a'b')^{-1} (aa'bb') \star x = (ab) \star x$$

which is the correct output for CDH on input  $(y, z)$ . Furthermore, as the set elements  $y'$  and  $z'$  are uniformly distributed over  $\mathcal{X}$ , the success rate of  $\mathcal{A}_0$  will be independent of the input.

Let  $\mathcal{D}$  represent the output distribution of  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ . While the answer to  $x = \text{CDH}(x, x)$  is trivial, the distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  provides crucial clues for our analysis.

**Lemma 1.** (Lemma 10, [MZ22])  $\Pr[x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}] = \epsilon$ .

*Proof.* Recall that  $\mathcal{D}$  is the distribution  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ .  $\mathcal{A}_0$  on input  $(x, x)$  calls  $\mathcal{A}(a' \star x, b' \star x)$  for random  $a', b' \in G$ . With probability  $\epsilon$ ,  $\mathcal{A}(a' \star x, b' \star x)$  returns  $(a'b') \star x$ , and in this case we have  $w = x$  as desired.  $\square$

We next generalize our notation. For any  $y, z \in X$  where  $y = a \star x$  and  $z = b \star x$  for some  $a, b \in G$ , let  $\mathcal{D}_{y,z}$  be the distribution of outputs of  $\mathcal{A}_0(y, z)$ .

**Lemma 2.** (Lemma 11, [MZ22]) For every  $y, z \in \mathcal{X}$  such that there exist  $a, b \in G$  where  $y = a \star x$  and  $z = b \star x$ ,  $\mathcal{D}_{y,z} = \text{CDH}(y, z, \mathcal{D})$ , where  $\text{CDH}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$  is the 3-way CDH function. In other words,  $\mathcal{A}_0(a \star x, b \star x)$  is identically distributed to  $(ab) \star \mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ .

*Proof.* Fix  $a, b \in G$ . Consider the probability that  $\mathcal{A}_0(a \star x, b \star x)$  outputs  $w$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{A}_0(a \star x, b \star x) = w] &= \Pr_{a', b' \in G} [(a'b')^{-1} \star \mathcal{A}((a'a) \star x, (b'b) \star x) = w] \\ &= \Pr_{a', b' \in G} [\mathcal{A}((a'a) \star x, (b'b) \star x) = (a'b') \star w] \\ &= \Pr_{a'', b'' \in G} [\mathcal{A}(a'' \star x, b'' \star x) = (a''b'' (ab)^{-1}) \star w] \\ &= \Pr[\mathcal{A}_0(x, x) = (ab)^{-1} \star w] \end{aligned}$$

Thus,  $\mathcal{A}_0(a \star x, b \star x)$  is just the distribution  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ , but shifted by  $ab$ .  $\square$

For some intuition on this lemma, we emphasize that  $\mathcal{A}_0$  completely re-randomizes the output that the adversary sees. In other words, on an input  $(a \star x, b \star x)$  to  $\mathcal{A}_0$ , the adversary sees a CDH tuple  $(x, (ga) \star x, (hb) \star x)$  for uniformly random group elements  $g$  and  $h$ . Then,  $\mathcal{A}_0$  takes whatever set element  $x'$  that the adversary returns and outputs  $(gh)^{-1} \star x'$ . Note that, even if the adversary could solve GA-DLog, it couldn't output a constant element: even if

it can solve for  $(ga)$  and  $(hb)$ , it information-theoretically doesn't know what  $a$  is (or  $g$  for that matter). For instance, if the adversary got  $(x, c \star x, d \star x)$  and always tried to output  $(cd)^{-1} \star z$  for some fixed set element  $z$ ,  $A_0$  wouldn't actually output a constant element: if  $c = g$  and  $d = h$ , then  $A_0$  would just output  $z$  (i.e. the case where  $a = b = 1$ ), but if  $c = ga$  and  $d = hb$ , then  $A_0$  would output  $(ab) \star z$ , as the lemma states.

Using this "shift invariance" we can define  $\mathcal{D}_w := \mathcal{D}_{w,x} = \mathcal{D}_{x,w} = \mathcal{D}_{y,z}$ , if  $\text{CDH}(y, z) = w$ . Lemma 2 shows that  $\mathcal{D}_{y,z}$  outputs  $\text{CDH}(y, z)$  with probability  $\epsilon$ . Thus, by running  $A_0$  many times, the right answer is almost certainly amongst the list of outputs. However, to amplify the success probability, we would need to know which element of the list of outputs is the correct answer; we cannot determine this yet.

### 3.2 Estimating $\epsilon$

At this point, we deviate from the approach taken in [MZ22]. We will need to have a precise estimation of a lower bound for  $\epsilon$  in our later algorithms; luckily, this is easy enough for us to compute. Although we need to use some statistical tests, our approach is straightforward: we just run  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$  "enough" times and keep track of how many times we get  $x$  as an output. We generate a (w.h.p.) lower bound for  $\epsilon$  which we call  $\epsilon_{\min}$ .

*Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_\epsilon(\lambda, \lambda')$  (Estimating  $\epsilon$ ).*

- On input (security) parameters  $\lambda, \lambda'$  where  $\lambda'$  can be chosen linearly in the security parameter  $\lambda$ , do the following:
  - Set  $c = \lambda^2 \lambda'$ .
  - Set  $T = 0, i = 0$ .
  - While  $i < c$ :
    - Run  $x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ .
    - If  $x' = x$  then  $i++$ .
    - $T++$ .
  - Output  $\epsilon_{\min} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}\right) \frac{c}{T}$ .

We next prove some bounds on our estimation of  $\epsilon_{\min}$ . We use a simple Chernoff bound.

**Lemma 3.** *Let all parameters be defined as above. When  $\lambda > 2$ , except with probability that decays exponentially in  $\lambda'$ , we have  $\epsilon_{\min} < \epsilon$ .*

*Proof.* We assume that  $\epsilon T < c$ , or otherwise our bound holds trivially. Note that

$$\Pr[\epsilon_{\min} \geq \epsilon] = \Pr\left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}\right) \cdot \frac{c}{T} \geq \epsilon\right] = \Pr\left[c - \epsilon T \geq \frac{c}{\lambda}\right]$$

Using a Chernoff bound, we have

$$\Pr[c - \epsilon T \geq \eta \epsilon T] \leq e^{-\epsilon T \eta^2 / 2 + \eta}.$$

for any  $\eta > 0$ . Suppose we set  $\eta\epsilon T = \frac{c}{\lambda}$  for our parameter  $\lambda$ . If we continue to assume that  $\epsilon T < c$ , we have  $\eta \geq \frac{1}{\lambda}$ . This gives us

$$\Pr[c - \epsilon T \geq \eta\epsilon T] \leq e^{-\epsilon T \eta^2 / 2 + \eta} \leq e^{-\frac{c}{\lambda} \cdot \frac{\eta}{\eta+2}} \leq e^{-\frac{c}{3\lambda^2}}.$$

Setting  $c = \lambda^2 \lambda'$  makes this equation decay exponentially in  $\lambda'$ , as desired.  $\square$

We can think of  $\lambda$  and  $\lambda'$  as essentially security parameters. We leave these undefined for now because we will need to make the error probability in our final algorithm dependent on the group size. We now prove an upper bound on  $\epsilon$ .

**Lemma 4.** *Let all parameters be defined as above, and let  $\lambda \geq 5$ . Except with probability that decays exponentially in  $\lambda'$ , we have  $\epsilon < \left(1 + \frac{3}{\lambda}\right) \epsilon_{\min}$ .*

*Proof.* When  $\epsilon T \leq c$ , the statement holds trivially if  $\lambda \geq 2$ . This is because  $(1 + \frac{3}{\lambda})(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}) > 1$  when  $\lambda \geq 2$ . Hence, we assume  $\epsilon T > c$ .

At this point, the result follows from another Chernoff bound. Note that

$$\Pr[\epsilon T - c \geq \eta\epsilon T] \leq e^{-\epsilon T \eta^2 / 2}.$$

for any  $\eta \in (0, 1)$ . Recall that  $\epsilon_{\min} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}\right) \frac{c}{T}$ , and therefore we have that  $c = \frac{\epsilon_{\min} T}{1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}}$ . If we take  $\eta = \frac{2\lambda - 3}{\lambda^2 + 2\lambda - 3}$ , then we have

$$\Pr[\epsilon T - c \geq \eta\epsilon T] = \Pr\left[\epsilon T - \frac{\epsilon_{\min} T}{1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}} \geq \frac{2\lambda - 3}{\lambda^2 + 2\lambda - 3} \epsilon T\right].$$

Some basic algebra gives us that

$$\Pr\left[\epsilon T - \frac{\epsilon_{\min} T}{1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}} \geq \frac{2\lambda - 3}{\lambda^2 + 2\lambda - 3} \epsilon T\right] = \Pr\left[\epsilon \geq \left(1 + \frac{3}{\lambda}\right) \epsilon_{\min}\right]$$

as desired. Thus, by taking  $\eta = \frac{2\lambda - 3}{\lambda^2 + 2\lambda - 3}$ , with the Chernoff bound, we have

$$\Pr\left[\epsilon \geq \left(1 + \frac{3}{\lambda}\right) \epsilon_{\min}\right] \leq e^{-\frac{T\epsilon\eta^2}{2}} \leq e^{-\frac{T\epsilon}{2\lambda^2}} \leq e^{-\frac{c}{2\lambda^2}},$$

where  $\eta \in (0, 1)$  and  $\eta > 1/\lambda$  when  $\lambda \geq 5$ . Since  $c = \lambda^2 \lambda'$ , the statement holds except with probability  $e^{-\frac{\lambda'}{2}}$ .  $\square$

We can now easily determine the running time of  $\mathcal{A}_\epsilon$ .

**Lemma 5.** *Let all parameters be defined above, and let  $\lambda \geq 5$ . Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_\epsilon$  terminates in time  $O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon} \lambda^2 \lambda'\right)$  with probability one minus a function exponentially decaying in  $\lambda'$ .*

*Proof.* This follows as an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.  $\square$

We now know that we can closely estimate  $\epsilon$ , and we can find such an estimate  $\epsilon_{\min}$  efficiently.

### 3.3 Thresholding

We know from earlier that  $A_0(x, x)$  outputs elements according to some “true” distribution  $\mathcal{D}$ , and that using different set elements instead of  $x$  only shifts this distribution. We know that, by assumption  $A_0(x, x)$  outputs  $x$  with probability  $\epsilon > \epsilon_{\min}$ , which is a fact we will use extensively. Below, we formally define some properties of this distribution that will be useful to us for building an algorithm.

Let the distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  be supported on  $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots$  in  $\mathcal{X}$  such that, writing  $p_i = \Pr[x_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}]$  we have  $p_1 \geq p_2 \geq p_3 \geq \dots$ . Then  $p_1 \geq \epsilon$ . The following result shows that fairly quickly there is a noticeable “gap”  $p_i - p_{i+1}$  that we can use for thresholding. Since we don’t exactly know  $\epsilon$  (and thus, can’t use it), we will write the lemmas below for  $\epsilon_{\min}$ , which we know is relatively close to  $\epsilon$ .

**Lemma 6.** *Let  $p_i = \Pr[x_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}]$  be defined as above, so that  $p_1 \geq \epsilon$  and  $p_1 \geq p_2 \geq p_3 \geq \dots$ . Let  $0 < \epsilon_{\min} \leq \epsilon$  be any real number. Let  $i_0$  be the smallest integer such that  $p_{i_0} > \epsilon_{\min}$  and  $p_{i_0+1} \leq \epsilon_{\min}$ . Let  $\ell > 0$  be an integer such that  $\ell$  is divisible by 2, and let  $\delta \in (0, 1)$  be a real number. If  $\ell(\epsilon_{\min} - \frac{\ell\delta}{2}) > 1$ , then there is some integer  $i < i_0 + \ell$  such that  $p_i \leq \epsilon$  and  $p_i - p_{i+1} \geq \delta$ .*

*Proof.* Because the  $p_i$  are probabilities, we know that  $\sum_{i=1}^{|G|} p_i = 1$ . Let  $i_0$  be the smallest integer such that  $p_{i_0} > \epsilon_{\min}$  and  $p_{i_0+1} \leq \epsilon_{\min}$ . Hence  $p_{i_0+1} \leq \epsilon$ .

If  $p_{i_0+1} < \epsilon_{\min} - \delta$  then, since there is some  $i$  such that  $p_i = \epsilon$ , it follows that  $p_{i_0} \leq \epsilon$ . The result holds in this case by taking  $i = i_0$ . Hence it suffices to consider the case  $p_{i_0+1} \geq \epsilon_{\min} - \delta$ . Suppose, for the purposes of contradiction, that for all  $i$  such that  $i_0 < i < i_0 + \ell$  we have  $p_i - p_{i+1} < \delta$ .

We have

$$\sum_{i=1}^{i_0+\ell} p_i \leq 1.$$

Since we know that  $p_{i_0} > \epsilon_{\min}$ , as well as for all  $i_0 < i < i_0 + \ell$ ,  $p_i - p_{i+1} < \delta$ , we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^{i_0+\ell} p_i > \sum_{i=1}^{i_0} \epsilon_{\min} + \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} p_{i_0+k} > i_0 \epsilon_{\min} + \sum_{k=1}^{\ell} (\epsilon_{\min} - k\delta).$$

By the Gauss summation formula, this implies that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{i_0+\ell} p_i > i_0 \epsilon_{\min} + \ell \left( \epsilon_{\min} - \frac{(\ell+1)\delta}{2} \right) = (\ell + i_0) \epsilon_{\min} - \ell(\ell+1)\delta/2.$$

However, we have assumed that  $\ell(\epsilon_{\min} - \frac{\ell\delta}{2}) > 1$ , which implies that  $\sum_{i=1}^{\ell} p_i > 1$ . This gives us the desired contradiction and completes the proof.  $\square$

Concretely, one can verify that  $\delta = \epsilon_{\min}^2/4$  and  $\ell = 2\lceil 1/\epsilon_{\min} \rceil$  satisfy the equation  $\ell(\epsilon_{\min} - \frac{\ell\delta}{2}) > 1$ . Note also that for  $\ell < 2/\epsilon_{\min}$  we have

$$\epsilon_{\min} - \ell\delta > \epsilon_{\min} - \frac{2}{\epsilon_{\min}} \frac{\epsilon_{\min}^2}{4} = \frac{\epsilon_{\min}}{2}.$$

Hence the hard case of thresholding is when there are  $p_i$  such that  $\epsilon > p_i > \epsilon_{\min}/2$ . Since  $i_0 \leq 1/\epsilon_{\min}$ , we have  $i_0 + \ell \leq 3/\epsilon_{\min} + 2$ . Since  $\epsilon < \epsilon_{\min}(1 + 3/\lambda)$  we have

$$i_0 + \ell \leq 2 + 3/\epsilon_{\min} < 2 + 3(1 + 3/\lambda)/\epsilon = O(1/\epsilon). \quad (1)$$

*Remark 2.* Note that the above result also applies if  $p_i$  are (good) estimations of the true probabilities from some empirical distribution based on a fixed number of samples, up to some (small) margin of error, of course. In practice, the bounds will largely be interchangeable with  $\epsilon$  rather than  $\epsilon_{\min}$  (up to constant factors, assuming we picked  $\lambda$  and  $\lambda'$  large enough when finding  $\epsilon_{\min}$ ). But in our algorithm below we will actually be working with the empirical estimate  $\epsilon_{\min}$  and estimates of the  $p_i$ .

### 3.4 Finding a Gap

Our intuition for how we find a gap is fairly simple: choose some security parameter  $\lambda$ , which will impact the failure probability of our simulation. Then, compute an estimated lower bound  $\epsilon_{\min}$  as we described in the previous subsection and set  $\delta = \epsilon_{\min}^2/4$ . Then, we will query  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$  enough times so that, if there is a gap of size at least  $\delta = \frac{\epsilon_{\min}^2}{4}$  between two (estimated) probabilities  $p_i, p_{i+1}$ , there will be a noticeable difference in the number of  $x_i$ 's and  $x_{i+1}$ 's that we see over all of the outputs. Then, by standard sampling theorems, if  $\lambda''$  is large enough, the gap in sampled elements will be at least  $k\lambda''$  for some constant  $k$ . We can use a similar analysis to show that, with high probability, we don't incorrectly find a small gap either (although we might not find the largest gap). The full algorithm and proof are below.

*Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_I(\epsilon_{\min}, \lambda'', \delta, T)$  (Gap-finding algorithm)* On input a positive number  $\lambda''$ , which can be chosen linearly to the security parameter  $\lambda$ , and all previous parameters as previously stated. The algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_I$  proceeds as follows:

- Initialize an empty database  $\mathcal{D}$  consisting of tuples  $(x \in \mathcal{X}, t \in \mathbb{Z})$  where  $\mathcal{X}$  is the set and  $t$  is a nonnegative integer.
- For  $(i = 0; i \leq T; i++)$ :
  - Set  $z_i = \mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ , where each  $z_i$  is a “fresh” call of  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ .
  - If  $z_i$  is the first entry in some tuple  $(z_i, t) \in \mathcal{D}$ , increment  $t$  by 1 in the tuple and update  $\mathcal{D}$ .
  - If  $z_i$  has not yet been added to  $\mathcal{D}$ , add the tuple  $(z_i, 1)$  to  $\mathcal{D}$ .
- Sort (and relabel) the tuples in  $\mathcal{D}$  in *decreasing order of  $t$* , getting a database of tuples  $(z_1, t_1), (z_2, t_2), \dots$ , such that, for all  $i$ ,  $t_i \geq t_{i+1}$ .
- Find the smallest integer  $i$  such that  $t_{i+1} \leq (\epsilon_{\min} - \delta/2)T$  and  $t_i - t_{i+1} \geq T\delta/2$  and output that  $i$ . If no such  $i$  exists then output  $\perp$ .

*Proving that we find a gap.* We next claim that the above algorithm outputs some  $i$  with high probability if  $\lambda''$  is large enough. More precisely, we show that it outputs a gap close to the “best” with high probability, which is good enough for us.

First we need a basic lemma about how well our estimates  $t_i/T$  approximate the true values  $p_i$ , for values  $p_i$  in the worst case zone  $\epsilon_{\min} \geq p_i > \epsilon_{\min}/2$  handled by Lemma 6.

**Lemma 7.** *Let  $\epsilon_{\min} \leq \epsilon$  and  $\delta = \epsilon_{\min}^2/4$ . Let  $T = \lambda'' \left( \frac{3072}{\epsilon_{\min}^3} \right)$  for some  $\lambda''$ . Let  $i$  be an integer,  $t_i$  be the number of times element  $x$  is sampled in an experiment where  $x$  is sampled  $T$  times independently with probability  $p_i$ . We have*

1. *If  $\epsilon_{\min} \geq p_i$ , then  $t_i/T - p_i < \delta/8$  holds except for the probability that decays exponentially in  $\lambda''$ .*
2. *Moreover, if  $\epsilon_{\min} \geq p_i \geq \epsilon_{\min}/2$ , then  $|t_i/T - p_i| \leq \delta/8$  with probability that decays exponentially in  $\lambda''$ .*

*Proof.* Firstly, since

$$\Pr \left[ t_i/T - p_i \geq \frac{\delta}{8} \right] = \Pr \left[ t_i - p_i T \geq \frac{\delta}{8} T \right] = \Pr \left[ t_i - p_i T \geq \left( \frac{\epsilon_{\min}^2}{32p_i} \right) p_i T \right],$$

by taking  $\eta = \frac{\epsilon_{\min}^2}{32p_i} \geq 0$  for the Chernoff bound, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[ t_i/T - p_i \geq \frac{\delta}{8} \right] &\leq e^{-p_i T \eta^2 \frac{1}{2+\eta}} \\ &= e^{-T \cdot \frac{p_i \cdot \epsilon_{\min}^4}{1024 \cdot p_i^2} \cdot \frac{1}{2+\eta}} \\ &= e^{-\frac{T \cdot \epsilon_{\min}^3}{1024} \cdot \frac{\epsilon_{\min}}{p_i} \cdot \frac{1}{2+\eta}} \\ &= e^{-3\lambda'' \cdot \frac{\epsilon_{\min}}{p_i} \cdot \frac{1}{2+\eta}} \\ &= e^{-3\lambda'' \cdot \frac{\epsilon_{\min}}{p_i} \cdot \frac{32p_i}{64p_i + \epsilon_{\min}^2}} \\ &\leq e^{-3\lambda'' \cdot \frac{32\epsilon_{\min}}{64\epsilon_{\min} + \epsilon_{\min}^2}} \\ &\leq e^{-3\lambda'' \cdot \frac{32}{65}} \\ &\leq e^{-\lambda''}. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, we have

$$\Pr \left[ |t_i/T - p_i| \geq \frac{\delta}{8} \right] = \Pr \left[ |t_i - p_i T| \geq \frac{\delta}{8} T \right] = \Pr \left[ |t_i - p_i T| \geq \left( \frac{\delta}{8p_i} \right) p_i T \right].$$

Since  $\epsilon_{\min} \geq p_i \geq \epsilon_{\min}/2$  we have  $1 \leq \epsilon_{\min}/p_i \leq 2$ , so

$$\Pr \left[ |t_i - p_i T| \geq \left( \frac{\delta}{8p_i} \right) p_i T \right] \leq \Pr \left[ |t_i - p_i T| \geq \left( \frac{\epsilon_{\min}}{32} \right) p_i T \right]$$



By the Chernoff bound, with  $\eta = \epsilon_{\min}/32 \in (0, 1)$ , this is bounded by

$$2e^{-p_i T \eta^2/3} \leq 2e^{-(\epsilon_{\min}/2)T(\epsilon_{\min}/32)^2/3} = 2e^{-\lambda''/2}$$

which proves the result.  $\square$

**Lemma 8.** *Consider all parameters as previously stated. Consider the smallest choice of  $i$  such that  $p_i - p_{i+1} \geq \delta = \frac{\epsilon_{\min}^2}{4}$  and  $p_i \leq \epsilon_{\min}$ . It is the case that algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_I$  outputs some integer less than or equal to  $i$  with probability that decays exponentially in  $\lambda''$ .*

*Proof.* Let  $i$  be the index from Lemma 6, so that  $p_i \leq \epsilon$  and  $p_i - p_{i+1} \geq \delta$ . It follows that  $p_i \geq \epsilon_{\min}/2$  and  $\epsilon - \delta \geq p_{i+1} \geq \epsilon_{\min}/2 - \delta$ . By Lemma 7 (Item 2) we have  $|t_i/T - p_i| < \delta/8$ .

Since  $\epsilon_{\min} \geq p_i > p_{i+1}$ , by Lemma 7 (Item 1) we have  $t_{i+1}/T - p_{i+1} < \delta/8$ . (Recall that  $p_{i+1}$  might not be less than  $\epsilon_{\min}/2$ .) It follows that

$$t_i/T - t_{i+1}/T > (p_i - \delta/8) - (p_{i+1} + \delta/8) = (p_i - p_{i+1}) - \delta/4 > \delta/2.$$

This proves the result.  $\square$

**Lemma 9.** *Consider all parameters as previously stated. Let  $I$  be the output of algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_I$ . The probability that  $p_I - p_{I+1} \leq \delta/4 = \frac{\epsilon_{\min}^2}{16}$  is a function that decays exponentially in  $\lambda''$ .*

*Proof.* Suppose  $p_I - p_{I+1} \leq \delta/4$  for the purpose of contradiction. Then we claim that  $t_I - t_{I+1} \geq T\delta/2$  holds with a negligible chance.

Since  $\epsilon_{\min} \geq p_I \geq \epsilon_{\min}/2$ , we have  $p_{I+1} \geq p_I - \delta/4$  where  $\delta = \epsilon_{\min}^2/4$ . Since  $\epsilon_{\min}/4 \geq \epsilon_{\min}^2/16$  always holds, we have  $p_{I+1} \geq \epsilon_{\min}/4$ .

Similar to the proof of Lemma 7, write

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[ |t_{I+1}/T - p_{I+1}| \geq \frac{\delta}{8} \right] &= \Pr \left[ |t_{I+1} - p_{I+1}T| \geq \frac{\delta}{8}T \right] \\ &= \Pr \left[ |t_{I+1} - p_{I+1}T| \geq \left( \frac{\delta}{8p_{I+1}} \right) p_{I+1}T \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Since  $\epsilon_{\min} \geq p_{I+1} \geq \epsilon_{\min}/4$  we have  $1 \leq \epsilon_{\min}/p_{I+1} \leq 4$ , so

$$\Pr \left[ |t_{I+1} - p_{I+1}T| \geq \left( \frac{\delta}{8p_{I+1}} \right) p_{I+1}T \right] \leq \Pr \left[ |t_{I+1} - p_{I+1}T| \geq \left( \frac{\epsilon_{\min}}{32} \right) p_{I+1}T \right]$$

By the Chernoff bound, with  $\eta = \epsilon_{\min}/32 \in (0, 1)$ , this is bounded by

$$2e^{-p_{I+1}T\eta^2/3} \leq 2e^{-(\epsilon_{\min}/4)T(\epsilon_{\min}/32)^2/3} = 2e^{-\lambda''/4}.$$

Hence,  $|t_{I+1}/T - p_{I+1}| < \frac{\delta}{8}$  with an overwhelming chance. By applying Lemma 7 (Item 2) to the term of index  $I$ , we have  $|t_I/T - p_I| < \frac{\delta}{8}$  with an overwhelming chance. By combining together, we have  $t_I/T - t_{I+1}/T < \delta/4 + p_I - p_{I+1} < \delta/2$  except for a probability that decays exponentially in  $\lambda''$ . That is,  $t_I - t_{I+1} \geq T\delta/2$  holds only with a negligible chance, which proves the result.  $\square$

To conclude, algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_I$  runs in time proportional to  $1/\epsilon^3$  and outputs an index  $I = O(1/\epsilon)$  such that  $p_I \leq \epsilon$  and  $p_I - p_{I+1} > \delta/4$ .

### 3.5 Using the Fixed Set of Elements

From the previous section, we know that there will be some index  $I \leq \frac{2}{\epsilon_{\min}}$  such that we can efficiently find (in time proportional to  $\frac{\lambda}{\epsilon_{\min}^3}$ ), for some  $\lambda''$  independent<sup>5</sup> of  $\epsilon_{\min}$ , the set of elements  $x_1, \dots, x_I$  that appear with highest probability. Note that this set is invariant across calls to different inputs to  $\mathcal{A}_0$ , and we will exploit this in our algorithms.

*Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1(y, z, I, T)$  (Algorithm to find heavy elements)*

- Initialize an empty database  $\mathcal{D}$  consisting of tuples  $(x, t) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathbb{Z}$  where  $\mathcal{X}$  is the set and  $t$  is a nonnegative integer.
- For  $(i = 0; i \leq T; i++)$ :
  - Set  $z_i = \mathcal{A}_0(y, z)$ , where each  $z_i$  is a “fresh” call of  $\mathcal{A}_0(y, z)$ .
  - If  $z_i$  is the first entry in some tuple  $(z_i, t) \in \mathcal{D}$ , increment  $t$  by 1 in the tuple and update  $\mathcal{D}$ .
  - If  $z_i$  has not yet been added to  $\mathcal{D}$ , add the tuple  $(z_i, 1)$  to  $\mathcal{D}$ .
- Sort (and relabel) the tuples in  $\mathcal{D}$  in *decreasing order of  $t$* , getting a database of tuples  $(z_1, t_1), (z_2, t_2), \dots$ , such that, for all  $i$ ,  $t_i \geq t_{i+1}$ .
- Return the set  $\{z_1, \dots, z_I\}$ .

The following lemma shows that if  $T = \lambda'' \left( \frac{3072}{\epsilon_{\min}^3} \right)$  then with overwhelming probability Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1$  does output the  $I$  elements that are heaviest, in the sense that the corresponding probabilities  $p_i$  are the highest.

**Lemma 10.** *Consider all parameters as previously stated. Let  $T = \lambda'' \left( \frac{3072}{\epsilon_{\min}^3} \right)$  for some  $\lambda''$ . Then algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs the  $I$  heaviest elements in the distribution except with probability that decays exponentially in  $\lambda''$ .*

*Proof.* From Lemma 9 we have  $p_I - p_{I+1} > \delta/4$ . Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_I$  ensures  $t_{I+1} \leq (\epsilon_{\min} - \delta/2)T$ . Hence,  $p_{I+1} < \epsilon_{\min} - \delta/4$ . It suffices to show that the heaviest  $I$  elements all appear with frequency strictly larger than  $(p_{I+1} + \delta/8)T$  and that the remaining elements all appear with frequency strictly smaller than  $(p_{I+1} + \delta/8)T$ . Note that  $p_{I+1} + \delta/4 < \epsilon_{\min}$ .

If  $p_i \geq \epsilon \geq \epsilon_{\min} > p_{I+1} + \delta/4$  then

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[t_i > (p_{I+1} + \delta/8)T] &= \Pr[t_i > (p_i - (p_i - (p_{I+1} + \delta/8)))T] \\ &= \Pr[t_i - p_i T > -(1 - (p_{I+1} + \delta/8)/p_i)p_i T]. \end{aligned}$$

The Chernoff bound with  $\eta = 1 - (p_{I+1} + \delta/8)/p_i \in (0, 1)$  shows this holds with an overwhelming chance. That is,

$$\Pr[t_i - p_i T \leq -(1 - (p_{I+1} + \delta/8)/p_i)p_i T] \leq e^{-\frac{\eta^2 p_i T}{2}}.$$

<sup>5</sup>  $\lambda''$  may be dependent on  $\log |G|$ .

The next case is  $i \leq I$  where  $p_I < \epsilon_{\min}$ . We apply the union bound to the  $O(1/\epsilon_{\min})$  values of  $i$  in this case. Note that  $\epsilon > p_i > \epsilon_{\min}/2$  in this case, so we can apply Lemma 7. Hence,  $|t_i/T - p_i| \leq \delta/8$  with overwhelming probability.  $t_i/T \leq p_i + \delta/8$ . It follows that for  $i \leq I$  we have  $t_i/T \geq p_i - \delta/8$ , and then  $t_i \geq Tp_{i+1} + T\delta/8$  with an overwhelming chance.

Finally, we need to handle the case when  $i > I$  (so  $p_i \leq p_{I+1}$ ). For any specific  $i$  then the Chernoff bound shows that  $t_i$  does not exceed  $(p_{I+1} + \delta/8)T$  except with probability that decays exponentially in  $\lambda''$ . But since there are exponentially many such  $i$  we need to argue that, for all  $j \leq I$  and all  $k > I$ , the probability that  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs *any*  $z_j$  fewer times than any  $z_k$  decays exponentially in  $\lambda''$ .

To handle this, suppose we group each of the  $z_k$ 's (recall  $k > I$ ) into sets  $\tilde{z}_1, \tilde{z}_2, \dots$  in the following way: starting with  $z_{I+1}$ , add set elements in increasing order to the set  $\tilde{z}_1$  as long as the total sum of probabilities of elements in the set is less than  $p_I$ . Once  $\tilde{z}_1$  is "full", continue this process with the "unused" set elements in increasing order until  $\tilde{z}_2$  is "full", and then continue this process until all of the set elements  $z_k$  have been placed in a set  $\tilde{z}_{k'}$ . We note that such a process may not be efficient, but we do not need it to be.

Since the  $p_i$  are decreasing, it follows that the probability mass of each set  $\tilde{z}_{k'}$  (except perhaps the last one) is at least  $p_I/2$ . Hence there are a maximum of  $\frac{2}{p_I}$  sets  $\tilde{z}_{k'}$ , or otherwise the sum  $\sum_{k=i}^{\infty} p_k > 1$ , which is a contradiction. Moreover, note that the probability that some  $z_k$  is output more than some  $z_j$  is less than the probability that elements in the set  $\tilde{z}_{k'}$  containing  $z_k$  are output more than the  $z_j$ .

Therefore, the probability that  $\mathcal{A}_1$  does not output the  $I$  heaviest elements is at most  $I \frac{2}{p_I}$  multiplied by the probability that  $\mathcal{A}_1$  outputs  $z_{I+1}$  more than  $z_I$ . Since  $I$  and  $p_I$  are independent of  $\lambda''$ , the statement claimed in the lemma holds.  $\square$

Consider the following algorithm, where all parameters are as previously stated. We assume as inputs a CDH challenge  $(y, z) = (a \star x, b \star x)$  and all relevant parameters.

Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_2(y, z, I, T)$  (Pruning)

- Run the algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1(y, z, I, T)$  from the previous section with oracle calls  $\mathcal{A}_0(y, z)$  to get a set of elements  $\mathcal{S} = \{z_1, \dots, z_I\}$ . Record all of these.
  - Create a list  $L$  of set elements initialized to be empty.
  - For each  $j \in [1, I]$ :
    - Run the algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_1(x, z_j, I, T)$  getting a set of elements  $\mathcal{S}_j$ .
    - If  $\mathcal{S}_j = \mathcal{S}$  then add  $z_j$  to  $L$ .
- Output  $L$ .

We next prove a lemma about the running time of this algorithm.

**Lemma 11.** *Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_2$  runs in time  $O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon_{\min}^4}\right)$  in  $\epsilon_{\min}$  and in time polynomial in all other factors.*

*Proof.* Since  $I \leq \frac{c}{\epsilon_{\min}}$  for some constant  $c$ , and this algorithm makes  $I$  calls to our previous algorithm, it has running time  $O\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon_{\min}^4}\right)$ , ignoring the  $\lambda''$  factors, which are technically independent of  $\epsilon_{\min}$  (i.e.  $\lambda$  must be proportional to something in  $\log |G|$ ).  $\square$

In the next section we show that  $L$  consists of either a single element  $(ab) \star x$  or else there is a subgroup  $H$  such that  $L = \{(hab) \star x : h \in H\}$ .

### 3.6 Proof of Finding the Subgroup

Let  $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{A}_1(x, x)$  be the set of heavy elements output by the gap-finding algorithm on instance  $x$ . We have  $x \in \mathcal{S}$  with overwhelming probability. For  $w \in \mathcal{X}$  let  $\mathcal{S}_w = \mathcal{A}_1(x, w)$ . Let  $L = \mathcal{A}_2(x, x)$  be the list (a subset of  $\mathcal{S}$ ) output by the pruning algorithm. We know that if  $x \in L$  then  $x \in \mathcal{S}$ . For  $w \in \mathcal{X}$  let  $L_w = \mathcal{A}_2(x, w)$ .

For any set  $\mathcal{S} = \{x_1, \dots, x_I\}$  and  $g \in G$  define  $g \star \mathcal{S} = \{g \star x_1, \dots, g \star x_I\}$ . Ditto for  $g \star L$ . From lemma 2, we know that  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, g \star x) = g \star \mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ .

**Lemma 12.** *Let notation be as above. The following properties hold:*

1.  $\mathcal{S}_{g \star x} = g \star \mathcal{S}$ .
2.  $\mathcal{A}_1(x, g \star x) = g \star \mathcal{A}_1(x, x)$ .
3.  $L_{g \star x} = g \star L$ .
4.  $\mathcal{A}_2(x, g \star x) = g \star \mathcal{A}_2(x, x)$ .

*Proof.* To prove the first item, note that  $\mathcal{S}_{g \star x}$  is the set of thresholded outputs of  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, g \star x)$ . But  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, g \star x) = g \star \mathcal{A}_0(x, x)$ . So  $\mathcal{S}_{g \star x} = g \star \mathcal{S}$ .

The second part is immediate, since  $\mathcal{A}_1(x, g \star x) = \mathcal{S}_{g \star x} = g \star \mathcal{S} = g \star \mathcal{A}_1(x, x)$ . Finally,

$$\begin{aligned} L_{g \star x} &= \{w \in \mathcal{S}_{g \star x} : \mathcal{A}_1(x, w) = \mathcal{A}_1(x, g \star x)\} \\ &= \{w \in \mathcal{S}_{g \star x} : \mathcal{A}_1(x, w) = g \star \mathcal{A}_1(x, x)\} \\ &= \{w \in \mathcal{S}_{g \star x} : g \star \mathcal{A}_1(x, g^{-1} \star w) = g \star \mathcal{A}_1(x, x)\} \\ &= \{w \in g \star \mathcal{S} : \mathcal{A}_1(x, g^{-1} \star w) = \mathcal{S}\}. \end{aligned}$$

Hence  $L_{g \star x} = g \star L$ . The fourth part, in a similar argument to the second part, is immediate since  $\mathcal{A}_2(x, g \star x) = L_{g \star x} = g \star L = g \star \mathcal{A}_2(x, x)$ .  $\square$

Now we let  $H = \{g \in G : g \star x \in L\}$  and we show  $H$  is a subgroup. For a set  $\mathcal{S}$  we define  $H \star \mathcal{S} = \{h \star w : h \in H, w \in \mathcal{S}\}$ .

**Corollary 1.** *Let notation be as above and assume  $x \in L$ . Let  $H = \{g \in G : g \star x \in L\}$ . Then  $H$  is a subgroup of  $G$  and  $H \star L = L$ . Finally  $|H| = |L| \leq |\mathcal{S}| = O(1/\epsilon_{\min})$ .*

*Proof.* Since our group action is regular, we can define  $H = \{g \in G : g \star x \in L\}$ . Since  $x \in L$  we have  $1 \in H$  and  $H$  is non-empty.

Let  $w \in L$  and let  $g \in H$  be such that  $w = g \star x$ . Recall that  $L = \mathcal{A}_2(x, x)$  and  $\mathcal{A}_2$  takes as input the set  $\mathcal{S}$ . It then computes all  $w \in \mathcal{S}$  such that  $\mathcal{A}_1(x, w) = \mathcal{S}$ .

By definition of  $L$ , we have  $L = \mathcal{A}_2(x, x)$ . Note that, for any  $w \in L$ , we have  $\mathcal{A}_1(x, w) = \mathcal{A}_1(x, x)$  by definition, and thus we immediately see that  $\mathcal{A}_2(x, w) = \mathcal{A}_2(x, x)$ , since we will prune identically in both cases. Finally, we have

$$\mathcal{A}_2(x, w) = \mathcal{A}_2(x, g \star x) = g \star \mathcal{A}_2(x, x) = g \star L$$

Hence  $g \star L = L$ . It follows that  $H \star L = L$ .

(As an aside, going back to  $g \star L = L$ , by induction we have  $g^n \star L = L$  for all integers  $n$ . Hence the order of  $g$  is at most  $|L|$ .)

Finally, let  $g_1, g_2 \in H$ . By definition of  $\mathcal{A}_2$ , this means  $\mathcal{A}_2(x, g_1 \star x) = \mathcal{A}_2(x, g_2 \star x)$ . But this implies  $g_1 \star L = g_2 \star L =: L$ . Then  $\mathcal{A}_2(x, (g_1 g_2) \star x) = g_1 \star \mathcal{A}_2(x, g_2 \star x) = g_1 \star L = L$ . Hence,  $g_1 g_2 \in H$ .  $\square$

The outcome of all this is that  $L$  is a coset of a subgroup  $H$  of  $G$ . Just like in [MZ22], we can output a complete subgroup  $H$  in which our solution is guaranteed to lie.

### 3.7 Putting It All Together

We are now in a position to state an overall algorithm. We are given a group action  $(G, \mathcal{X}, \star)$ , a fixed  $x$ , and an oracle  $\mathcal{A}$ . First, we do several precomputations: We run Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_\epsilon$  to compute  $\epsilon_{\min}$ , and then Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_I$  to compute  $I$ , and finally we use Algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_2$  to compute the list  $L$  and hence the subgroup  $H$ . The cost of the precomputation is  $O\left(\frac{\lambda^2 \lambda'}{\epsilon} + \frac{\lambda''}{\epsilon^4}\right)$ , assuming  $\lambda > 5$ .

When provided with a GA-CDH challenge  $(x, y, z)$  we run  $\mathcal{A}_2(y, z, I, T)$ , which does the pruning to  $\mathcal{S}$  and outputs  $L$ , which is a coset with respect to a subgroup  $H$ .

**Lemma 13.** *The probability that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  does not output a correct  $L$  (meaning that  $L$  is a complete coset of a subgroup  $G/H$  for some subgroup  $H$ ) decays exponentially in  $\lambda, \lambda'$ , and  $\lambda''$  assuming  $\lambda > 5$ .*

*Proof.* This follows from Lemmas 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and Corollary 1.  $\square$

This essentially allows us to minimize our error exponentially by only growing  $\lambda'$  and  $\lambda''$  linearly.

### 3.8 Using the Subgroup

At this point, we can go back to the template of [MZ22]. Once we have the appropriate set  $L$ , we just need to follow their approach for finishing the overall algorithm. We mirror both their techniques and presentation in this subsection. While we could just cite their results, we present them here for the sake of completeness and point out the text here is only slightly modified from their work.

*Removing Superfluous Information.* We will next want to run quantum period-finding algorithms which make queries to  $\mathcal{A}_2$  on superpositions of inputs. These algorithms, however, assume  $\mathcal{A}_2$  is a function. Unfortunately, our algorithm generates significant side information, namely all the intermediate computations used to arrive at the final answer. Fortunately, since our algorithm outputs a single answer with overwhelming probability, we can use the standard trick of purifying the execution of  $\mathcal{A}_2$  and then un-computing all the intermediate values. The result is that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  is negligibly close to behaving as the function mapping  $(y, z) \mapsto H \star \text{CDH}(y, z)$ . From now on, we will therefore assume that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  is such a function.

*Computing  $H$ .* Given algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_2$ , we can compute the subgroup  $H$  using quantum period-finding [BL95]. Concretely, the function  $a \mapsto \mathcal{A}_2(a \star x, x)$  will output  $(aH) \star x$ , which is periodic with set of periods  $H$ . Therefore, applying quantum period finding to the procedure  $a \mapsto \mathcal{A}_2(a \star x, x)$  will recover  $H$ . This will make  $O(\log |G|)$  calls to  $\mathcal{A}_2(a \star x, x)$ .

*Solving DLog in  $G/H$ .* Notice that  $\mathcal{A}_2$  is a (near) perfect CDH-solver, just in the group action corresponding to  $G/H$ . Concretely, the group  $G/H$  acts on the set  $X/H := \{H \star y : y \in X\}$  in the obvious way; the distinguished element of  $X/H$  is  $H \star x$ . Our algorithm  $\mathcal{A}_2$  gives a perfect CDH algorithm for this group action: we compute  $\text{CDH}(H \star y, H \star z)$  as  $\mathcal{A}_2(y', z')$  for an arbitrary  $y' \in H \star y, z' \in H \star z$ .

We apply Galbraith et al. [GPSV21] to our CDH adversary for  $(G/H, X/H)$  to obtain a DLog adversary  $\mathcal{B}(gH \star x)$  which computes  $gH$ . For completeness, we sketch the idea: Let  $\mathbf{a}$  be a set of generators for  $G/H$ . Since  $G$  is abelian, we can write any  $g$  as  $\mathbf{a}^{\mathbf{v}}$  for some vector  $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_{n_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{n_k}$  where  $n_i$  is the period of  $a_i$ . We assume the  $n_i$  are fully reduced, so that the choice of  $\mathbf{v}$  is unique. Shor's algorithm is used in this step, and we note that Shor's algorithm will not necessarily work if  $G$  is not abelian and our group action is not regular, which is why we need this restriction.

The CDH oracle allows, given  $h \star (H \star x)$ , to compute  $h^y \star (H \star x)$  in  $O(\log y)$  steps using repeated squaring. Given a DLog instance  $g \star (H \star x) = \mathbf{a}^{\mathbf{v}} \star (H \star x)$ , we define the function  $(\mathbf{x}, y) \mapsto \mathbf{a}^{\mathbf{x} + y\mathbf{v}} \star (H \star x)$ , which can be computed using the CDH oracle<sup>6</sup>. Then this function is periodic with period  $(\mathbf{v}, -1)$ . Running quantum period-finding therefore gives  $\mathbf{v}$ , which can be used to compute  $h$ .

*Solving DLog in  $G$ .* We now have an algorithm which solves, with overwhelming probability, DLog in  $G/H$ . We now turn this into a full DLog adversary, which works as follows:

- Given  $y = c \star x$ , first apply the DLog adversary for  $G/H$ , which outputs  $cH$ .
- For each  $a \in cH$  (which is polynomial sized), test if  $y = a \star x$ . We output the unique such  $a$ .

<sup>6</sup> The original paper [GPSV21] needed to solve close vector problems in the relation lattice, but Wesolowski [Wes22] (proof of Theorem 3) has shown that one can bypass this by using the CDH oracle.

Overall, assuming  $\epsilon$  is small relative to  $\log |G|$ , the running time of the algorithm is dominated by the cost of running  $\mathcal{A}_2$ .

### 3.9 Extending to Non-Regular Group Actions

We also borrow the text in this section almost verbatim from [MZ22] for the sake of completeness. The above assumed a regular group action, which captures all the cryptographic abelian group actions currently known. Here, we briefly sketch how to extend to an arbitrary abelian group action. The idea is that, within any abelian group action, we can pull out a regular group action, and then apply the reduction above.

Concretely, we first consider restricting  $(G, X, \star)$  to the orbit of  $x$  under  $G$ , namely  $G \star x$ . Let  $S \subseteq G$  be the set of  $a$  that “stabilizes”  $x$ , namely  $a \star x = x$ . Then  $S$  is a subgroup. Moreover, for any  $y \in G \star x$ , the set of  $a$  that stabilize  $y$  is also exactly  $S$ .

The first step is to compute the (representation of the) subgroup  $S$ . Let  $f : G \rightarrow X$  be defined as  $f(a) = a \star x$ . Then  $f$  is an instance of the abelian hidden subgroup problem with hidden subgroup exactly  $S$ . Therefore, we can find  $S$  using Shor’s quantum algorithm.

Then we can define the new group action  $(G/S, G \star x, \star)$ , which is a regular abelian group action. CDH in this group action is identical to CDH in the original group action, in that a CDH adversary for one is also a CDH adversary for the other. We can also solve DLog in  $(G, X, \star)$  by solving DLog in  $(G/S, G \star x, \star)$ , and then lifting  $a \in G/S$  to  $a' = (a, g) \in G$  for an arbitrary  $g \in S$ .

The main challenge is that our CDH adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  may not always output elements in  $G \star x$ , and it may be infeasible to tell when it outputs an element in  $G \star x$  versus a different orbit. Nevertheless, the same reduction as used above applies, and the analysis can be extended straightforwardly but tediously to handle the fact that  $\mathcal{A}$  may output elements in different orbits. The rough idea is that  $S$  outputted by  $\mathcal{A}_1$  may have pieces from elements from different orbits. But  $S \cap G \star x$  is still going to contain a solution, and elements in different cosets will be pruned since they are inherently unreachable. This is enough to ensure that we obtain a near-perfect CDH algorithm on  $(G/S)/H$ .

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## A Example: Discrete Gaussian

The purpose of this Appendix is to explain a special case of oracle for the group action problem that is a bad case for our reduction. Indeed, we are inclined to believe that this case is the worst case for any reduction from DLog to CDH for group actions. Unfortunately, there are a number of difficulties in actually formalizing a lower bound to show this, but we wanted to go ahead and present some intuition for why this is true.

Let  $0 < q < 1$  and define

$$M_q := \sum_{n \in \mathbb{Z}} q \exp(-\pi(qn)^2)$$

We have

$$M_q \approx q \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \exp(-\pi(qx)^2) dx = 1.$$

From now on we assume  $1 \leq M_q < 1.05$ , which is the case for  $0 < q < 0.999$ .

Define a distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  on  $\mathbb{Z}$  as follows: The probability to sample  $i \in \mathbb{Z}$  is  $(q/M_q) \exp(-\pi(qi)^2)$ . Note that the probability of sampling 0 is close to  $q$ , and the standard deviation is proportional to  $1/q$ .

Let  $G$  be a group acting on  $\mathcal{X}$  as above. Suppose the oracle  $\mathcal{A}(a \star x, b \star x)$  returns outputs distributed in the following way: An integer  $i$  is sampled from the above distribution  $\mathcal{D}$ , and the output is  $(g^i ab) \star x$ , where  $g$  is a fixed element of the group  $G$  of order much larger than  $1/q$  (so that no set of  $O(1/q)$  consecutive powers of  $g$  is a subgroup of  $G$ ).

We consider how such an oracle behaves with our reduction. Note that  $\epsilon \approx q$ .

First we study the gap in probabilities between consecutive elements of the distribution  $\mathcal{D}$ . By approximating  $e^x \approx 1 + x$  we have, for  $n > 0$ ,

$$q \exp(-\pi(qn)^2) - q \exp(-\pi(q(n+1))^2) \approx 2\pi q^3 n.$$

Hence, there is a gap of size at least  $O(1/\epsilon^2)$  only when  $n > 1/\epsilon$ . This is consistent with the results earlier in our paper. This example shows that the results in the paper cannot be improved without vastly different techniques (if at all), as for this example the biggest gap really is only of size proportional to  $1/\epsilon^2$  and there is no larger gap (note that when  $n$  is larger than  $1/q$  then the approximation  $e^x \approx 1 + x$  is no longer valid).

Now we consider the problem of determining which outputs of the oracle are the correct ones. Let  $z = (g^u ab) \star x$  be a candidate value. The general approach, following [MZ22], is to run  $\mathcal{A}_0(x, z)$  a number of times and to compare the outputs with the original samples from  $\mathcal{A}_0(a \star x, b \star x)$ . In our paper this is done by thresholding. But one could consider other methods to distinguish distributions.

The main observation of this appendix is to explain that there is unlikely to exist a method that distinguishes  $(gab) \star x$  from  $(ab) \star x$  in fewer than  $O(1/\epsilon^2)$  queries to  $\mathcal{A}$ . To do this, we denote by  $\mathcal{D} + u$  the shifted distribution on  $\mathbb{Z}$ , which

has mean  $u$ . So the probability of sampling  $j$  from  $\mathcal{D} + u$  is proportional to  $q \exp(-\pi(q(j-u))^2)$ . We will show that the *squared Hellinger distance* between  $\mathcal{D}$  and  $\mathcal{D} + 1$  is at least a constant times  $\epsilon^2$ . It then follows from standard results (see below) that there is no statistical test that distinguishes  $\mathcal{D}$  and  $\mathcal{D} + 1$  without making at least constant times  $1/\epsilon^2$  samples from the distributions.

The Squared Hellinger distance  $d_H^2(f_1, f_2)$  on two distributions on a finite set  $Z$  is defined to be

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{z \in Z} \left( \sqrt{f_1(z)} - \sqrt{f_2(z)} \right)^2 = 1 - \sum_{z \in Z} \sqrt{f_1(z)f_2(z)}.$$

The restriction to finite sets is not too serious, since we may truncate our Gaussian after 6 or 7 standard deviations and it will be indistinguishable from the true Gaussian (and, anyway, we are working with a finite group  $G$  so the distribution really is finite).

We claim that the Squared Hellinger distance behaves as  $d_H^2((\mathcal{D} + u), \mathcal{D}) \geq (\text{const})u^2q^2$ .

Here is a sketch argument. Note that

$$\begin{aligned} d_H^2((\mathcal{D} + u), \mathcal{D}) &= (q/2) \sum_{i \in Z} \left( e^{-\frac{1}{2}\pi q^2(i-u)^2} - e^{-\frac{1}{2}\pi q^2 i^2} \right)^2 \\ &= (q/2) \sum_i \left( e^{-\pi q^2(i-u)^2} - 2e^{-\frac{1}{2}\pi q^2(i-u)^2} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\pi q^2 i^2} + e^{-\pi q^2 i^2} \right). \end{aligned}$$

The exponent in the middle term boils down to  $\frac{1}{2}\pi q^2(2i^2 - 2iu + u^2) = \frac{1}{2}\pi q^2(2(i-u/2)^2 + 3u^2/4) = \pi q^2((i-u/2)^2 + 3u^2/8)$ . Hence the distance can be approximated as

$$\begin{aligned} (q/2) &\left( 2 \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^{-\pi q^2 x^2} dx - 2e^{-\pi q^2 3u^2/8} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} e^{-\pi q^2 x^2} dx \right) \\ &= (q/2) \left( 2/q - (2/q)e^{-\pi q^2 3u^2/8} \right) \\ &= 1 - e^{-\pi q^2 3u^2/8} \\ &\approx \pi q^2 3u^2/8. \end{aligned}$$

We quote the following result (Proposition 11.8 of [Lee20]). For proofs and theoretical background we refer to Chapter 2. of [Tsy08].

**Theorem 3.** *Let  $f_1, f_2$  be two distributions on a finite set  $Z$ . Any algorithm that distinguishes between  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  with probability at least  $2/3$  requires  $\Theta(1/d_H^2(f_1, f_2))$  samples.*

Our conclusion is that any reduction from DLog to CDH for group actions that follows the template of [MZ22] must take at least  $(\text{const})/\epsilon^2$  queries to the CDH oracle to distinguish  $(ab) \star x$  from  $(gab) \star x$  in the discrete Gaussian case.

Hence we do not expect a reduction to exist that requires fewer than  $(const)/\epsilon^2$  oracle queries in the worst case. By “template” we mean any algorithm that works by obtaining a sample distribution that includes  $(ab) \star x$  and then tests certain values  $z$  from that distribution by again computing a sample distribution and computing the statistical distance between them (for some choice of distance). However, we cannot rule out a totally different approach to reductions from DLog to CDH that bypasses this obstacle. While we view it as unlikely, it might be possible to use the computation of the group action or CDH oracle itself in such a reduction to circumvent these restrictions.